What will happen to the Iranian regime?

US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continue to call on Iranians to overthrow the regime once the military campaign concludes, but a successful popular uprising is unlikely. The public is unarmed, unorganized, and facing one of the most repressive and securitized states in the region.

The US-Israeli targeting is increasingly focused on IRGC bases, Basij infrastructure, and police facilities in an effort to erode the state’s repression capacity. Even under sustained military pressure, the regime retains intelligence and internal security institutions designed to suppress dissent during moments of existential threat. The reports of US-Israeli strikes on Iranian border guard positions in western regions suggest efforts to weaken the regime’s security capacity; weakening border control could create space for armed groups operating along Iran’s periphery.

However, even if such efforts are underway, their effectiveness remains unclear, and the long-term consequences for the regime’s trajectory and the country’s internal stability remain uncertain. In the absence of a cohesive armed opposition or plans for ground operations, meaningful regime change would hinge on large-scale defections within Iran’s security apparatus. Thus far, there is little concrete evidence of mass defections, but prolonged pressure may encourage them. Efforts to project institutional continuity — including the quick establishment of the leadership council — coordinated public state messaging, and visible security deployments indicate that decision-making structures remain functional and that coercive institutions are cohesive, at least for now.

An alternative pathway would be a change from within the system. This could involve selecting a weak supreme leader with curtailed authority, alongside someone from the existing political elite prepared to pursue a more pragmatic course. Even this outcome would require a sustained campaign to weaken and, over time, marginalize hardline elements within the IRGC. If, however, the United States and Israel are ultimately pursuing full regime change, this would entail a far longer, more costly, and significantly more destabilizing process, with severe implications for Iran and the wider region.