Q&A: Is Ethiopia at war again? 10 things you need to know.

Is Ethiopia at war again?

Serious fighting has returned between the Ethiopian government and forces from Tigray. Conflict in Ethiopia has been ongoing even before 2018, when it had a drastic change in government. At that time, the EPRDF — led by the minority TPLF party for 28 years — was removed from power by a coalition of other groups and parties. Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister, and significant problems began. These erupted in late 2020, when the TPLF in Tigray started the war that lasted two years, involved neighboring Eritrea fighting with the Ethiopian government, and created mass death and destruction. A poorly organized peace agreement did not end these tensions. Since the end of the 2022 war, conflict has flared in the Amhara region between government forces and Fano militias and the ongoing Oromo Liberation Army rebellion in Oromia. But the northern TPLF-led conflict has been restarting in 2026, and with new coalitions of parties and governments at play. 

What is happening in Tigray?

Tigrayan forces took three airports in a single day, and seven groups have announced an alliance against the government. In May, the TPLF reinstated the regional government that was in place before the 2020 war and began mobilizing and forcibly conscribing people. On 1 August, fighting resumed between Tigrayan and government forces. Since then, ACLED records troop movements, artillery, drone attacks, and fighting across several locations. On 23 September, Tigrayan forces seized three airports — Mekelle, Aksum, and Shire. A new coalition of opposition parties began to engage government troops on the Tigray-Amhara border and the Tigray-Afar border.

Is this as bad as the last Tigray war?

This is very far from the violence that occurred during the 2000-2022 Tigray war, but it is still in its early stages. There is serious fighting and new alliances with aims well beyond Tigray and Ethiopia. So, the situation is quite dangerous. 

Why has fighting started again?

The 2022 peace agreement stopped the major war, but it didn't resolve any issues over control of Tigray,  territory, disarmament, and the return of displaced people. In 2026, after spending four years seeking alliances to destabilize the federal government, the TPLF has been actively engaged in military mobilization — and, since August, open fighting.

Is this just the old Tigray war starting again?

The sides have drastically changed, as have the ambitions. During the last war, the federal government allied with the Eritrea government, Amhara regional forces, and Fano militias against Tigrayan forces, who relied on inconsistent Sudanese support and general international goodwill. Currently, a number of these players have changed sides: The federal government is in open hostility with the Eritrea government, which itself is in a “Red Sea” alliance with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Somalia. But Ethiopia has allies in the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Somaliland. Internal fighting between the government and the Amhara Fano has weakened this regional force, but also pitted a formidable region against the central government. On 23 September, ACLED reported joint Tigray Defense Forces and Amhara Fano National Movement forces fighting the Ethiopian military.

Who is fighting the government?

There is now an alliance of seven armed and political groups opposed to Abiy Ahmed's government, bringing together groups from different parts of Ethiopia that haven't traditionally been on the same side. But seven groups joining an alliance doesn't mean seven equally powerful armies. Their size, capabilities, and ability to operate vary enormously. What matters is whether that political alliance turns into coordinated fighting in different parts of the country. In Ethiopia, your enemy’s enemy is most certainly your alliance member, so things are very fluid. 

Is violence spreading beyond Tigray?

There is already violence in other parts of Ethiopia unrelated to the Northern conflict, but it is beneficial because it can distract the ENDF federal forces from fully engaging in the North. In western Oromia, for example, Fano militia activity increased by 80% between 1 January and 21 August 2026 compared with the same period in 2025. In August, ACLED records OLA fighters coordinating with government security forces against Fano for the first time. That tells you how fluid this has become — groups that normally fight each other can find themselves temporarily on the same side.

Why does Eritrea matter?

Eritrea fought alongside the Ethiopian government during the last Tigray war. Now relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara have deteriorated, and links between Eritrea, the TPLF, and the Amhara Fano National Movement through the emerging Tsimdo coalition are active. 

The most important development here is that the United States lifted its five-year-old sanctions against Eritrea on 18 September 2026. Eritrea can now buy weapons from the US or other affiliates. This was done because of the instability in the Red Sea and the need for more countries to be available to defend that waterway from the Houthis or their allies in the future. However, it has added a very dangerous element to this conflict as Eritrea could buy weaponry to supply the TPLF. 

Could this turn into a much bigger war?

It could become much wider and more deadly. New weapons available to all parties, new regional ambitions, and powerful allies could all conspire to engulf this regional conflict into something beyond a renewed civil war. Immediate steps into dangerous territory will be whether a state of emergency is called for Tigray and whether other armed groups elsewhere in Ethiopia begin moving at the same time.

So what should people actually watch next?

Watch what happens outside Tigray: whether a state of emergency is called, whether Eritrea has a large budget to buy arms, what happens in the Red Sea, Israeli elections, and how other groups in Ethiopia can consistently fight in other active fronts around the country.