Is the new Syrian state ISIL’s main target?

On 20 June 2026, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) killed two members of the Syrian army in the village of Salha in Manbij countryside. This attack came after a series of three other attacks that targeted the Syrian army and police forces in June: on a fuel tanker near Manbij, and on government personnel in Damascus and Raqqa. The Raqqa attack on a police headquarters on 15 June involved suicide explosive belts — a tactic used for the first time since December — killing two ISIL members, two police officers, and injuring three others. This targeted assault on a fortified facility allowed ISIL to assess government readiness, signaling a phase of active preparation, rebuilding supply networks, and recruitment.

Muaz Al Abdullah, Middle East Research Manager at ACLED, said:

“ISIL's decision to target this fortified security facility in the western sector of the city suggests that the group was seeking to achieve both symbolic and tactical objectives. Had the attack been directed against less protected security positions on the outskirts of the city or in rural areas, it could have resulted in significantly higher casualties. Instead, ISIL appears to have intended to demonstrate its capability to strike hardened security targets, thereby projecting strength and resilience. Such messaging is likely to play an important role in the group’s recruitment efforts.

“This comes as ACLED records 83 political violence events involving ISIL between 1 January and 20 June 2026:

• 80% of events were armed clashes
• Deir ez-Zor: Accounts for 50% of the 2026 total so far.
• Raqqa: Remains a secondary focus at 20%.
• Aleppo: Emerged as a new front, recording 12 events (roughly 15% of the total) after being almost absent in earlier periods.

“ACLED data shows that ISIL’s targeting in 2026 is focused primarily on government forces, who were hit in 52 ISIL attacks so far — compared to 16 across 2025 — as targeting shifted entirely onto them from February onward, with no attacks against the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) recorded for the rest of the period. This coincided with the SDF’s merger with government forces in January, which allowed government forces to deploy across many areas of eastern Syria. The new wave of attacks in 2026 comes in the aftermath of the closure of several long-standing files related to camps and detention facilities holding ISIL members during January and February, following battles between the Syrian government forces and the SDF. 

“Through these operations, Syrian government forces managed to control several detention facilities and camps that housed ISIL members, including al-Hol and al-Shaddadi camps in al-Hasaka Province, as well as al-Aqtan Prison in Raqqa. However, operational challenges and security gaps during these operations enabled a large number of key ISIL members to escape, helping the group regain momentum and conduct more attacks across northern and northeastern Syria during the first quarter of 2026.

“Following the fall of the Assad regime, ISIL attempts to shift its activities from the desert to urban centers across Syria, but this exposes the group to a government security campaign that has so far limited its ability to operate. In this context, ISIL may return to its old operations in peripheral areas, targeting less secure positions, especially oil supply routes from Iraq.”