Raleigh Report - June 2026

“The old ones called it ‘the hour of the wolf.’ It is the hour when the most people die, and the most are born. At this time, nightmares come to us. And when we awake, we are afraid.” – Johan Borg in “Hour of the Wolf”

Strategery.

The war with Iran has created intense chat about strategy — who has it and who doesn’t. What does a viable strategy look like in a period where we are moving into a declining hegemon, several arenas of international conflict, ongoing domestic conflicts that will provide key pivot points to the larger international wars, rising and competitive middle powers, resurgent transnational threats like jihadi groups and cartels, upset populations, and little oversight or enforced standards about the use of violence? 

The answer is very much an “eye of the beholder” situation, but even then, there are a few things about strategy and its development that I wanted to discuss. This is in the form of a list because that is how coherent and flowing this is. 

1. I recently picked up a more recent translation of “The Prince” by our old favorite Niccolò Machiavelli. The fantastic translation is by Tim Parks, as is the introduction. Did you know that the reception for “The Prince” (and actually Machiavelli’s life) was not great? It was considered quite scandalous as it advocated operating under different, “looser” moral codes that contradicted Christianity (and it began as “On Principalities” — a discussion of subnational administration formats, and for that, I will always love Niccolò). He actually made whatever money he had from smutty novels and plays. And while he was known as an incisive advisor, the practices he suggested were only sometimes taken up and successful; other times they failed. “The Prince” is about how to manipulate for short-term benefit, but it is also about being realistic about prospects and strategy. And sometimes being realistic means preparing for failure. Park makes the persuasive case that “The Prince” is about how personality traits of leaders can “mesh positively or negatively with certain sets of historical circumstance” (p. xix), and by Christ, this situation in Iran would be a whole meal for Machiavelli. 
2. I have also been reading Sun Tzu, and (paraphrasing) when your enemy strikes, they show you their weakness. Drones, assassinations, and blockades are not a strategy. They may form part of an overall military strategy, but alone cannot cause enough pressure to take down the government (which is weak but about to be smothered in cash!). There was an inertia to this war: The same events over and over again, even if it was short. Also, the constant barrage of “is it over yet” every 20 minutes. What an unbelievably stupid way to conduct a conflict. At the very least, Pete Hegseth should be fired. He won’t be. It brings to mind a scene from “The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat” by Ryszard Kapuściński, where the failure of Haile Selassie’s regional governors to stop a devastating famine in Ethiopia resulted in millions of dead subjects. Rather than acknowledge that he appointed the wrong people with devastating results, Selassie promotes them to appear as if the famine was part of his strategy that they executed well. 
3. Donald Trump’s weaknesses are that he is quickly bored and wants isolation from costs. His strength is his ability to conduct himself like a mob boss in a hurry. He didn’t think much past his advantage (military strength), and like a mob boss, there isn’t a strategy – there is just the threat and the use of violence. If he doesn’t wield that, he is just a troubled, unpopular president who hastened his country’s global decline in influence. He can ignore that, even if the rest of the country cannot. What Iran did was eschew its previous architecture of power and instead focus on the collective goal. As Hamidreza Azizi writes in a Time article: “what has emerged in Iran is a different architecture of leadership, where power is exercised through institutions and networks that have reconfigured themselves to meet the demands of war and prolonged confrontation.” That could not happen in the United States because the architecture of power is concentrated on not boring or annoying Trump. 
4. The bill for the Trump strategy in Iran is in, and there are more costs than benefits. Iran will reap benefits, but the Gulf states have incurred a massive immediate cost: Trump is demanding immediate normalization with Israel. The Abraham Accords live. Reports are that the Gulf states are not thrilled about this development. What did we learn? Benjamin Netanyahu needs this success to stay viable, and the way this has played out between Trump and the Iranians means that neither of the two goals the US and Israel wanted to meet  (remove uranium and/or remove the regime) was going to happen. Therefore, the US presents a new prize and acts like it was the right one all along. Again, this reiterates that – despite all claims to the contrary and the weight and importance of the Gulf states — Israel remains the most important to the US. But Saudi Arabia was — at various points — pushing the conflict and then retracting due to its domestic and economic costs. It was at best inconsistent and hesitant, yet it wants to be the regional hegemon. If Saudi Arabia’s regime wants to best Iran and the United Arab Emirates, develop the Red Sea, and chart the next 30 years in the Gulf, it is going to have to act like it. Otherwise, others — like Iran — are eager to sow disorder. 
5. Even though protests around Gaza, Palestine, and even the Iranian war have recently decreased (we recorded 69,000 since 2022 to last month), they have taken on an interesting geography. Yemen has the largest number of these protests at over 17,000; Morocco has the most significant anti-Israeli normalization trend at over 6,000. These protests are common and active across the Arab world (with over 50% of the protests overall), and changing the position on the Abraham Accords by denying that Israel allowed Arab leaders to show that they were listening to their people (at the very least). It was a crisis they had an answer for, and that answer was “OK, fine. Israel is bad” (their own interpretation of Israel’s strategy notwithstanding, nor their strong desire to see Hamas, Hezbollah, and others destroyed). But now a forced normalization will make them appear like second-rate political players. Public opinion calms down when you win. But who won here? At the moment, the Iranians. It could not be bleaker for Gulf states, or indeed the US. 
6. A little off our direct topic, but I am super interested in the idea of the “conflict labor market.” There is a fair amount about how armed groups grow via recruitment, ideological alignment, and coercion, etc., but new research concentrates on how to “make a career in dictatorship.” In a new book by Christian Gläßel and Adam Scharpf, “Making a Career in Dictatorship: The Secret Logic behind Repression and Coups,” they take a look at the henchmen and women of autocracy. Their research, summarized here by the New York Times, suggests that it is the mediocre “rank and file” that are happy to get on with the business of autocracy and burrow themselves within its bureaucracy. To these “loyal losers,” autocracy offers a noncompetitive environment, and because they are so middling at their jobs, there is no risk of internal coups from the middle management. I find this thesis equally fascinating and terrifying, mainly the latter. 

Notes and notions

What happened to the US opioid epidemic? No one talks about it anymore, and in my deep research (i.e., one Google search), I noticed that most articles are from years ago. But where did it go? If it has been handled, why aren’t there celebrations of public health wins? Regular readers might know that I frequently come out of my little rabbit hole and say, “Where did x, y, or z go?” My last question was “What happened to Q-Anon?” I still demand an answer to that – I read a lot of moral panic about it, and deserve a resolution! 

My local ladies bookclub, populated by wonderful and understanding neighbors, is reading “The Witch” by Marie NDiaye for our next meeting, and it is phenomenal. 

After my rant last month and the continued “live body autopsy” that is happening for the Starmer administration, I came across this good take on the disparity between public bodies and the actual public regarding expected policy outcomes by Albert Dolan. It makes a very clear point, and one that is constantly missing from Irish and United Kingdom public discourse. In response to a policy designed to address a social issue or problem, the public will ask: “Did we get what we paid for?” While the public bodies responsible for the policy practice will be asking: “Did we follow the rules?” This disparity between outcome and process is at the heart of so much frustration and mistrust that has grown in the public toward the government. “Following the process” is never a good answer, and is not an end in itself.

I binge-watched “Legends” on Netflix with my ailing father, and it was excellent!

ACLED webinars

Webinar | Russia's shadow fleet: Sanctions evasion meets hybrid warfare

On 28 May, ACLED hosted a webinar to discuss the findings of one of our latest reports: Russia’s shadow fleet presents a sustained hybrid war threat at sea. It explored how Russia’s shadow fleet has become an active hybrid warfare platform, implicated in undersea cable sabotage, reconnaissance drone launches over military bases and airports, and an escalating cat-and-mouse game with European states in the Baltic and North Sea. It was moderated by ACLED’s Head of Analysis, Andrea Carboni, and featured speakers Witold Stupnicki, ACLED’s Senior Analyst for Europe and Central Asia and author of the report, and Mathieu Boulègue, Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. If you missed it, you can watch the recording. 

We’ll be hosting a webinar on our new East Asia Monitor on 11 June and one on mining security in the Sahel on 23 July. Keep an eye on our Events & Webinars page for more information.

Select ACLED in the media!

• Witold’s report on Russia’s shadow fleet has been a big hit in the media. Newsweek ran an entire article on it. We were also thrilled to see the Newsweek article in which Sherwan Ali was quoted has been widely syndicated. 
• InSight Crime used ACLED data to map out strikes on alleged drug boats in the Caribbean and Pacific, The Guardian used our data on fatalities in Myanmar and Israel’s assault on southern Lebanon, The Economist used our data on protests in Asia since the war in Iran began, Al Jazeera used ACLED data in an article about Iranian seafarers who have been killed during US-Israeli war, and Reuters used our data to map violence from militants in Mali.
• On the topic of Mali, Héni Nsaibia spoke to Financial Times and The Telegraph. He also spoke to CNN about Russian forces’ withdrawal from Mali.
• Jalale Getachew Birru was quoted in a Le Monde article about the tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia. She also spoke to France 24 about fatalities in Sudan’s Blue Nile state.
• Nasser Khdour was quoted in Bloomberg for an article on Israel’s control of Gaza. 
• Olha Polishchuk spoke to Al Jazeera about the increasing use of drones by Ukraine and Russia, and Tiziano Breda spoke to The Guardian about the use of militarized drones by armed groups in Colombia.
• Infobae picked up information from our April webinar After El Mencho: CJNG succession dynamics and the future of security in Mexico. If you missed it, you can watch the recording.