Raleigh Report - November 2025

“Everyone has a plan ‘till they get punched in the mouth” — Mike Tyson

No offense to Mr. Tyson, but the real question is: What’s your plan after you get punched? Because in today’s world, you should assume you will. Today, I wish to talk about uncertainty, in part because, at the end of this year, there is a palpable sense that things are unstable and uncertain. Those are two different things, and I would argue that things are not uncertain, but they are unstable. 

What is certain? Conflict rates are high and sustained, in keeping with 2024 rates, which were already very high and — as I never tire of saying — twice the rate of five years ago. State violence is the main driver of this increase, and with state violence comes more hardware (generally) — so bombings and the like — and, depending on what the state is trying to achieve, a high rate of civilian attacks in urban areas, covered up when possible. 

So, high instability. But not uncertain. Indeed, as a preview of next month’s 2026 Conflict Index, I can reveal that the top 10 conflict countries are largely the same. These patterns are clear and consistent. But I think people don’t particularly like the conclusions and patterns that have created instability and are therefore more uncomfortable rather than uncertain. In short, people are evasive about the patterns because they see how abject competition and politics are generating this violence, and there are few, if any, “right sides” to take shelter in. We are also clearly witnessing the level of incompatibility between favored policy positions and resulting conflict (i.e., no one seems all that interested in peace or prevention programming) and a distinct lack of influence over conflict and its impacts. Again, discomfort, not uncertainty. 

Reinforcing the lack of influence and instruments is the certain absence of an effect: Almost 10 months after the cessation of the vast majority of USAID’s work, there is no discernible influence on conflict rates. They neither increased nor decreased (although sourcing and information did change). Individual conflicts have and will continue to change. For example:

• The peace deal in the Democratic Republic of Congo has had no appreciable effect on violence rates. 
• Conflict in Myanmar continued, without almost anyone noticing outside of that country.
• Sudan’s conflict had a surge in recent weeks as the Rapid Support Forces tired of its 500+ day siege of El Fasher and murdered thousands of people. In the latest RSF offensive (25 - 31 October), at least 1,856 were killed in El Fasher; since 15 April 2023, 10,476 were killed (conservatively).
• Although the conflict in Gaza has recently been reduced (by about 48%), the rate in Ukraine increased. 

Therefore, at a global level, nothing at all happened to conflict rates overall. Trump isn’t ushering in a new era of high violence! Neither are the seven or eight “wars” he has apparently handled done much to the overall violence rate (I am still baffled by most of that list). Those conflicts that decreased did so because someone or something more powerful forced the conflicting parties to do so (and sometimes that was the US). 

Why do we think otherwise? We can clearly see the influence of power and the search for influence in the choice to go into conflict. We can see who chooses to compete with violence: It is those who have authority and some abilities to create conflict in the first place. It is predictable and certain. Conflict is increasing and intensifying because political competition locally, nationally, and internationally is at an extreme state. It has not reached its zenith, mainly because that would involve direct mass conflict between major world powers, and, at present, that is too costly, and the alliances are fluid. It may never be a good strategy to start or engage in such conflict if political competition can be managed. Political “management” is not peaceful — indeed, it is quite violent in most cases. If you wish to be involved in any way, you need to have a plan for the violence as it is, not what you wish it to be. 

Politics is fascinating in part because it does not have a single or a right answer. It is, as famously noted by Otto von Bismarck, “the art of the possible.” And there are many likely violent outcomes and benefits to violence when viewed in this context. Let’s take the violence in Tanzania’s election: Continued intra-party competition spurred fragmentation of military, police, intelligence, and paramilitary groups before the election. President Samia Suluhu Hassan needed to be seen as a) winning a convincing majority of votes and b) having a large turnout. Those who threatened either aim were subject to violence, disappeared, arrested, or worse, by militias reportedly run by her son. This re-run of the Kenyan and Zimbabwe 2008 election play was considered impossible in (otherwise) quiet and stable Tanzania. But, if the most important goal was to hold power (rather than hold a faultless election), then violence is on the table. And it worked, if only to create a new form of political management: Hassan remains in power and is a regional player, but will now need to invest in coup-proofing her regime and repressing elements of the security service that will ally with opposition and youth protestors. More violence is to come because of the way political competition changes form. 

My point here is to emphasize that violence from Hassan’s politics, the DRC, Nigeria, boats in Venezuela, Hamas,  Russia, etc., is not uncertain or unpredictable. Those who can use violence will because the political climate calls for it, and the politics of their situation incentivize it. The shape it takes is based on the form of political competition at that moment, and that will change as the contest does. That is certain. If you want to survive it, plan not for peace — but for the punch.

Notes and notions

In this line of work, some people pay the heaviest cost. This story of graduate student Elizabeth Tsurkov is a harrowing account of being kidnapped, tortured, and held for 2 1/2 years by a Hezbollah affiliate in Iraq.

Good books alert:  “Perfection” by Vincenzo Latronico is … perfect for a neighborhood ladies’ short-book club. It leaves you appreciating how good he is at observing the age, yet sad and disconcerted by the vapid lives of the characters. 

I have forced “Narconomics: How to Run a Drug Cartel” by Tom Wainwright into many people’s hands recently — it is such a riveting, insightful read! Thank you to Jeremy from InSight Crime for the recommendation! In a good segue to seeing this cartel action in practice — the Irish coast appears to be open for cartels to sail into Europe. 

I share this not to support physically assaulting voters, but to demonstrate that even insane situations used to be handled far better than they would be today. Some people are just a bit off, and voters will still support them! Context is everything, be yourself!

Regular readers may recognize that I really love old ladies and their whole deal. This is an example of why, and if the camel herding does not work out as my eventual retirement plan, I will sign up for “giving blunt advice to strangers” when age appropriate. I also plan on devoting my entire life to stopping the use of LED bulbs in car headlights, so it will be a busy time.  

I am not a big sweets person, but every word of this article is the truth! Gazelle horns are the food of the gods. 

When I was living in Boulder, Colorado, a Sierra Club member came to my house for donations. I asked him about a recent anti-immigrant position the club had very publicly taken. He was clueless and said, “just here for the trees.”  SC needed more of these people and far fewer of the others (even if they are very pro-immigrant now, this indicates that they have long been far too vulnerable to the sway of the most extreme voices in the group). 

ACLED webinars

Virtual launch: Conflict Index and Watchlist

Save the date for our last webinar of the year on 11 December at 14:00 GMT | 9:00 EST, during which  we will launch our annual Conflict Index and Watchlist findings. There will be more details to follow, but register now to secure your spot!

Tackling the Islamic State threat in Africa: State responses and the road ahead

On 12 November, ACLED hosted a follow-up webinar to the one held in September on the Islamic State’s pivot to Africa. Our analysts on Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique provided another in-depth analysis of IS’s pivot to Africa and the evolving nature of African regional security. Given these evolving threats, African governments have increasingly turned to strategic military partnerships to push back. These partnerships have taken diverse forms — from bilateral military cooperation to hiring private mercenaries and equipping local self-defense groups. If you missed it, watch the recording here. 

ACLED in the media

• Our East Africa Senior Analyst, Jalale Getachew Birru, spoke to CNN, The Associated Press, and PBS News about the crisis in Sudan.
• Trump’s comments on Nigeria have spurred numerous requests for ACLED to comment on the situation. Africa Senior Analyst Ladd Serwat was quoted by The New York Times, Al Jazeera, Reuters, The Washington Post, BBC, and France24, to name a few. Our Assistant Research Manager for Southern and Eastern Africa, Miriam Adah, was also quoted by NBC News.
• A year after the canopy collapse at a train station in the Serbian city of Novi Sad, our Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Caucasus Research Manager, Magda Anastasijevic, spoke to a number of outlets about the ongoing protests demanding accountability for the incident, including The Observer.
• Nichita Gurcov, our Senior Analyst for Europe and Central Asia, shared his insights on Russia’s campaign to bomb Ukrainian energy infrastructure with Newsweek.
• ACLED data on Israeli strikes in Lebanon were featured in The Wall Street Journal.
• Following the recent violence in Brazil, our Senior Analyst for Latin America and the Caribbean, Sandra Pellegrini, shared her thoughts with CNN.