The Houthis have drawn down their attacks on commercial shipping, but dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Yemen bring the Red Sea to a crossroads between de-escalation and spiraling violence.
The Houthis have drawn down their attacks on commercial shipping, but dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Yemen bring the Red Sea to a crossroads between de-escalation and spiraling violence.
In this Q&A, ACLED’s experts discuss how Islamic State affiliates operate in Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, the Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique, and how authorities are responding to this growing threat.
Despite the Somali government’s security operation against al-Shabaab for the past two years, the group continues to pose a threat to the state.
In 2024, ACLED records over 1,800 demonstrations in Kenya, primarily by Gen Z, teachers, and health workers.
The Horn of Africa is currently experiencing high levels of political violence and instability, owing to a number of civil conflicts, violence by militias and militant Islamist groups, and insurgencies. The region typically includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, and Eritrea. A broader definition, often referred to as the Greater Horn of Africa, includes Kenya, Sudan, and South Sudan.
The civil war that broke out in Sudan in April 2023 has caused major destruction across the country. As a result, Sudan has featured on ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist ever since.
The ongoing conflicts in Ethiopia began in 2018 with the transition of power within the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, which led to political competition among various actors. Since then, various phases of civil conflicts, competition for power, and intra-ethnic disputes have added to the violence, instability, and civilian targeting in the country.
In Somalia, decades of armed conflict and social and political instability have been driven by complex factors, including clan disputes and the al-Shabaab insurgency that Somali forces and other regional and international actors have been fighting since the mid-2000s. Outside of Somalia, al-Shabaab militants have also been active in Kenya, a country that battles pastoralist militia.
Multiple armed actors are involved in the political violence shaping the Horn of Africa. Here, Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia experience the most sustained and intense conflicts.
In Sudan, the primary belligerents are the Sudanese army, called the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whose power struggle has driven widespread violence and instability, pulling various armed groups into the conflict.
In Somalia, the Islamic State Somalia has become an increasingly bigger hub of the group’s global operations. But al-Shabaab remains the dominant non-state armed group in Somalia. It is engaged in protracted conflict with federal government forces, allied clan militias, and troops from the African Union missions. Al-Shabaab has also expanded its operations into neighboring Kenya, particularly in the border counties.
In Ethiopia, the past two years have seen heightened activity from two key ethnonationalist insurgencies: the Fano militias, aligned with Amhara nationalist interests, and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), aligned with the Oromo nationalist movement. Both groups have clashed frequently with federal forces — mostly the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) — in struggles for territorial and political control.
Meanwhile, in South Sudan, political tensions between President Salva Kiir and First Vice President Riek Machar have escalated into renewed armed conflict since the beginning of 2025. South Sudan’s military force, called South Sudan People's Defense Forces, is battling the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), led by Machar, along with the White Army, a predominantly Nuer militia believed to be loosely aligned with SPLM-IO.
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The Houthis have drawn down their attacks on commercial shipping, but dynamics in the Horn of Africa and Yemen bring the Red Sea to a crossroads between de-escalation and spiraling violence.
As the SAF and RSF build parallel governments and upgrade their arsenals, the world’s deadliest conflict for civilians is unlikely to end soon.
ISCAP’s collaboration with allies deepened in the DRC, Ethiopia launched its first airstrike against the Tigray Defence Forces since the Pretoria agreement, and violence surged in the Tombouctou region of Mali.
The RSF attacked civilians in Sudan after taking over El Fasher and Bara, unrest erupted in Cameroon over President Biya’s re-election, and al-Shabaab struck a prison in the Somali capital.
Insurgent violence rose in Nigeria’s Borno state, the US’ first recorded drone strike in the Sanaag region of Somalia killed an elder, and in Sudan the RSF made gains in El Fasher.
JNIM overran the Farabougou army base in Mali after a five-year siege, Boko Haram escalated attacks on the Cameroon-Nigeria border, and targeted violence in Darfur drove an increase in civilian deaths in August.
In this Q&A, ACLED’s experts discuss how Islamic State affiliates operate in Somalia, the Sahel, the Lake Chad basin, the Great Lakes region, and northern Mozambique, and how authorities are responding to this growing threat.
In the week of 7 to 20 June, displaced Tigryanians demanded their return to disputed territories, and Ethiopian and South Sudanese forces clashed at the border.
Update on Ethiopia covering 24 May - 6 June 2025, including analysis on violence in Oromia and Tigray.
Update on political violence and protests in Ethiopia from 10 to 23 May 2025.