Raleigh Report - April 2026

“What cannot be avoided, must be welcomed.”

― William Boyd, Brazzaville Beach

Many times scholars and analysts have reflected on the surprising survival of the Iranian regime. Through the revolutionary upheavals in the late 1970s, the very protracted and bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s, the constant internal power struggles, sanctions, attacks by the global superpower, Israeli infiltration of their elite ranks, and now mass decapitations and destruction, Iran and its military dictatorship have managed a strong degree of internal consistency and control. That is not the same as political stability, and it certainly is not guaranteed to continue. But we find ourselves reflecting once again on how the regime is managing to keep internal alignment from the local to the center. Or maybe it isn’t?

As I write this, there is a chance that the conflict involving the United States and Israel is closing (as President Trump implied as much on 1 April); but equally, it is likely that this is a bluff, and both will find themselves in an intractable war for several years. The central problem is that an emboldened, battered, and more extreme Iran is a very bad and destabilizing neighbor, but so, too, is a broken, fragmented, internally chaotic Iran. Preventing either requires that the Iranian regime have internal coherence, yet be weakened to the point of functioning stability, but no more. That leaves in place a system of repression that will terrorize its own citizens, at the very least. 

To summarize the current situation: Almost 5,000 attacks have occurred across 18 countries in 32 days, with 1,524 fatalities. Iran absorbs 73.9% of all events (more than 3,600) and 88.4% of fatalities (1,347). Tehran province alone has had almost 800 strikes. But Iranian retaliation is geographically broad and largely ineffective (from a military standpoint). Iran struck 14 countries with more than 560 outward attacks and caused at least 70 fatalities. Gulf state and Israeli systems intercepted the vast majority of inbound projectiles, more than 619 times.

What have we learned about conflict during this period? Iran turned time and economic disruption to its advantage, using geography and the region’s economy. Energy infrastructure is a primary Iranian target across the Gulf.  ACLED records 163 energy-sector-related events across Gulf states, hitting oil refineries (BAPCO, Mina al-Ahmadi, SAMREF Yanbu, Fujairah), LNG facilities (Ras Laffan), airports (Dubai, Kuwait, Bahrain), ports (Jebel Ali, Shuaiba, Salalah), and power plants (Sabiya, Doha West) — mostly from drone attacks. 

Iran’s energy revenue potential is bolstered at present, and so it is funding this war quite well. According to reports from US officials, the Strait of Hormuz has been mined as Iran deployed approximately 12 Maham 3 and Maham 7 limpet mines. Where geography isn’t serving Iran’s aims and the ports available outside of the Strait of Hormuz (e.g., Fujairah in the UAE, the Red Sea options for Saudi Arabia) are being used, Iran has taken to hitting those too and destroying regional relationships. 

Iran’s other obvious advantages include its very extensive internal security apparatus and regional militia forces (all of whom have taken several knocks in the past year). We see a “division of labor” emerging: Lebanon as a site of entrenched Israeli conflict with Hezbollah; the Houthis willing to occasionally disturb the alternative shipping routes for energy (i.e., Bab al-Mandab); Iraq’s Iran-aligned militias causing massive trouble within for US infrastructure and personnel and Iraqi domestic politics. As noted in our podcast about the regional overspill of one month, Iraq’s internal security has been sacrificed for Iran’s.  

It appears as of now that the way this war is fought has only enriched and emboldened Iran. This is surprising given how thorough the attacks on Iran and its regime have been over the past month. In particular, Iran’s leadership ranks have been decimated. Israel has killed several layers of Iranian officials in key national powers, in regional areas, and local authorities. Israel has a long history of using assassinations to eliminate the leadership of violent groups, and it is an effective tactic for altering the course of a war. However, it is more effective for destabilizing insurgent groups than states. For insurgents, it often hastens the end of the war in ways favorable to the state opposition, it often reduces the intensity of the conflict, and rarely causes blowback violence. But crucially, the reason it is effective for insurgents is that decapitation alters the hierarchy of power and decision-making — it creates a power vacuum. State systems not only have replacement elites (in fact, often too many wanting to step into the leader’s role), but any state facing the risk of decapitation will have strategies to quickly resolve the power vacuum. 

Iran prepared for such an  assault — although unlikely of this precision and intensity. These preparations allowed for internal consistency and some degree of local independence, especially in how the provinces have stayed under control. The regime still yields tremendous internal force: Of the 1,047 protests recorded in Iran — the largest sustained protest wave in the crisis — 99.2% are pro-regime, transitioning from mourning Ali Khamenei’s death (Phase 1) to endorsing Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession (Phase 4). Six anti-regime protests were recorded and met with lethal force. Virtually all 1,047 protests follow identical templates, and this suggests centralized coordination rather than organic mobilization. Iran publicly executed anti-regime protestors from January and expanded arrests over information sharing and dissent. An estimated 1,441 people were arrested inside Iran for espionage, royalist affiliation, documenting strike damage, Starlink usage, and sending footage to foreign media. At least eight arrest events specifically mention Starlink satellite internet devices, indicating the regime views satellite-based internet as a critical intelligence threat enabling strike coordination and information leakage. There is no avenue for the Iranian population to take advantage of regime weakness if and when it occurs. Even a wounded paramilitary unit is much stronger than an unarmed citizenry. 

This regime is all the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij have, and a web of patronage is structured to directly benefit these loyalists. Further, there are no internationally sanctioned “off ramps” for those who wish to defect. So while there are signs of internal regime weakening — including no ability to communicate and meet, no places to congregate — and  clearly Mossad is deeply embedded within the system, there are also ways that this regime can continue to benefit. The more money Iran is making with the toll system in the Strait, the more assistance it gets from Russia, the more those not directly affected by Iran want to return to cheaper energy, the longer this will go on. 

To clarify, there are at least four possible scenarios at the end of the war. 

The first scenario is that the IRGC falls, and that causes chaos and catastrophe for the region: mass migration, insurgency, and long-running instability that destabilizes the entire region for a decade. 

The second is that the regime keeps up a war of attrition, and the US leaves just because it’s not worth it, with a much more extreme government in Iran. That is currently happening. This scenario will end the expected global future role of the Gulf states as financial, energy, and tourism areas, hold energy prices hostage, and lead to an explosion of Iran-aligned militias throughout the Gulf and massive continued repression internally. 

The third is that the regime changes because the population demands it. This is very unlikely, as they show as little regard for their population as they do for the region at large. 

And the last one is that the regime is so weak that it concedes and makes policy changes, becoming a fragile but contained state, hemmed in by its suspicious and militarized neighbors. This is looking unlikely, but is also the best potential outcome for all. All scenarios are based on different directions of the IRGC. Anything that will happen in Iran unless it is through altering the calculus and cohesion of the IRGC.

Crises can consolidate systems rather than transform them. This one has pushed the regime’s elites toward greater cohesion, and both Moscow and Beijing continue to sustain Iran’s economic and strategic partnerships. There is no new “balance of power” at the end of this, and that means that all manner of relationships are shifting in the Gulf, in the Horn, and between the US and its many strained allies. This imbalance — during a time of shifting geopolitics — is the crack that brings down the wall in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.

For updates and to access our daily crisis data, take a look at our Iran war updates page.

Notes and notions

Despite joking about how I am all bad news, I was still appalled by this month’s information consumption. But overall, I would highly recommend reading those commenting on the war and the politics (and not confusing the two): Iran Analytica by Hamidreza Azizi, Amit Segal, Andrew Fox, and Nadav Eyal. Benoit Faucon at the Wall Street Journal is excellent.

Typically, I turn to Agatha Christie as a soothing mental blanket during these moments, always highly recommended in any form. 

But back to end times: I mean, for the love of God.

Consider watching this very good and short documentary on Somali forces and their fight against Islamic State in the north. The US has done some important work in Somalia, and recent changes may upend that, especially as IS feels emboldened. Excellent research on the Somali branch of IS reveals: “The Islamic State’s Al-Karrar regional office has been based in Somalia since at least late 2018, just one of many such ‘offices’ under the [Islamic State’s General Directorate of Provinces] that function as regional command structures organized to help coordinate all of the Islamic State’s activities and operations in a specific area. Al-Karrar’s purview includes all of eastern, central, and southern Africa, where it helps oversee and manage all of the Islamic State’s official ‘provinces,’ networks, and support activities.” This film includes the use of the very versatile camel, so that is this month’s mention taken care of. 

In case you are looking for an Easter watch with your children, I can recommend (maybe not the exact word…) the Chernobyl miniseries from a few years ago. The children learned something that they needed to know about this disaster, and Sam and I concluded that they should especially know the slow evil of loyalty and ideology to political parties and their extensive ways of destroying lives. 

If more destruction is not to your taste but tragedy is, consider watching Saipan — a film about Roy Keane’s Irish World Cup. It is very good, if a particular niche! A good example of not being wrong, but still losing. 

ACLED webinars

The eastern front: Regional reverberations of the Iran War 
Join ACLED on 16 April, at 1pm London | 2pm Madrid

The war in Iran is creating ripple effects far beyond the Middle East, with South Asia particularly exposed. The confrontation has brought with it profound risks for neighboring Pakistan, exacerbating existing security concerns in the restive Balochistan province at the same time that Pakistan is mired in active conflict with Afghanistan. Existing sectarian fault lines could also be exploited by militant groups to foment instability.

Join us for a timely webinar examining how the Iran conflict is interacting with existing conflict dynamics in Pakistan and Afghanistan. This discussion will explore the interplay between regional conflicts, the role of armed groups, and broader societal impacts. Register now. 

Lebanon in crisis: Escalation dynamics and future scenarios

Over the past weeks, Lebanon has re-emerged as a central point in a widening regional confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Intensifying Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon — particularly along the Litani River — alongside the targeting of civilian infrastructure in Beirut, spark fears of a broader escalation reminiscent of 1982's invasion. 

The webinar covers the consequences of the Iran–US–Israel escalation in Lebanon, how patterns of violence are evolving, how Hezbollah and other actors are positioning themselves, and what risks lie ahead for both Lebanon and the wider region. Watch here. 

Select ACLED in the media!

• We’ve been regularly cited in the news as a growing list of media houses use our data to report on the situation in the Middle East. To list but a few examples, ACLED data have been used to map and track the conflict by The Washington Post, The New York Times,  Al Jazeera, the BBC, and The Economist.
• I was featured on The Telegraph's Battle Lines podcast and was quoted by Ireland’s national broadcaster, the RTÉ, and South Africa’s national broadcaster, the SABC.
• Continuing the coverage of the war, Luca Nevola was quoted in this CNN article, Muaz al-Abdullah spoke to Deutsche Welle, the Associated Press used our data in their reporting, The Telegraph used ACLED data in this scrollytelling piece, and The Wall Street Journal also cited our data.
• Nasser Khdour spoke to The Guardian for an article on Israeli-backed Palestinian militias’ operations against Hamas.
• Bloomberg referred to ACLED data in its article “Why You Should Worry About the Other War on Iran’s Border.”
• Reuters quoted us for an article on JNIM’s kidnapping campaigns in West Africa.
• Héni Nsaibia spoke to Deutsche Welle for an article on jihadist insurgencies in Nigeria.
• Ladd Serwat did an interview with Deutsche Welle about the use of kamikaze drones in the DRC.
• Human Rights Watch referenced our March Africa Regional Overview.
• CNN referenced the fact that we rank Ecuador among the 10 most violent countries in the world.
• Su Mon was widely quoted in this Al Jazeera article on Myanmar’s civil war, and they used our data in another article.