Nohad Eltayeb on how Middle East tensions are reshaping Sudan’s war economy

Nohad Eltayeb, Senior Research Assistant at ACLED, said: 

“The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are beginning to feel the strain of the conflicts in the Middle East. The group has long depended on regional supply routes backed by the United Arab Emirates that pass through neighboring countries like Chad and South Sudan. As it faces new pressures, the UAE will likely struggle to provide the same level of support to Chad, South Sudan, and Ethiopia — all countries it has invested in through economic support and other forms of engagement. Subsequently, with global economic pressures forcing local actors to realign themselves, it is unlikely that these states will continue facilitating the RSF’s transit routes in the same way as before the Iran war. 

“Chad is already the clearest example of this shift, compounded by its own internal dynamics linked to ethnic groups in Darfur and the way elites on both sides are increasingly intertwined. The RSF has therefore been forced to use longer alternative routes to bypass border issues, which has increased fuel prices in regions it controls and affected its ability to govern and sustain operations.

“The same economic consequences are felt by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as it struggles to rebuild infrastructure and restore basic services through economic investments from Saudi Arabia — another key player that is affected by the Iran war. However, the SAF has a geographic advantage because it controls Port Sudan and the eastern side of the country, which is closer to the Red Sea and is the country’s main import and export hub. 

“These external pressures are not just logistical — they are also reshaping internal dynamics. Both sides are likely to face increasing defections and infighting as resources tighten. For the RSF in particular, this raises the risk of fragmentation, given its decentralized structure and reliance on local and cross-border networks that it consolidated due to a previously thriving war economy.

“Overall, these are a series of indirect effects — mostly economic, but with clear implications for how the conflict evolves. And if regional support declines, there is a real risk that the conflict becomes more fragmented and localized, with cross-border reach, rather than remaining one primarily between the RSF and SAF.”