Q&A: Why is jihadist violence escalating in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria border triangle?

✓ ACLED is the world’s most trusted source of conflict information >

Much of ACLED's 2021 to 2025 data on Benin are provided by a consortium led by the Clingendael Institute. 

Over the past year, the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) have expanded their violent campaigns in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands (see map below). ACLED data indicate that this expansion has entered a new phase marked by entrenchment and the transformation of littoral border regions into a flashpoint of violence. These developments are unfolding amid geopolitical changes, weakened regional cooperation, and limited border security coordination. Héni Nsaibia, ACLED’s Senior Analyst for West Africa, explains this growing threat.

How is the jihadist threat in the Benin-Niger-Nigeria borderlands evolving, and what does this suggest about its trajectory?

The jihadist threat in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands is no longer just defined by geographic expansion; it has taken on new characteristics and proportions as Sahelian jihadist militants have escalated, entrenched, and increasingly broadcast their footprint. When comparing 2024 and 2025, the number of violent events involving jihadist groups in the borderland regions of Benin’s Alibori and Borgou departments; Niger’s Dosso department; and Nigeria’s Sokoto, Kebbi, Niger, and Kwara states rose by 86%, and the related fatalities increased by 262% (see graph below). This pattern of violence illustrates a combination of continued spread, growing lethality, and risks to civilians in the regions concerned.

The borderlands form a connected conflict zone, although with distinct dynamics in each country. In Benin, sporadic but particularly deadly cross-border raids against the military made 2025 the deadliest year to date. In Niger, parallel campaigns by JNIM and ISSP show that these groups are consolidating and expanding their presence, with recent operations in and around the capital, Niamey. In Nigeria, United States airstrikes against ISSP — which is active in Sokoto and northern Kebbi — coincide with increasing violent activities by multiple groups and in the same areas in Kwara state, including JNIM, the Mahmuda group, and Boko Haram (JAS), along with a recent series of large-scale killings attributed to JAS.

Sahelian jihadist groups have also increasingly publicized their activities in the borderland regions. Between June and November 2025, JNIM publicly claimed a series of attacks in Basso, Wara, Nuku, and Karunji along the Benin-Nigeria border.¹ These attacks included the group’s first claimed operations inside Nigeria, broadcasting the group’s presence in an area where its activity had previously been suspected but less overt. Similarly, in December and February, ISSP began to signal its presence by officially claiming attacks in Goubey and Birni N’Konni in the Niger-Nigeria borderlands,² where the group’s activities have previously been attributed to the Lakurawa, a name often used as a catch-all term for Sahelian militant groups and their local recruits operating in Nigeria.³ 

These strategic communications, which follow the expansion efforts of JNIM and ISSP, point to growing competition and outbidding between the groups, demonstrating that both are positioning themselves to maintain their presence and influence in the borderlands. If this pattern continues, it will likely intensify violence, consolidate militant presence in rural border areas, and increase pressure on nearby population centers, while increasing the likelihood of military operations and militia formation — a trend already visible on a limited scale.

How are the recent US airstrikes in Nigeria connected to this growing jihadist threat?

The December US airstrikes in Nigeria’s Sokoto state targeted ISSP militants in the Tangaza Local Government Area, which is known to host the group’s camps. The decision to strike ISSP inside Nigeria, away from its core areas in the central Sahel, points to a focus on containing militant expansion toward coastal West Africa while maintaining a foothold in the wider region. A more immediate trigger for the strikes may have been ISSP’s October kidnapping of US citizen, missionary, and civilian pilot, Kevin Rideout, in Niger's capital, Niamey.⁴

President Donald Trump framed the intervention as a response to a “Christian genocide” in Nigeria, a characterization disputed by available conflict data and not fully consistent with Nigeria’s complex mix of communal, ethnic, criminal, and jihadist violence.⁵ In this context, ISSP is not an armed group associated with violence typically described as targeting Christian communities in Nigeria, which suggests a disconnect between the public framing of the strikes and the group that was actually targeted.

Beyond the kidnapping and the disruption of ISSP activity, military cooperation between the US and Nigeria presents a viable option for the US to engage Sahelian militant groups, unlike in central Sahel — the epicenter of the Sahelian jihadist insurgency — where states aligned under the Alliance of Sahelian States have largely expelled Western forces. This cooperation provides Washington with continued regional access, enabling closer monitoring and pressure on both Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist groups.

What conditions are aiding the jihadist expansion and entrenchment in the borderlands, and how durable are they?

Jihadist entrenchment in the borderlands is sustained by structural governance gaps unlikely to be reversed in the near term. Limited state presence and weak border control persist after several Sahelian states withdrew from ECOWAS, which led to weakened regional cooperation, bilateral tensions, and limited cross-border coordination. Beyond the weak military and security presence, other local armed actors, including bandit and hunter groups, remain fragmented and outmatched, offering little resistance to better-armed, more organized, and combat-experienced militant groups. These conditions create a permissive environment across vast rural areas.

Within this setting, terrain plays a central role in sustaining the militants’ presence. Forest belts and protected reserves serve not only as concealment but as core operating areas. JNIM initially expanded into the subregion through the W-Arly-Pendjari (WAP) Complex of reserves and national parks. ISSP has also established a network of camps in wooded hills (locally known as “dutses” in Hausa) along the Niger-Nigeria border, which provide remote shelter sites that are difficult to access by ground operations (see map below). These groups’ continued use of natural reserves and classified forests indicates a deliberate reliance on these areas as transit routes, base areas, and staging grounds rather than temporary hideouts. 

These groups’ persistent presence in under-governed areas further shapes recruitment patterns. Recruitment in the borderlands has changed over time and has not been limited to a single ethnic community. Fighters and supporters have been drawn from groups with diverse linguistic and cultural identities in the borderlands, including Fulani, Gourmantche, Djerma, and Bariba, among others. Early mobilization efforts targeted individuals from areas affected by farmer-herder conflicts in parts of the Dosso region. For example, following intercommunal violence between farmers and pastoralists in 2019, militant groups began offering training and weapons to members of local communities. This was especially evident in the border commune of Tanda in Niger,⁶ situated along the Niger River and the Benin border, where both JNIM and ISSP recruited from the same villages and communities. From 2022 onward, as the two groups expanded their operations into Benin, the riverine border strip became a focal point for militancy, with fighters regularly crossing between the two countries. 

As JNIM consolidated its presence around the WAP Complex and along the Niger River, recruitment broadened to populations living around the parks and along the Niger and Mekrou rivers where the militants operated. Both groups also expanded their manpower by co-opting local bandits, while ISSP gained acceptance by leveraging existing kinship networks and providing protection to communities facing bandit violence, particularly in parts of Sokoto. 

Lastly, the control over illicit trade routes, especially fuel smuggling connecting northwestern and north-central Nigeria with riverine communes in Niger and Benin, and other areas surrounding the WAP Complex, has linked local livelihoods and economies to militant presence. Boat operators who transport fuel, supplies, and people along the rivers play an important role in both smuggling and militant mobility. Therefore, communities and traders along these routes have become increasingly dependent on access, taxation, and protection arrangements provided by these groups, leading to both passive and active support. These dynamics also help explain the Sahelian militants’ expansion into Nigerian border areas, where key transit hubs are located, and supply routes serve communities and militant-held areas in the neighboring countries.

How do Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist groups interact?

The relationships between Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist groups reflect historical linkages rather than newly formed alliances. Each of the main Sahelian groups has a Nigerian counterpart. JNIM strengthened ties with the Nigerian al-Qaeda affiliate, Jamaat Ansar al-Muslimeen fi Bilad al-Sudan, more commonly known as Ansaru, after the latter pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in mid-2020,⁷ building on pre-existing ties between the groups. Similarly, ISSP has long-standing connections with the Lake Chad Basin-based Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Its predecessor, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, functioned as a Sahelian subgroup within ISWAP before becoming a standalone province in March 2022. 

Alongside these networks, additional jihadist groups operate in north-central Nigeria, including the Boko Haram (JAS) faction under the leadership of Abubakar Saidu, better known as Sadiku, and the local jihadist group, the Mahmuda group, or Mahmudawa. Many share historical roots or maintain channels of contact, allowing coexistence and cooperation around short-term objectives. In practice, they operate independently but may coordinate on specific operations. There are indications of cooperation between JNIM, the Mahmuda group, and JAS’ Sadiku faction, particularly in overlapping areas of activity in Kwara state and around the Kainji Lake National Park.⁸ The Mahmuda group’s affiliation is unclear, with reported ties to JAS, Ansaru, and ISWAP — groups that all trace their roots to the broader Boko Haram insurgency, illustrating a conflict environment where group boundaries are often fluid and unclear.⁹

These dynamics are visible on the ground. For example, violence in the Nigerian villages of Nuku and Woro in early February, attributed to JAS’ Sadiku faction, took place in areas where attacks had previously been attributed to the Mahmuda group and where JNIM has claimed operations.¹⁰ A further series of attacks attributed to the same JAS faction in parts of Borgu underscores the growing overlap of several jihadist groups operating in the same localities (see map below).¹¹

How do these different jihadist actors operate and communicate?

Most jihadist actors in the borderlands operate clandestinely, limiting public exposure and staying under the radar of military and security responses. Until recently, JNIM was the primary group openly claiming attacks to signal territorial presence and shape perceptions of control.

ISSP has also begun publicly claiming attacks, including ambushes against the Nigerien military in Goubey in December and Birni N’Konni in February. These claims are significant because violence in the same areas has often been attributed to the Lakurawa, which in practice reflects ISSP-linked activity rather than a separate group. In this way, public claims serve not only propaganda purposes but also clarify — or in their absence, deliberately blur — who operates in a given area.

These groups communicate directly with local communities. In Woro, JAS sent a handwritten letter in Hausa to local leaders requesting permission to preach and promising not to harm residents. According to local leadership, the letter was reported to security agencies, after which the group carried out an attack.¹² Such messaging serves multiple purposes, including testing compliance, identifying cooperation with authorities, and establishing deterrence through punishment.

These practices show that messaging functions as a tool of control as much as a means of communication. Attribution confusion matters operationally; it obscures who controls which areas and complicates threat assessment. Militants sometimes exploit this ambiguity to complicate effective responses. As competition between groups increases, causing them to shift from maintaining a covert presence to becoming selectively visible, messaging becomes part of efforts to control communities, deter cooperation with authorities, and signal presence and intent to rival groups.

Correction: A legend was added on the bar graph titled "In the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands, militant violence and resulting deaths spiked in 2025," and one incorrectly categorized as a "claimed attack" in Niger was removed from the map called "Militant activity in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands."

Visuals produced by Christian Jaffe.