Raleigh Report - September 2025

“Down with this sort of thing.”

I wanted to take a little temperature check on where we are in terms of the “conflict community” (what a terrible phrase) and actual conflict more generally as we move into the last part of a truly exceptional year. We are contending with continued massive conflicts and smaller wars, intermittent terrorist attacks, huge layoffs, economic and political discontent, falling/teetering governments, state-sanctioned assassinations and an enormous rise in state violence, resurgent Islamic State (IS) groups, and pervasive distrust in the political class and systems. These adversities did not start in January, and they are nowhere close to being over. The roughness of the year and the fallout have unearthed some thoughts:

1. Despite an entire NGO and INGO class operating under the assumption that there is a “global responsibility” around conflict, its victims, and mitigation, there isn’t.

2. Many civil society groups, and often many governments, push “peace” as the objective for policy and practice work, despite “peace” being what we have the least influence over. There are not enough dashboards in the world to fix that.

3. The audience for conflict/peace policy and discussions is very rarely people, governments, or armed groups in conflict. The chasm between the audience for foreign policy (narrow domestic interest groups and those making conflict policy) and the “recipients,” i.e., those in crisis, is why conflict programs appealing to (western) domestic elite preferences (e.g., climate, gender, health) were not successful in dealing with any conflict patterns. Now those policies don’t exist, and it will be laid bare how much governments value stable and healthy populations. But conflict patterns will not budge.

4. The Humanitarian-Development-Peace (HDP) nexus is not coming back. You went to all those trainings for nothing. There is every likelihood that significant amounts of humanitarian work will be privatized, sharply narrowing its scope and reducing its costs. On the one hand, this may be affordable in a way the recent system was completely not, but mainly because the remit is more restricted.

5. Where private companies fill humanitarian gaps, the focus will be on maximizing delivery, operations, and utility. It is quite difficult to argue against that in favor of a philosophical questioning of utilitarianism or the ethics of private industry. Equally, select private sector “AI-driven humanitarian solutions” send a cold shiver down my spine, as does the militarization of aid. But who will be an honest broker about the efficacy of this approach compared to public sector, international institutionalism?

6. In the warfare vs. welfare contest, warfare will always win. Governments will continue to cut development funding (any linked to “welfare” in crisis contexts) and invest more in defense.     

   

   The only stark thing about this post is the pretense that there is still a choice to be made.

7. There is every reason to expect that the diplomacy, negotiations, and engagement on peace will be actively curtailed as countries decide that “stabilization” and “cooperation” are expensive and ineffective, where bombing is not. The proof is in where most governments are putting their money, and where some governments are putting their bombs — even Qatar has not escaped the new world order! 

8. Crisis-affected countries want controllable levels of conflict. This means that there will be a lot more regional conflict and hegemons emerging and a steady increase in state violence. Regular readers may recall that I am a development-conflict skeptic. In that vein, while a decrease in development funding will not increase conflict, more defense and warfare spending will — these weapons are not supposed to rest in the garage. These changes will exacerbate shifts already underway: more state violence in domestic territories and more regional hegemonic violence in neighboring countries. For those governments that have felt constrained by the liberal western order, less funding has been replaced by less oversight (it is like a perversion of the China model, which is “more money, less oversight, but don’t make a mess”). And it is far easier to fight a war when you don’t have to be accountable for civilian deaths.

9. This effectively means under-reach by current hegemonic powers (or a hands-off attitude) to the activities of the “middle powers.” Perhaps you think I mean “peripheries”: I don’t. The new world order (when it emerges) is unlikely to recognize peripheries as we have done in the past. All neighbors are now important; all are vying for their seat at the table. There will be some clashes of regional authority (India and China, South Africa and Nigeria, Vietnam and the Philippines), which will determine the stability of the regions.

Notes and notions

The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is open and flowing! As an Ethio-optimist, I am delighted. Indeed, the pearl-clutching that accompanied the development of this dam really got me thinking about the honesty of some media in reporting on this — much of the anti-Ethiopian sentiment was shameless and factless. Journal articles about the GERD were far more reasonable and positive about its overall impact (consider figure 7). When my children attended an Ethiopian primary school, one day they returned home with a letter asking for a GERD contribution. The Ethiopian government was very much trying to make this a national project, where everyone felt like they had a role in its success. I certainly hope it reaches its intended impact.

This is one of the best ideas I have ever heard of. This is another one (and a hill I will die on).  

Libraries, exam books, newspapers, landlines, and playing outside! Welcome to the future!

“This is not ‘Nam. There are rules.” The most important friendship test is when you get introduced to Walter. This scene reminds me of chats with my upcoming podcast co-host, Cait 

(she is the reasonable person in these discussions). 

Actually, on the subject of friends, this story by David Sedaris is so painful and lovely — a reflection on young friends and long lives. Many of his recent short stories have been like this. When a somewhat recent one about a lamb in a field pops into my head, remembering the last lines feels like being stabbed in the stomach. 

Over the summer, I listened to this excellent and damning long essay by Michael Lewis. If you are also a parent who has lost their bloody mind regarding children’s sports, listen to it in shame and recognition. 

One of the upsides of this destruction is that maybe we can now really stop using ridiculous, awful words like “stakeholder” or “impact.” Others seem quite ready to overthrow “empowerment,” “accountability,” “ground truthed,” or “mission-driven.” But nothing makes me madder than “learnings.” It makes me actually angry to hear it. For the love of Christ, the word is lessons! And, as this person points out, “When did food, water, and shelter become so complicated?”

ACLED webinars

The Islamic State’s pivot to Africa

On  11 September, I moderated a webinar with ACLED experts on Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique, as they explored how IS is increasingly pivoting its operations toward Africa. They broke down how IS affiliates are operating in Africa, what their ties to IS Central are, and how civilians are paying the price of their territorial ambitions. This comes as ACLED records over two-thirds of global IS activity in the first half of 2025 on the continent. If you missed it, you can watch the recording of the webinar. We will also have another soon, as there is so much to discuss!

ACLED in the media

• Our experts have been busy of late. In August, Héni Nsaibia was quoted in articles by BBC Afrique and CNN.
• Jalale Getachew Birru spoke to Radio Free International about a joint operation carried out by Somalia and the US against the Islamic State in Puntland.
• The Associated Press used ACLED data in articles on the impact of conflict in Sudan and the Sahel.
• Other notable uses of ACLED data include an article by The New York Times on the hunger crisis in Gaza, a SkyNews article on Russian attacks on Ukrainian emergency services, a Reuters article on white nationalist activity in the US, an Economist article on Wagner’s operations in Africa, an article by The Wall Street Journal on Rwanda’s regional power, and an Al Jazeera article on fighting in Mozambique. Newsweek also mapped the deadliest conflicts in 2025 using ACLED data.
• So far in September, Su Mon was featured on the BBC's Global News Podcast.
• Sandra Pellegrini spoke to CNN and Deutsche Welle about the US’ involvement in Latin America.
• I did an interview with CNN about the shooting of Charlie Kirk and was quoted by Sky News on the same topic. It’s one that has generated much interest from the media.
• Other ACLEDers have also done a number of interviews. To name a few, over the last month or so, Tiziano Breda and Nichita Gurcov both did interviews with Expresso, Tiziano on the possibility of election-related violence in Bolivia and Nichita on peace prospects in Ukraine. The Washington Post interviewed Ameneh Mehvar about developments in Gaza and Héni on the security situation in Mali. Andrea Carboni did a live interview on Voice of Islam Radio.