Brief
Q&A: The Wagner Group’s new life after the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin
Discussion on changes in Russian mercenary activities in Africa post Prigozhin's death.
Q&A with
Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia
ACLED Africa Regional Specialist and Associate Analysis Coordinator for West Africa
How has Russian mercenary activity in Africa been affected by the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin on 23 August 2023 and the subsequent formation of Africa Corps? In this Q&A, ACLED’s Africa Regional Specialist Ladd Serwat and Associate Analysis Coordinator for West Africa Héni Nsaibia say Russia has taken the opportunity to step up military activity, more closely control mercenary operations, and expand its footprint on the continent.
In the year since the death of Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, what has changed for Russian mercenaries in Africa’s Sahel?
Ladd Serwat: The most important thing to be said is that, even after the death of the Wagner Group’s Yevgeny Prigozhin, violence involving Russian mercenaries has increased in Africa. In the fourth quarter of 2023, ACLED data show that activity doubled from the previous quarter — whether it was under the name of Wagner or any of its successor organizations like ‘Africa Corps.’ The first two quarters of 2024 also saw more Russian mercenary-related political violence events in Africa than when Prigozhin was alive (see graph below).
One year ago, Russian Wagner mercenaries already appeared to have become an indispensable actor in the Sahel, supporting coups, fighting jihadists, defending dictators, and generally taking over from France, the former colonial power. Then came the Wagner Group’s short-lived June 2023 rebellion against the government in Russia, their failed march on Moscow, and, on 23 August 2023, the death of the Wagner Group’s leader Prigozhin and several senior Wagner officials in a suspicious plane crash.
After Prigozhin’s death, many expected Moscow would just shut down the private military company (PMC) and force its mercenaries to either sign contracts with the Russian military or quit. We saw some of this pressure in June 2023 before Prigozhin and Wagner Group staged their revolt and one-day march on Moscow. And while many Wagner mercenaries fighting in Ukraine were pressured to sign with the military, quit, or sign with smaller PMCs, the approach in Africa has been different.
Is that where the name ‘Africa Corps’ comes from? Is the group the same as the Wagner Group?
Ladd Serwat: After some early official Russian reports in late 2023 designated the mercenaries as the Africa Corps, international commentators now often use this name to refer to Russian mercenaries in general.
Héni Nsaibia: Africa Corps is like the new face of the Wagner Group’s involvement in Africa. It serves the Russian state’s strategy in Africa and its effort to rein in, control, and restructure the Wagner Group since Prigozhin’s death.
What do these changes actually look like on the ground, for instance, in Mali?
Héni Nsaibia: We’ve seen more continuity and evolution than an abrupt change in Mali, where Russian mercenaries are currently most active. The structure appears to remain the same, supposedly under the leadership of Ivan Maslov, but he now seems to be assisted or overseen by officers from the main Russian military intelligence organization.
Why has Mali become so violent?
Héni Nsaibia: Mali’s been in crisis since 2012. The violence took on regional proportions after France’s intervention, the arrival of jihadi groups, and the spread of the insurgency to other Sahel states. The current Malian and Russian offensive includes high levels of civilian targeting against northern Mali groups like Tuareg, Arabic-speaking tribes, and Fulani. FAMa and the Wagner Group have engaged in the pillaging of artisanal gold mines; the seizing of vehicles; and the arrest, interrogation, and summary executions of people who get in the way. There’s no ambiguity about it: The joint offensive involves moving out as many unwanted people as they can.
Beyond Mali, what else has changed over the past year for Russian mercenaries in Africa?
Ladd Serwat: Since the Wagner Group started operating on the African continent, ACLED has tracked political violence linked to the group in seven countries: Libya, CAR, Chad, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, and Mauritania. Beyond political violence, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs have been involved in other activities, such as disinformation campaigns in the Democratic Republic of Congo and political intervention in Madagascar.
Ladd Serwat: In CAR, the Wagner Group and the military — along with allied armed groups — had initial success in suppressing levels of violence carried out by rebels in late 2020 and 2021. It also provided support in taking back numerous areas from various armed groups. However, this has yet to fully resolve the capacity for rebels to regroup and conduct smaller offensives. For example, in the later part of 2022 and early 2023, political violence rose once again following a rebel offensive. Like before, the Wagner Group and other allies were able to defend positions across the country, but numerous armed groups continue to operate in CAR. We are also seeing rising political violence in CAR again in recent months amid a rise in rebel group activity. While it is too early to understand the Wagner Group’s response fully, this exemplifies the limited capacity of the mercenaries to pacify violence in the country.
Ladd Serwat and Héni Nsaibia were in conversation with Gina Dorso, ACLED’s Communications Coordinator, and Hugh Pope, former Chief of External Affairs.
