Southern Transitional Council

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a United Arab Emirates-backed secessionist political organization founded and led by Aydarus al-Zubaydi. Established in May 2017, the STC aligned with the anti-Houthi camp, though engaging in political and military competition with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG). Despite joining the Presidential Leadership Council in April 2022, the STC claims to represent the will and interests of the southerners, it advocates for the south’s peaceful secession, and it firmly opposes the Islamist Islah party. STC President Zubaydi is also the supreme commander of the Southern Armed Forces, which include several military brigades and police forces integrated into the IRG’s defense and interior ministries.

Associated Actors

The Southern Transitional Council comprises multiple actors. Profiles of select actors are available below:

Security Belt Forces (SBF)

The Security Belt Forces are STC-aligned paramilitary units carrying out counter-terrorism and law enforcement activities in southern Yemen

Elite Forces

The Elite Forces are STC-aligned military units engaged in stabilization and counter-terrorism operations

STC Leadership

President of the STC Aydarus al-Zubaydi hails from al-Dali. Since the mid-1990s, he has emerged as a main leader in the southern Yemen secessionist movement.¹ In 2015, during the Houthi-Saleh advance, he led the resistance in al-Dali and Lahij, and later served as Aden’s governor until April 2017. Zubaydi’s faction of the STC overlaps with the historical Tughma group, including leaders from al-Dali, Lahij, and Hadramawt, which opposed the Zurma faction hailing from Abyan and Shabwa in the 1986 civil war. Although al-Dali-born leaders dominate the STC, other factions, like the Yafii wing and the Southern 33 group, have also been appointed to senior positions.² The STC leadership recently underwent restructuring, with the appointment of Giants Brigades leader Abdulrahman al-Muharrami and former Hadramawt Governor Faraj al-Bahsani as vice presidents. Yet, the relationship with the UAE-backed leader of the Joint Forces, Tariq Saleh, remains tense.

Historical Background

The emergence of the STC is inextricably linked with the history of the Southern Movement and the crucial role played by the UAE in Yemen. In 2007, former military officers from al-Dali established the Southern Movement (often referred to by its name in Arabic, al-Hirak al-Janubi, or just Hirak), advocating for the secession of the southern provinces³ from the north, and seeking resolution for grievances dating back to the 1994 Yemeni civil war. In 2015, when the Houthi-Saleh alliance advanced southwards to capture Aden, many Hiraki activists took arms and joined the Southern Resistance (SR), supported by the UAE.

Among them, Aydarus al-Zubaydi – a Hiraki leader from al-Dali – rose to prominence spearheading the liberation of al-Dali and Lahij from the Houthis, and was later installed as commander-in-chief of the SR. Appointed governor of Aden in December 2015,⁴ Zubaydi strengthened his ties with the UAE and contributed to the establishment of the Security Belt Forces (SBF). However, relations with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) rapidly soured. In February 2017, clashes erupted between IRG and UAE-backed forces over the control of Aden’s airport. In an attempt to curb the influence of Zubaydi’s UAE-backed clique, President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi sacked the governor.

In response, Zubaydi announced the establishment of a 26-member Southern Transitional Council on 11 May 2017.⁵ As the STC’s commander-in-chief, he claimed to represent the southern people’s will and interests, forming an executive authority known as the Praesidium with diverse southern political figures. Furthermore, he took the lead of several UAE-backed forces – including the SBF, Support and Reinforcement Brigades, and Elite Forces – assuming the title of Supreme Commander of the Southern Armed Forces. In subsequent years, STC-IRG relations deteriorated, leading to occasional violent skirmishes in Aden and neighboring areas. In January 2018, the SBF seized control of most of Aden, ousting IRG forces. In August 2019, a Houthi missile strike in Aden killed several SBF fighters, including prominent SBF commander Abu Yamama al-Yafii. The STC blamed the IRG for enabling the attack, sparking clashes in the neighboring Abyan and Shabwa.

In November 2019, IRG-STC tensions were temporarily resolved with the Riyadh Agreement, a Saudi-brokered deal mandating a political and military overhaul. However, a stall in the implementation of the agreement led the STC to declare self-rule in April 2020.⁶ In July 2020, the approval of an ‘acceleration mechanism’ convinced the STC to rescind the self-rule declaration, and eventually a new cabinet including STC members was established in December of the same year. The novel power-sharing government granted the STC with political recognition and provided them an avenue to partake in United Nations-sponsored peace talks.⁷

On 7 April 2022, during the Riyadh talks, President Hadi relinquished his powers and established the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), an eight-member executive body led by Rashad al-Alimi and that included Zubaydi. The establishment of the PLC was instigated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, intending to replace Hadi’s ineffective leadership and create a political equilibrium within the anti-Houthi coalition. However, lacking a common political vision, the PLC bloc proved equally ineffective, failing to confront the Houthis unitarily, while new internal tensions arose in Shabwa, Abyan, and Hadramawt.⁸

On 8 May 2023, Zubaydi decreed the establishment of the Supreme Executive Leadership of the STC’s presidency. The new executive body includes southern PLC ministers, governors, and other prominent figures, aiming to establish the STC as an umbrella organization representing the southern cause. Pursuing this purpose, Zubaydi has appointed as vice presidents three southern PLC members: former Hadramawt Governors Faraj al-Bahsani and Ahmad Bin Burayk; and Giants Brigades Commander Abdulrahman ‘Abu Zaraa’ al-Muharrami.⁹ This move ostensibly unified the UAE-backed forces under the STC umbrella. Furthermore, several southern political factions signed a National Charter demanding “the restoration of the state of the south with its political and geographical borders according to what was before May 22, 1990.”¹⁰

In late 2023, amidst ongoing peace talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the STC lamented its marginalization and stressed the importance of including the Southern Issue in the negotiations. Following the Houthi Red Sea escalation, the STC aligned decisively with the US-led international coalition. On 16 January 2024, Zubaydi demanded “military equipment, capacity building, and training for ground forces, as well as intel sharing” to complement US-UK airstrikes against the Houthis.¹¹ Domestically, the STC formed the House of Commons (Majlis al-Umum), a unified internal entity comprising the group’s key executive and legislative bodies.¹²