Raleigh Report - July 2025

“Have the night you deserve.” – Grand-mère Macron

Welcome to the summer edition of the Raleigh Report. Forewarning: This is a long report! I apologize! I have two important messages. The first is about our new conflict categories, and the second is about a beloved lost member of our community.

Conflict categories

Conflict observers are often interested in how much conflict is occurring, and ACLED answers in our Index, which documents a drastic increase in conflict incidents across the past five years (from 2019 to 2024). We are also often asked, “how many conflicts are there?” which sounds, to my mind, similar to, “how long is a piece of string?” “How many conflicts” assumes that they all present in the same ways, with clear and identifiable boundaries and agendas. But conflict has very malleable boundaries; many conflicts have vague starting and stopping points; conflicts can also have extended breaks in fighting; the main groups fighting can change; or violence may diffuse into new areas and take on new characteristics. These very common shifts create new and different forms of violence, but are they all characteristics of the same conflict? And what do we lose by presuming that all conflicts present in the same way? Further, why should we not acknowledge change and difference?

Analysts often have their own ideas about how they wish to define a conflict, and these can differ substantially. One analyst may see the recent peace agreement between Rwanda and Democratic Republic of the Congo as the end to a conflict that began in 1994, suggesting it can be defined as a 31-year run with significant internal shifts but retaining the involvement of the government of Rwanda and the government of the DRC. Another analyst may counter that the signing of this peace agreement ignores how most conflict incidents occurring in the DRC do not involve either Rwanda, Rwandan-supported groups, or the DRC’s security forces. Therefore, the DRC’s conflict is likely to continue, albeit through many fragmented armed groups. The overall point is that allowing an analyst to select their own necessary parameters creates far wider and more accurate analysis possibilities, but limits the comparability of “conflict numbers.”

In other cases, analysts will often designate violent activity under a specific mantle. There are generally known differences between a “civil war” and “terrorism” and between a “gang” compared to an “insurgent,” but where those boundaries are drawn is the subject of much debate. As readers will know, ACLED characterizes violence into discrete events involving specific actors and general group types, and this allows for people to aggregate as and how they wish.

But we also wish to make ACLED data and resources as usable as possible. To do so, we developed conflict categories, which function like meta-events. This month, we release five new categories of conflict that will be available in addition to event types. These categories organize events into a broad conflict dynamic, such as repression, rebellion, terrorism, foreign military engagement, and atrocities. We use consistent and transparent criteria grounded in event type, actor behavior, and other key attributes of the data. Relevant events since 2020 and events going forward will be tagged with the larger category within which they fall. The categories are not mutually exclusive: For example, an act of repression may also qualify as an atrocity, etc. We assume that such categories can expand into the future to make the microdata more usable and relevant to our members. A longer discussion of these conflict categories is available on our new website (Live as of 30 July!), along with specific information about how they are defined and coded. All of the ACLED community will be able to download files of the events associated with each of the new conflict categories. 

Rather than review the details of these different categories, allow me to tell you something interesting about each of the conflict types. To begin, these five categories collectively make up 50% of all data in the past year. Given that, more than 6% of people globally were exposed to these types of violence in 2024. What does that mean? 

Effectively, 12% of all state violence we collect and cover counts as repression, which captures state violence against civilians and protesters and is often a sign of broader civil rights abuses. Since 2020, the global rate of repression has steadily increased, peaking in 2024, with Myanmar recording the highest number of events.

Insurgency includes long-running rebel activity, from battles and bombings to abductions, looting, and strategic movements. Many of the world’s longest insurgencies are in Africa, with a growing use of airstrikes and remote attacks. 

This is perhaps nearest to my heart, as conflict analysts are insurgency-obsessed! Do we need another definition? Yes! Mainly to recognize that many acts by rebel groups occur outside of the traditional conflict between insurgents and state forces. Our insurgency conflict category captures the full scope of rebel group activity. Far beyond the rebel and government battles and civilian attacks (accounting for 73% of all rebel activity), we see battles with factions and other rebel groups, militias, and gangs; different types of violence and attacks (bombings, attacks, lootings, sexual violence); and non-violent events (arrests, agreements, and base establishments). A civil war is another world — another whole system of rules and conflict, often operating within and alongside a state-governed system. Capturing this reality, and how prolific and changing this form of conflict is, will produce more accurate and usable analysis.

Atrocities reflect large-scale, intentional civilian killings. These surged after 2022 — especially in Gaza and parts of Africa — and are often linked to displacement and humanitarian crises. In 2024, 1,216 reported atrocities occurred, culminating in — at the very least — 24,000 fatalities from mass killings. Identifying and tracking atrocities is critical for early warning, accountability, and humanitarian response, but equally can go some way to countering misinformation about atrocities and who commits them. 

Ever a glutton for punishment, I am entering the terrorism debates. We define terrorism based on what non-state groups do — their actions — and not on ideology, threats, or former status. This definition has several qualities that differ from others: 1) It is agnostic of any ideology or claims (e.g., cartels are as likely to be named terrorist groups as jihadis); 2) it is action-based rather than threat-based (a group either does or does not have a higher than average rate of civilian targeting relative to other, similar groups); 3) groups can move in and out of a “terrorist” label in their active years as they change strategies or intentions. For example, often armed groups conduct very high rates of civilian targeting during their early period because they are weak and cannot engage armed forces. They may cease this activity as they develop. 4) Countries might have no terrorist groups operating within their territory each year or several groups designated as terrorists, depending on the global average for that year and the rate of activity in that country. As a result of our approach, we can give a more accurate accounting of how many terrorist groups are currently active across the world, which, at the time of writing, includes 57 named groups, and 105 total groups if we also include the unnamed organized gangs who pursue civilians (and similar to how “lone wolves” in the US are increasingly accused of terrorism). In worse news, these numbers are increasing over time. 

Finally, we wished to quantify the impression that there is more conflict from state militaries than in the recent past. Indeed, there is. Foreign military engagement refers to all violent actions and strategic developments committed by state forces outside of their own territory.

A very large proportion of events collected by ACLED involve foreign state engagement. This has been growing substantially since 2022, when 18% of all violent events involved a foreign government acting internationally. Now, that number is beyond 30%. To put that into perspective, one-third of all violent events currently occurring across the world involve an international military. While Russia and Israel constitute the vast majority of cases, the majority modality of these attacks is airstrikes and bombings, and that is quite widespread now.

These categories don’t replace the underlying data — they enhance it. I hope they help you find patterns, track change, and navigate the complex reality of modern conflict.

José

Many readers will now be aware that we lost a wonderful and vital member of our community last month when José Luengo-Cabrera died from breathing complications. He was so young and vibrant: The man practically beamed himself into conversations! José was the conflict analyst community’s most popular member, without a doubt. He had recently started a position at the World Bank working with the wonderful Gary Milante, and we are doubly sad that this duo cannot reap the benefits of their combined work.

Losing a professional colleague infers losses for the future and the field, but for those who worked with José, it goes beyond that. He was a connective net — he knew everyone! And most importantly, he was friendly with everyone. Everyone I corresponded with after his tragic passing mentioned that they had recently spoken with him, which speaks to José’s incredible social prowess. His last messages to me, in addition to his ongoing Trump impressions, were about how he was going to take up looming in Ireland. They included homesteading videos! It looked picturesque and very like José to go headfirst into a strange lifestyle to try it out.  

He made the dreariest meetings fun and delighted in a good debate about how something should develop, what was important, and (frequently) what I should change. He worked with everyone and for all the outlets we regularly read. Again, he was our community’s connection. I will mention in particular his very beautiful visualizations for The Economist.  

Outside the personal loss for all who knew him professionally, we as an organization lost our favorite designer — more people understood conflict because of how José applied ACLED data. We could not be more in debt to him for this service to the organization as a whole, and we will miss him terribly. Please stay tuned for how we wish to memorialize José’s influence on new young talent in our field.

Notes and notions

A late summer version of this newsletter would only include a dissection of the goings-on in Chicken Shop Date as relayed to me by children, so I will spare you.

This article on Macron by Emmanuel Carrere is sheer perfection, as is the man himself, whom I adore. It is generous and perceptive and very … sensory.

My Irish news is maybe too local to be generally useful, but it has been very hot (the sun was splitting the stones, as they say), and there is to be a presidential election. I am not wild about the current president, as he was very fond of making obtuse statements about climate and conflict and a holy show of himself on television. One projected saviour, Joe Duffy (a very Irish version of Joe Rogan, who is incidentally very popular in Ireland), has bowed out of being a presidential contender. Nonetheless, I encourage all who can to give it a go, if only so that this chancer does not win (he has, as he says, the backing of “some very weighted individuals”), and you might be able to become president without anyone noticing.

Look! How incredible! No camel news is too small.

I found this so touching; his concern is palpable.

The August of meals! I love lunch because no one is asking me any questions, and I ask nothing of myself. 

As for books this month, there will be many. I aim to conclude “Conflict” by David Petraeus and Andrew Roberts, which is a masterful sweep through recent wars. It is really quite detailed and engaging! There is no love lost between Petraeus and Donald Rumsfeld, whom he all but calls an incompetent ass. 

I listened to a few books while passing the time watching children’s sports, including “The Haves and Have-Yachts” by Evan Osnos. You come away from it disliking everyone and appreciating that your opinion of the mega-wealthy is entirely justified. Sarah Vine’s “How Not to Be a Political Wife” (to Michael Gove) makes you dislike everyone, including the author and innocent surrounding civilians. I am giving some sideways looks to “On Xi Jinping” by Kevin Rudd, which I purchased at a traffic light. I just don’t know if I have it in me to get through it. Time will tell. 

Webinars

A Red Sea hall of mirrors: US and Houthi statements vs. actions

As regional tensions continue to escalate across the Middle East, the Red Sea crisis remains a flashpoint. Despite the US-Houthi ceasefire, the standoff is far from over. On 1 July, ACLED hosted a webinar to discuss the Red Sea crisis, the broader regional dynamics, and the deeper realities behind public claims. With multiple active frontlines across the Middle East, the webinar explored the gap between rhetoric and action, as well as the implications for regional stability. You can view the webinar recording here. 

ACLED in the media

• ACLED’s data on the Middle East have recently been featured in Al Jazeera, The Economist, and the Austrian newspaper Der Standard. ACLED's Middle East Senior Analyst Ameneh Mehvar also spoke to Newsweek about settler violence in the West Bank, and Salma Eissa, our Middle East Research Manager, was quoted in an El Diario Salvador article on the ceasefire proposal in Gaza.
• The New York Times cited ACLED data on violence targeting local officials in the United States.
• Asia-Pacific Senior Analyst Su Mon was featured in Deutsche Welle in an article that quoted her report The war from the sky: How drone warfare is shaping the conflict in Myanmar.
• Africa Senior Analyst Ladd Serwat’s report on the ADF was picked up by the Africa Defense Forum.
• The BBC picked up ACLED data on JNIM in Mali.
• This past month, Radio Free Europe used ACLED data from our Ukraine Conflict Monitor to highlight an increase in Russian air- and drone strikes.
• Our annual Violence Targeting Local Officials report has been featured in several media outlets since we published it in mid-June, including Vatican Radio, La Presse in Canada, L'Espresso in Italy, El Financiero televisión in Mexico, and Bloomberg, to mention some.

External engagements

Also on the topic of our report on Violence Targeting Local Officials: Earlier this month, ACLED’s Head of Analysis, Andrea Carboni, attended the launch event for Avviso Pubblico’s Annual Report “Amministratori Sotto Tiro,” for which ACLED contributed a chapter on the targeting of local officials in Europe. Andrea presented the findings of the chapter and contributed to a panel discussion with representatives from Avviso Pubblico; the former magistrate and President of the Italian Senate, Pietro Grasso; the chairperson of the parliamentary Antimafia Commission, Chiara Colosimo; and the undersecretary in the Ministry of Interior, Wanda Ferro.