Central Yemen
Information about the Central Yemen region, its strategic position, and the conflict scenario.

Overview
Straddling the former border between North and South Yemen, the Central Yemen region, comprising Ibb, al-Bayda, and al-Dhali, occupies a strategic position in the middle of the country. The region borders seven governorates — Taizz, Marib, Sanaa, Dhamar, and al-Hudayda in the historic north, and Shabwa, Abyan, and Lahij in the south — and provides critical access links to much of the country. The region demarcates the southern boundary of Houthi-controlled territory, running from the borders of al-Bayda through northern and western al-Dhali to Ibb, while the rest of al-Dhali is under the internationally recognized government (IRG). As a gateway between Houthi and IRG territory, the three governorates in the central region serve as one of the main transport hubs, as well as a primary smuggling route to Houthi-controlled areas from the south.1
Conflict background
The frontlines have largely been frozen since mid-2021 when the Houthis retook control over all of al-Bayda governorate, and have remained unchanged since the UN-mediated truce and throughout the subsequent unofficial ceasefire that has held since April 2022. Although these lines of control have not been challenged, border areas remain contested, primarily in eastern and southern al-Bayda and central al-Dhali, where Houthi and IRG forces engage in regular, though limited, confrontations despite the truce.
Houthi forces first moved into Ibb in October 2014 after they had overrun al-Hudayda and Dhamar. They entered Ibb’s capital without facing any resistance from IRG forces.2 The group’s takeover of the rest of the governorate also encountered little opposition, facilitated by the Houthi alliance with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and his affiliated forces and tribal network. Unlike the neighboring governorates of al-Bayda and al-Dhali, Ibb has not been a frontline in the war, although has experienced localized violence since the start of the current conflict, as well as spillover hostilities from the fronts in al-Dhali and Taizz. Local opposition to Houthi consolidation has flared up intermittently in the governorate but has not escalated into sustained confrontations.
Houthi forces faced more resistance in al-Bayda as they sought to take over the governorate in late 2014 and that thwarted their efforts to secure key districts. But, due to the internal divisions within the anti-Houthi factions and their lack of external support, the group managed to take control over most of the governorate in 2015. The situation was largely stable for several years as the Houthis co-opted and coerced local tribes to accept their presence in exchange for some degree of autonomy.3
The front was reopened in mid-2021 when IRG forces launched an offensive in an attempt to ease pressure in neighboring Marib. The operation backfired, allowing the Houthis to advance into the remaining areas south of the governorate and claim the rest of al-Bayda by September.4 The borders of the governorate remain restive. Houthi and southern forces are engaged in small-scale skirmishes between al-Bayda and Shabwa, which have been gradually increasing in intensity,5 and in the south into Abyan. Al-Bayda’s southwestern border on Lahij has also been the site of long-running clashes with local tribes, but these have been limited since 2021.
Houthi forces lost their foothold in southern al-Dhali at the same time as they were pushed out of most of neighboring Lahij in 2015. The Houthis were forced to retreat to the north of Damt district by what was then known as the Southern Resistance, but crucially, they managed to hold on to key points along the Sanaa-Aden and al-Dhali-Ibb roads. They subsequently lost more ground in 2018, including areas in the south of Damt and Qaataba, to STC-aligned forces, but retook most of them in March 2019. The frontlines have changed little since, but remain among the most active in the country due to their strategic importance in providing access to Ibb and the central highland.
Timeline
- 2014
- Oct. | Houthi-Saleh forces seize Ibb
- 2015
- Feb. | Houthi-Saleh forces capture most of al-Bayda
- Mar. | Houthi-Saleh forces overrun al-Dhali
- Aug. | Coalition’s Operation Golden Arrow retakes inland southern al-Dhali
- 2021
- Jul. | IRG counter-offensive makes initial inroads in southern al-Bayda
- Sep. | Houthis take full control over southern al-Bayda, consolidating control over the whole governorate
- 2022
- Apr. | UN-mediated truce
- Oct. | UN truce ends, but sides maintain unofficial truce as negotiations continue
Regional Context
As one of the primary supply arteries connecting IRG- and Houthi-controlled territory, the region has become a soft border, containing some of the Houthis’ main inland custom points, at which secondary taxes and customs are applied on goods and travelers. Most important is the Afar checkpoint in the central Malajim district in al-Bayda, established in January 2019. Most imports heading to Houthi territory from the southern coast and eastern land-crossing points with Oman and Saudi Arabia pass through the checkpoint.6 The site is a significant source of revenue for the Houthis, with the majority of gas and up to a quarter of fuel for Houthi-controlled areas traveling overland from Marib via the customs point. Meanwhile, key routes from Aden pass through al-Dhali and Ibb, as do roads used for transporting goods to the west coast of Taiz.
Prior to 2022, the other most active combatants in the central region had been AQAP and IS-Y, for whom the al-Bayda front was the main area of operation during the period of 2018-2020. In particular, internecine fighting erupted between the groups in July 2018, after which the two sides claimed more attacks against each other than any other single target. The rivalry seemingly broke out over control of local territory and competition for recruitment and influence within their overlapping areas of operation in the north of the governorate.7 Yet, after the Houthis gained control over the whole of al-Bayda in September 2021, AQAP militants were forced to withdraw to neighboring Shabwa and Abyan governorates.