Q&A: How do escalating tensions in the Middle East affect the Sudan conflict?

✓ ACLED is the world’s most trusted source of conflict information >

As the Sudan conflict enters its fourth year, the Kordofan region and Blue Nile state have emerged as the primary battlegrounds where the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are fighting for control. Strategic urban centers like El Obeid, Dilling, and Kadugli have been transformed into besieged combat zones in a conflict characterized by surging drone warfare and heavy artillery. These front lines have crippled vital supply routes, deepening what is now the world’s largest humanitarian catastrophe. 

Meanwhile, amid the Iran war, the relationships between the RSF and SAF and their respective regional allies in the Middle East have become more complicated. In this Q&A, ACLED’s Senior Analyst for East Africa Dr.des. Jalale Getachew Birru explains how regional rivalries are shaping the conflict dynamics and provides her outlook on the Sudan conflict over the next year.

Is either side closer to achieving a military victory in Sudan?

After three years of fighting that has caused mass destruction and at least 59,000 conflict-related deaths,¹ neither side is close to a decisive military victory. The SAF still maintains advantages in air capabilities, formal command structures, and international recognition, while the RSF holds the upper hand in western Sudan, the ability to besiege areas controlled by the SAF, and access to transnational supply chains. Both the SAF and RSF already have a stockpile of military supplies from their regional partners on hand and can generate revenues to sustain their military operations and co-opt militias. Therefore, the current balance points to a prolonged war of attrition or a long-term territorial division, rather than a battlefield resolution (see map below).

The war in the Middle East, sparked by the United States and Israel’s attacks on Iran, could shift the current balance of power in Sudan. If the conflict in the Middle East continues to impact the RSF’s main supporter, the United Arab Emirates, the group might lose its primary backing and weaken. Meanwhile, although the SAF could lose support from Saudi Arabia and Iran, it could still maintain support from Egypt and Turkey, which are not directly involved in the Iran conflict. 

What is the current situation on the front lines?

Kordofan is now the main battleground between the SAF and RSF (see map below). The region lies at the intersection of key supply routes connecting central Sudan and Darfur. The RSF gained complete control of West Kordofan state on 1 December 2025 when, alongside its ally, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N Hilu), it seized control of the last remaining urban area, Babanusa city. In turn, the SAF broke the long-standing sieges on Kadugli and Dilling in South Kordofan in early February. 

Yet another front line emerged in Blue Nile state after the SAF publicly accused neighboring Ethiopia of providing military support to the RSF in December 2025. Blue Nile is located in the southeastern corner of Sudan, sandwiched between Sennar state, Ethiopia, and South Sudan. The fight for territorial control in the state is concentrated in the al-Kurmuk and Bau localities. The RSF and allied SPLM-N Hilu’s troops overran al-Kurmuk’s capital in late March. If the RSF can capture both al-Kurmuk and Bau, it will have a clear path to the capital city, al-Damazin. Heavy fighting and the use of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population have resulted in the deadliest quarter for Blue Nile state since the war broke out in 2023. At least 450 people were killed between January and March 2026.

Drones have killed thousands of civilians since the war began in 2023. Why are drones so lethal, and how are warring parties using them?

More people died from drone strikes in 2025 than in any other year since the conflict began (see graph below). In 2025, ACLED records 515 drone strikes that killed at least 2,670 people, among them combatants and civilians. This is a nearly 600% increase in drone strike-related fatalities and 81% increase in events compared to 2024.

The RSF and SAF deploy drones to secure contested territories, disrupt mobilizations, and project power and insecurity into rival-controlled zones. On the battlefield, drone use has emerged as a force multiplier, enabling ground offensives and weakening enemy defenses. Both parties target infrastructure such as hospitals, dams, schools, markets, and camps for internally displaced people in rival-controlled areas — making drones particularly lethal for civilians. 

Foreign support has enabled this violence. Egypt, Russia, Iran, and Turkey have supplied drone technology to the SAF. The RSF has, meanwhile, received drones and other weapons systems from the UAE through a regional network of transit points that include Ethiopia, South Sudan, Chad, Libya, Puntland, and the Central African Republic.² 

How is the involvement of neighboring countries shaping the conflict?

All neighboring countries are indirectly involved in the conflict by, for example, smuggling weapons to warring parties, but Egypt and Ethiopia may be more involved than previously thought: Recent reports suggest a base in Egypt is hosting the SAF’s drones and is involved in drone strikes targeting RSF supply lines, and the RSF has reportedly used facilities in Ethiopia to train its forces and receive military support from the UAE.³

Egypt has maintained close ties with the SAF and views stability in Sudan as critical to its security interests, particularly along the Nile basin. Since the RSF took control of the North Darfur capital of El Fasher in October 2025, Egypt's drones have targeted RSF trucks operating along a supply route through the triangle border of Libya, Sudan, and Egypt.⁴ Egypt’s role in the conflict has grown in recent months, as reports suggest Egyptian military officials are assisting the SAF in Kordofan.⁵

Meanwhile, Sudan’s instability affects Ethiopia’s national interests in the region, including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Nile River that Cairo has long opposed. Addis Ababa has previously accused Egypt, Sudan, and Eritrea of supporting various rebel groups in Ethiopia to disrupt its dam construction.⁶ Thus, in an effort to counter this three-country alignment, Ethiopia may have allowed the RSF to use its facilities for militant training, and the UAE to deliver military support to the RSF via its territory.⁷ Amid the RSF and its ally’s offensive in Blue Nile state, in March 2026, Sudanese government officials stated that Ethiopia is directly assisting the RSF, the first time Ethiopia has been publicly accused of intervening in Sudan’s war.

In 2026, several individuals and groups linked to the RSF or SAF were placed on international sanctions lists. How can these sanction frameworks affect the conflict in Sudan? 

These sanctions affect the SAF’s manpower. On 9 March, the US designated the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood and al-Barra Ibn Malik Brigade as a terrorist group after claiming links with Iran. The al-Baraa Ibn Malik Brigade is a prominent Islamist militia that has been supporting the SAF on several war fronts. The group, which relies on sophisticated weaponry and an estimated 20,000 fighters deployed across Sudan, is reported to exert disproportionate influence within the Sudanese government and army. However, the SAF has repeatedly denied the Muslim Brotherhood's influence in the military.

The latest round of sanctions comes amid increasing pressure on the SAF to break ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. In September 2025, the Quad — comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt — submitted a peace initiative that included the exclusion of Islamist groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood from any post-war institutions. The SAF rejected this initiative and other calls to end its cooperation with the al-Baraa Ibn Malik brigade and other Islamist militias,⁸ fearing these concessions would give the RSF the edge on the battlefront. 

The terrorist designation, which notably excludes the former ruling National Congress Party,⁹ places increasing pressure on the Sudanese government. Just days before the US designation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group, a leader of the SAF-aligned Popular Congress Party had stated that his forces were ready to side with Tehran against an American or Israeli ground assault on Iranian territory.¹⁰ As a result of linking the Muslim Brotherhood with Iran-backed networks, the US may increasingly subordinate its support for the Sudanese government to a formal dissociation from Islamist militias — a move that might fragment the SAF-led coalition — while reserving the right of expanding the designation to other Islamist groups should the Sudanese government choose not to take decisive action. At the same time, the terrorist listing could further complicate arms deals with new and old allies, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan.¹¹

Visuals produced by Christian Jaffe and Ana Marco.