Conflict in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa is currently experiencing high levels of political violence and instability, owing to a number of civil conflicts, violence by militias and militant Islamist groups, and insurgencies. The region typically includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. A broader definition, often referred to as the Greater Horn of Africa, includes Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan. 

The civil war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 has caused major destruction across the country. As a result, Sudan has featured on ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist ever since. 

In South Sudan, a new round of violence erupted in 2025, affecting the fragile 2018 power-sharing arrangement. 

The ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia began in 2018 with the transition of power within the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, which led to political competition among various actors. Since then, various phases of civil conflicts, competition for power, and intra-ethnic disputes have added to the violence, instability, and civilian targeting in the country. 

In Somalia, decades of armed conflict and social and political instability have been driven by complex factors, including clan disputes and the al-Shabaab insurgency that Somali forces and other regional and international actors have been fighting since the mid-2000s. Outside of Somalia, al-Shabaab militants have also been active in Kenya, a country that battles pastoralist militia. 

Armed groups in the Horn of Africa

Multiple armed actors are involved in the political violence shaping the Horn of Africa. Here, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia experience the most sustained and intense conflicts. 

In Sudan, the primary belligerents are the Sudanese army, called the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whose power struggle has driven widespread violence and instability, pulling various armed groups into the conflict. 

In Somalia, the Islamic State Somalia has become an increasingly bigger hub of the group’s global operations. But al-Shabaab remains the dominant non-state armed group in Somalia. It is engaged in protracted conflict with federal government forces, allied clan militias, and troops from the African Union missions. Al-Shabaab has also expanded its operations into neighboring Kenya, particularly in the border counties. 

In Ethiopia, there has been heightened activity from two key ethnonationalist insurgencies: the Fano militias, aligned with Amhara nationalist interests, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), aligned with the Oromo nationalist movement. Both groups have clashed frequently with federal forces — mostly the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) — in struggles for territorial and political control. Since the beginning of 2026, tensions between the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Ethiopian government have escalated, leading to sporadic armed clashes between the TPLF-led Tigray Defense Forces and government forces in disputed territories in Tigray and along the border between Tigray and the Amhara region.

Meanwhile, in South Sudan, political tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar have escalated into renewed armed conflict since the beginning of 2025. South Sudan’s military force, called South Sudan People's Defense Forces, is battling the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by Machar, along with the White Army, a predominantly Nuer militia believed to be loosely aligned with SPLM-IO.