The TTP’s resurgence lies at the heart of the Afghanistan-Pakistan dispute

Since Thursday evening, fierce fighting has erupted between Afghanistan and Pakistan along their contested border (see map below). This escalation was inevitable. It comes after a year of increasing armed confrontations between the two countries in response to ever-rising militancy by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — which Pakistan accuses Afghanistan of harboring. 

Pakistan’s defense minister claimed that the two countries were now in “open war,” while Afghanistan has pledged to respond to “every evil act from Pakistan.”¹ Though it is unlikely that this will lead to a ground incursion by Pakistan just yet, the situation will remain volatile. 

Pakistan is overwhelmingly the dominant military power. Afghanistan’s decades of experience in waging a guerrilla insurgency, however, could allow it to respond with more unconventional tactics, such as increasing support for anti-Pakistan militant groups. This would strain Pakistan’s already-stressed security forces, who are grappling not only with the TTP but also with increasing Baloch separatism, all while maintaining a heavy presence along the eastern border with India. 

Afghanistan’s attacks along the Durand Line yesterday were a formal retaliation for Pakistani airstrikes over the weekend of 21 February, which targeted suspected militant camps in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar and Paktika provinces. These strikes, in turn, were prompted by a series of deadly militant attacks earlier in the month — including a suicide bombing by the Islamic State in Islamabad and the TTP’s multi-pronged assault in Bajaur. Pakistan claimed that the attackers were Afghan nationals.

The fighting rapidly escalated and spread across and beyond the border as Pakistani airstrikes hit the capital city of Kabul as well as Kandahar, the spiritual center of the Taliban and where its chief, Hibatullah Akhundzada, is believed to reside. While Pakistan had struck Kandahar province during the previous bout of fighting in October 2025, an attack on government buildings in Kandahar city would be considered an escalation. 

The TTP’s resurgence lies at the heart of the dispute. The TTP was involved in over 1,000 violent incidents across Pakistan in 2025, making it one of the most violent years ACLED has recorded in over a decade. In 2026 so far, ACLED records more TTP attacks and clashes with security forces than at the same time last year. 

There is, however, no easy solution to this rising militancy. Pakistan needs Afghanistan’s support to control it, as the porous border allows the militants to retreat to a safe haven. The Afghan Taliban, however, appears unwilling to crack down on the TTP, partly due to ideological and historical ties between the two groups but also out of fear of TTP militants defecting to its main rival, the Islamic State Khorasan Province. These genuine concerns notwithstanding, blaming Afghanistan also allows Pakistan to deflect attention from its own failings. It has so far sought to avoid political engagement with Pashtun groups and a sustained military operation in the militant strongholds — both of which could help curb militancy. In this context, the region is likely to remain a powder keg.