25 years after 9/11: al-Qaeda’s most active affiliates today

Twenty-five years later, al-Qaeda remains, but global jihadism no longer revolves around one organisation, one leadership or one geographical centre. Its descendants, affiliates, breakaways and rivals have become embedded in conflicts thousands of miles from Afghanistan.
 

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN: Where did the post-9/11 jihadist landscape go?

Pearl Pandya, South Asia Senior Analyst at ACLED, said: 

“If you start with 9/11, Afghanistan was at the center of the story because the Taliban was hosting al-Qaeda. Twenty-five years later, the Taliban is back in power — but the jihadist landscape around it looks very different. Not only are multiple militant groups pursuing their own agendas within Afghanistan, but it is neighboring countries in South and Central Asia that face heightened risk of violence. 

“Al-Qaeda continues to enjoy a permissive operative environment in Afghanistan under the Taliban. For the most part, its role is limited to providing training and support to the other militant groups active in Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent has, however,  shown signs of growing activity, with a car bombing in New Delhi in November 2025 and reported attempts to establish cells in Bangladesh.   

 “Among the groups enjoying al-Qaeda’s backing are the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, and the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP), both currently waging an insurgency in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Their threat is primarily local rather than transnational — directed against the Pakistani state — but the Afghan Taliban’s perceived support for these groups nevertheless triggered a prolonged conflict between the two countries in 2026, destabilizing the wider region. For Pakistan, the TTP poses one of the biggest internal security threats: according to ACLED data, TTP activity so far in 2026 has exceeded levels in the same period last year — itself one of Pakistan’s most violent years in over a decade.“
 

IRAQ & SYRIA: How did al-Qaeda lose control of its own affiliates In Iraq and Syria?

ACLED’s Syria analyst, Muaz Al Abdullah, said: 

“Today, neither Iraq nor Syria is a major centre of al-Qaeda activity. Instead, they show two very different ways in which the al-Qaeda movement fractured, with local armed groups using affiliation with al-Qaeda as an opportunistic tool.”

“In Iraq, friction existed from the beginning between central al-Qaeda leadership and its local affiliate led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The latter didn’t accept al-Qaeda’s limits on its operations, instead becoming increasingly extreme and independent, eventually leading to the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Islamic State of Iraq later broke from al-Qaeda in 2014, after attempting to merge with the Syrian Jabhat al-Nusra to become the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant .

“In Syria, the Syrian Revolution in 2011 provided al-Baghdadi with an opportunity to set up a like-minded group in neighboring Syria in the name of Jabhat al-Nusra. However, Jabhat al-Nusra clashed with Islamic State in Iraq and eventually pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2013, as a tactical move to preserve its position among the jihadist movements in Syria. Once the threat of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant diminished, Jabhat al-Nusra broke with al-Qaeda in 2016 and continued with its local project in Syria under Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — ultimately toppling the Assad regime.

“Neither group was a direct vehicle for al-Qaeda’s central leadership. Instead, both groups had their own ambitions that treated the affiliation with al-Qaeda as a resource and broke away once it stopped being useful. 

“Al-Baghdadi broke with al-Qaeda because its leadership stood in the way of his ambitions to seize territory and establish a caliphate. HTS broke for almost the opposite reason: its ties to al-Qaeda had become an obstacle to building a locally focused movement in Syria.”
 

THE SAHEL — Has al-Qaeda found a new centre of gravity? JNIM's extraordinary expansion and growing regional reach.

Heni Nsaibia, Senior Analyst for the Sahel, said: 

“If you’re looking for where al-Qaeda’s affiliates have gained the most momentum, the Sahel is increasingly difficult to ignore.

“JNIM has expanded from its strongholds in northern and central Mali across much of Burkina Faso and into Niger, Benin, Togo, and Nigeria. In February 2026, it launched a coordinated region-wide offensive across the central Sahel and into Benin.

“And the expansion is continuing. JNIM has pushed towards major cities and critical infrastructure, including attacks targeting airports in Bamako and Niamey, while increasingly competing with Islamic State for influence across the region.

“So this looks very different from the al-Qaeda model we were talking about after 9/11. JNIM is part of the global al-Qaeda network, but its strength comes from being deeply embedded in local conflicts — exploiting grievances, building relationships with communities and armed groups, and steadily extending its reach across borders.

“The question now is whether the Sahel is becoming a new centre of gravity for the al-Qaeda movement.”
 

SOMALIA: How powerful is al-Qaeda’s East African affiliate?

Dr Ladd Serwat, Senior Analyst for Africa, said:

“Somalia offers another illustration of al-Qaeda’s strength. Al-Shabaab is the country’s dominant non-state armed group and the most violent al-Qaeda affiliate globally. ACLED records over 2,300 political violence events involving al-Shabaab so far in 2026, accounting for nearly half of all recorded violence involving al-Qaeda affiliates worldwide this year. 

“The group has continued its long-running insurgency, with violence highest in Lower Shabelle so far in 2026, and maintains control over extensive rural areas throughout central and southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab also generates extensive revenue through networks across Somalia and the wider region, despite some weakening of these operations in Mogadishu.

“In the year ahead, uncertainty over international security support could create further opportunities for the group. The announced US withdrawal of financial and logistical support for the United Nations Support Office in Somalia by December 2026 threatens the sustainability of the African Union peacekeeping operations supported by this funding. Reducing the African “Union's operational capacity could enable al-Shabaab to recapture territory and intensify pressure on government-held towns in 2027.”
 

YEMEN: What remains of one of al-Qaeda's most important branches? Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) diminished militarily but survived, embedding locally and facilitating connections across the Red Sea.

Sherwan Ali, Analyst for Yemen, said:

“AQAP was once one of al-Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliates, with both territorial ambitions inside Yemen and the capacity to carry out attacks internationally. Today, it is considerably weaker militarily — but it has proved remarkably difficult to eliminate.

“ACLED recorded a 70% fall in AQAP activity in the first seven months of 2026, from 63 events last year to just 19. But that doesn’t necessarily mean the group is disappearing. It still has at least around 2,000 fighters, has used gaps in counter-terrorism pressure to regroup, and is working to embed itself more deeply within local tribal communities. The looming resumption of large-scale war between the Houthis and the Aden-based government could also allow the group to re-establish itself militarily. 

“And AQAP may now be playing another role: as a regional facilitator. Its position on Yemen’s southern coast and links with al-Shabaab make it an important node that  enables the exchange of weapons, drone technology and expertise across illicit trade networks in the Red Sea.

“So AQAP is a good example of what survival can look like for an al-Qaeda affiliate: much less visible militarily, but locally embedded, adaptable and connected to a wider regional network.”