ACLED’s methodology on Central Asia and the Caucasus

Also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, it is a breakaway state existing within the borders of Azerbaijan. Formerly the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, it declared independence from the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) in 1991 following a referendum. This led to the three-year Nagorno-Karabakh War, which ended with a ceasefire. The majority population of Artsakh are ethnically Armenian, and were supported by Armenia during the war with Azerbaijan.

Armenia continues to support the independence of Artsakh, although official Armenian military deployment within the territory seems to be rare.

For areas under the control of Artsakh, ACLED uses the internal administrative divisions of the de facto state rather than those of the de jure state (Azerbaijan), given that sources will most often reference the former when attributing an event location. Currently, the Republic of Artsakh divides itself into the following Admin 1 regions: Shahumyan, Martakert, Askeran, Hadrut, Martuni, Shushi, Kashatagh, Stepanakert. These regions roughly correspond to the following official Admin 1 regions of Azerbaijan: All of the Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli, Zangilan, Jabrayil, Shusha, Khojali districts, Khankendi city, Shusha city, as well as parts of the Tartar, Agdam, Khojavend and Fizuli districts.

The government and armed forces of Artsakh are represented by the following actors:

• Government of Artsakh (2007-)
• Military Forces of Artsakh (2007-)
• Police Forces of Artsakh (2007-)

South Ossetia is a breakaway state existing nominally within the borders of Georgia, and recognized by Russia and several other states. Similarly to Artsakh, South Ossetia declared independence from the Georgian SSR in 1991. This declaration led to a series of wars between Georgia and South Ossetia / Russia, the last of which being the five-day Russo-Georgian War in 2008. Many consider South Ossetia to be under Russian military occupation (Belgium UN, 8 August 2019).

For areas under the control of South Ossetia, ACLED uses the internal administrative divisions of the de facto state rather than those of the de jure state (Georgia), given that sources will most often reference the former when attributing an event location. Currently, the Republic of South Ossetia – the State of Alania divides itself into the following Admin 1 regions: Dzau, Leningor, Tskhinvali, and Znaur districts. These regions roughly correspond to the following official Admin 1 regions of Georgia: Small parts of the Racha-Lechkhumi and Kvemo Svaneti, Imereti, Mtskheta-Mtianeti regions, and the northern half of Shida Kartli region.

The government and armed forces of South Ossetia are represented by the following actors:

• Government of South Ossetia (2017-)
• Military Forces of South Ossetia (2017-)
• Police Forces of South Ossetia (2017-)
  

Abkhazia is another breakaway state nominally within northwestern Georgia, which first declared independence in 1992, leading to a war where it was also backed by Russian forces. Abkhazia is named after its primary ethnic group, the Abkhazians; the region experienced a large-scale ethnic cleansing of Georgians following the conflict.

Unlike South Ossetia, Georgia initially recognized the autonomy of Abkhazia, but not its independence. An official pro-Georgian ‘Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia’ was established to govern the region. However, following fighting with separatist groups, the pro-Georgian government was exiled to Tbilisi, where it remains today. For this reason, Georgia has an official Admin 1 region known as the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, which outlines the borders of the de facto state.

The government and armed forces of Abkhazia are represented by the following actors:

• Government of Abkhazia (2014-)
• Military Forces of Abkhazia (2014-)
• Police Forces of Abkhazia (2014-)

People living in contested regions (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Artsakh) are often taken into custody by the local de facto state police for crossing the dividing line. Sources tend to refer to these events as “kidnappings”; however, ACLED codes these events with the ‘Sub-event type’ of “Arrests” given the de facto legitimacy of these state forces within their own territory. This is in line with the way in which ACLED codes arrests by legitimate state forces across the dataset (see page 15 of the ACLED Codebook). As such, most of these “kidnappings” will not be represented in the dataset as they do not meet the threshold of being significantly ‘strategic’ to be included under the ‘Event type’ of ‘Strategic developments’ — those events which can impact trends in disorder.

Ceasefire violations along multiple fronts have been ongoing since the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War and the signing of the Bishkek Protocol in 1994. However, while there are a large number of daily violations reported (an average of over 21 as of 19 October 2019), the lethality of these events is exceptionally low, about two fatalities reported each month. The two main sources that cover the vast majority of ceasefire violence are the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

Covering official reports from both states allows ACLED to triangulate the information and to form a more complete picture. The following notes explain how each circumstance is sourced:

The primary source for this type of event is the Azerbaijan Ministry of Defense (MoD) website, which updates each day with ceasefire violations from the previous day. These events are sourced using a script and translation tool, described in the Appendix at the end of this document.²Note that the Azerbaijan MoD stopped reporting violations into Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic specifically around 2017.

In addition, traditional and new media sources also report on ceasefire events, though these sources tend to largely duplicate the information from the MoD, except in the following cases:

• they report on fatalities or injuries, and/or damage to civilian housing.
• they report events which are more detailed than those of the MoD (i.e: “the ceasefire was violated at X date and X location”). Examples include descriptions of drone attacks, infiltration missions, larger clashes, or the use of heavier weaponry such as missiles and tanks.
• they report events which might not be covered by MoD reports, such as firing into Nakhchivan.

Data from these sources which meet the above criteria are cross-checked with MoD events and additional information is added to coverage of the event where applicable.

On a monthly basis (occasionally with a one or two month delay) the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) releases a document submitted by the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) containing a detailed table of ceasefire violations.

As is the case when coding firing from Armenia/Artsakh into Azerbaijani-controlled territory, traditional and new media are used to supplement data with more detailed coverage. Basic weekly coverage of these supplemental sources is also used to cover the frontline in real-time per ACLED’s publication schedule in order to ensure the delay in UNSC releases impacts trends in the data as minimally as possible. Per standard ACLED processes, a duplication check with the published data is done before submitting new information from UNSC reports.

The Armenian MoD also has a weekly report of the number of violations along the frontline, however these reports are often too vague to be coded as they lack details.

• Some reports refer to “positions on unnamed hills in the X region.” A combination of satellite imagery and known military positions from records has been used to determine the most likely position of these hills in reference to the region given and established front line. The ‘Location’ variable in the dataset is coded in such cases as Nameless Hills (X Region), with a geoprecision of 2, which references a specific set of geo-coordinates.
• Similarly, some reports refer to non-specific “positions along the line of contact” (LoC) in a region. We code these as a single event located at a predetermined point in Martuni province, on the Artsakh side, along the frontline (LoC) between Artsakh and Azerbaijan proper, with a geoprecision of 3. The Location name used for these events is Artsakh-Azerbaijan LoC (Unspecified).

If additional, more specific, incidents are mentioned within the same reports which outline firing on vague locations (hills; unspecified location), these are added as separate events in the data.

• As per general ACLED rules, the use of small arms - alone or in combination with other weapon types - during a single event is coded as ‘Sub-event type’ variable ‘Armed clash’. When heavy weapons are used alone in a specific location, without the use of small arms, the event is coded ‘Sub-event type’ variable ‘Shelling/artillery/missile attack’.

There are two separate gaps in reporting from both the Armenian MFA and the Azerbaijani MoD throughout the 2018-2019 dataset. The first is a missing report from the Armenian MFA to the UNSC in July 2018. It is unclear why this report is missing, although it is believed to be the result of a clerical error. Non-MFA sources continued to report events during this period, so this gap does not represent a gap in the conflict. The second gap occurs between 22 June and 16 July 2019, when the MoD of Azerbaijan reported that there were no ceasefire violations - though the Armenian MFA and a number of other sources detailed specific reports of firing along the Line of Control during that period. ACLED continues to investigate whether these missing reports are retrievable.