Al-Qaeda’s “new normal” in Yemen: strategic continuity despite a leadership change

In early June 2025, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) released a video featuring Saad Bin Atif al-Awlaqi’s first appearance since assuming the organization’s leadership.¹ In the video, Awlaqi — dressed in traditional Yemeni attire, with a “janbiyya,” the traditional curved Yemeni dagger, prominently displayed — outlines AQAP’s strategic direction. The message is strikingly ambitious. Moving from a critique of the Gaza crisis, it frames global jihad as AQAP’s central objective and identifies the United States and Israel as its primary adversaries. It also openly aspires to the establishment of an Islamic state in Yemen.²

References to global jihad are echoes of AQAP's past achievements, meant to resonate with its core constituency. But this ambition clashes with ground reality: AQAP is a weakened organization grappling with limited resources, dwindling operations, and a reduced capacity to project force beyond its area of operations or to conduct international attacks. The message casts a spotlight on Awlaqi and the extent to which he can credibly impose such a direction on the group.

Considered one of AQAP’s tribal leaders³ — he hails from the prominent Awlaqi tribe in Shabwa — Awlaqi initially fiercely opposed the policies of his late predecessor, Khalid Batarfi, and the so-called “Iranian shift.”⁴ This shift entailed a pragmatic non-hostility pact with the Houthis and an escalation of operations against what AQAP considers US/Israeli proxies in Yemen — namely, the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) and, in particular, the United Arab Emirates-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). ACLED data indicates that this shift began around the time of the death of al-Qaeda (AQ)’s global leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the emergence of Sayf al-Adil — AQ’s second-in-command, who has close ties to Iran⁵ — as the group’s de facto acting leader (see graph below).

Challenging Batarfi’s leadership, Awlaqi’s Yemeni faction⁶ pushed for a resumption of hostilities against the Houthis. Accordingly, many scholars anticipated a shift in AQAP’s strategic direction under Awlaqi’s leadership.⁷ Yet no such shift has materialized, and strategic continuity appears to define AQAP’s new normal. Within this broader continuity, though, the group’s operational patterns are evolving in three key areas: its engagement with pro-STC counter-terrorism forces, its covert cooperation with the Houthis, and its interactions with local communities.

Cyclical flare-ups and STC counter-terrorism operations against AQAP

Since 2022, the confrontation between the STC and AQAP has followed a cyclical pattern in which short but intense counter-terrorism campaigns have produced temporary territorial and operational gains, followed by periods of AQAP regrouping and renewed activity (see the graph below). AQAP’s resurgence in 2022, when their activity more than doubled compared to 2021, was less a sign of renewed strength than a reaction to the STC’s expansion into AQAP strongholds in Shabwa and Abyan⁸ under the banner of counter-terrorism.⁹ This confrontation peaked between August and September 2022 with dueling operations — the STC’s Arrows of the East and AQAP’s Arrows of Righteousness — in which AQAP ultimately bore the brunt.

The STC’s operation secured some key gains, including the capture of AQAP’s main stronghold in the rugged mountain valley of Wadi Awimran¹⁰ — though at the price of heavy losses, such as the death of Abdullatif al-Sayyid, head of the Security Belt Forces (SBF) in Abyan. Subsequent counter-terrorism campaigns, including Operation Swords of Haws in mid-2023, and renewed security operations between December 2024 and July 2025, again reduced AQAP’s operational footprint (see map below). At the peak of this push, the STC advanced into southern Abyan and the coastal areas, with the aim of dismantling smuggling networks.¹¹

However, these gains proved fragile. In September 2025, the STC’s operations reached their highest activity levels since August 2023 and produced the largest territorial gains on record. Yet most of the areas secured during this phase lay south of Wadi Awimran, in zones previously cleared by the STC, underscoring the ephemeral nature of territorial control and AQAP’s ability to re-emerge by exploiting persistent security gaps.

Indeed, AQAP’s operational trajectory during this period reflects a pattern of adaptation rather than decline. Following a brief low point in late 2023 — amid rumours that Batarfi had been poisoned¹² — the group rebounded sharply in early 2024, coinciding with Awlaqi’s appointment as leader on 10 March 2024.¹³ The new leader embraced the strategy set by his predecessor, identifying the STC as the group’s main enemy and depicting it as a proxy of the US and Israel.¹⁴ Yet, he found himself operating in a markedly different security landscape and adopted a distinct modus operandi, drawing on increased support from AQAP’s local Yemeni militant networks.

While Batarfi confronted a more aggressive STC, emboldened by the launch of the counter-terrorism campaign and its gains in Shabwa governorate, Awlaqi faced STC forces in a posture of territorial consolidation. Entrenched in the small village of al-Buqayra, at the mouth of Wadi Awimran, they focused on holding ground through patrols rather than advancing into AQAP areas. Furthermore, AQAP’s constituency appeared emboldened by the appointment of a local Yemeni commander with strong tribal ties, as confirmed by local sources interviewed by the authors.¹⁵

Together, these dynamics translated into a reconfiguration of AQAP’s operations, characterized by more direct assaults against STC troops, growing boldness, and a renewed focus on Abyan governorate. Under Awlaqi, armed clashes increased by 55%, while IED attacks fell by about 70% compared to the same period under Batarfi. These figures indicate a recalibration of the group’s battlefield approach, marked by more targeted forms of violence and reflecting increased confidence. The decline in IED attacks appears to reflect a deliberate shift away from indiscriminate or low-impact targeting — such as vehicles and checkpoints — in favour of more selective use of explosive devices.

The terrain of al-Buqayra and Wadi Awimran proved conducive to this shift. With STC forces concentrated along the valley floor and AQAP fighters operating from elevated positions on the surrounding slopes (see map below), AQAP could easily carry out sniping attacks. Between March 2024 and January 2025, ACLED records around 35 sniping attacks against STC soldiers. These high-risk operations that require close-range fire surpassed the total number recorded in all previous years combined since 2015. Concurrently, AQAP increased direct strikes on higher-profile targets, such as STC leadership and military sites, thus replacing Batarfi’s earlier emphasis on vehicles and convoys, which were comparatively easier to target and more accessible.

Another strategic shift involved the use of cars rigged with IEDs. Under Batarfi, only two such attacks occurred in four years, and they were used exclusively in an attempt to decapitate the STC’s security leadership at sites deep within STC-held territory, away from AQAP operational areas. In contrast, Awlaqi attempted to maximize STC losses by targeting their barracks. AQAP’s two car bomb attacks in August 2024 and October 2025 killed at least 20 STC members and injured over 30. The August attack was the deadliest of its kind since 2015. Concurrently, Awlaqi started using drones in Abyan rather than Shabwa to strike the enemy’s internal lines.

These patterns are particularly salient in the context of the recent political crisis in southern Yemen. This crisis led to the dissolution of the STC and Saudi Arabia’s assumption of direct control over the IRG’s political and security architecture. During the STC’s brief advances in Hadramawt and al-Mahra in December 2025, AQAP was unable to significantly exploit the situation. However, the subsequent suspension of UAE counter-terrorism operations¹⁶ and the withdrawal of STC-aligned forces from Wadi Awimran, Mudiya, and surrounding areas open a window of opportunity for AQAP to regain ground in Abyan.

While repeated STC campaigns have historically kept AQAP in check, they have not fundamentally degraded the group’s operational capacity. At present, the group’s activity remains at relatively low levels, suggesting a deliberate “wait-and-see” approach following the recent political and security realignments. In this context, AQAP is likely to prioritise consolidating its presence in its historical areas of operation, while potentially seeking to expand its reach if new security gaps emerge. At the same time, the disappearance of its main adversary, the STC, raises open questions about how the group may recalibrate its targeting strategy in the mid-term.

AQAP and the Houthis: Concealed cooperation?

Claims of cooperation between the Houthis and AQAP have proliferated in recent years. However, the extent to which this relationship is substantive — and how it may evolve in the context of the crisis in southern Yemen — remains open to question.

Historically, documented interactions between the Houthis and AQAP have been largely limited to prisoner exchanges. Since 2022, however, tacit cooperation has expanded to include mutual non-aggression, links to a regional illicit economic network involving al-Shabaab, and the Houthis’ purported provision of drone technology to AQAP. By contrast, claims that AQAP and the Houthis have formed a strategic alliance and coordinate their attacks against STC forces remain weakly documented and difficult to verify, reflecting the narrative interests of several actors — including the STC itself.

Prisoner exchanges are often interpreted as evidence that the pragmatic relationship between AQAP and the Houthis is deepening.¹⁷ These exchanges are not new: several occurred between 2016 and 2021, suggesting that such channels existed even during periods of active hostilities.¹⁸ Indeed, since June 2022, at least four documented prisoner swaps have taken place. While these exchanges indicate the existence of open communication channels, they do not in themselves constitute evidence of a strategic alliance.

A more substantial and recent indicator of cooperation is the emergence of a smuggling network linking the two groups. United Nations expert reports on Yemen document smuggling between the Houthis and AQAP,¹⁹ linking both groups to a broader trade network that also includes al-Shabaab in East Africa. This network has become an increasingly important lifeline for all three groups, enabling them to bypass international sanctions and diversify their weapons procurement channels.²⁰

Several Yemeni and international sources report transfers of drone technology from the Houthis to AQAP, viewing this as a tangible indication of cooperation between the two groups.²¹ AQAP launched its first drone attack on 12 May 2023, around a year from the last corroborated violent interaction between AQAP and the Houthis (see graph below). Since then, the group’s annual drone usage has increased by over 300% according to ACLED, despite the targeted killing of AQAP’s senior drone expert in April 2024.²² This exponential increase suggests access to a sustained source of drone procurement, with the Houthis representing a plausible supplier — although AQAP may also have procured at least some of its first drones through looting government depots or purchasing them from local smugglers.²³

AQAP primarily relies on multi-use drones dropping grenades, basically off-the-shelf commercial quadcopters with minimal navigation systems. Indeed, only two attacks out of 48 recorded by ACLED involved the use of suicide drones. This conservative pattern suggests limited and uncertain access to drone supplies. Operationally, AQAP drone attacks take the form of low-intensity harassment attacks against STC targets, meant to amplify the group’s threat profile.²⁴ Usually, these attacks cease when the STC escalates counter-terrorism operations, suggesting risk aversion and a strategy of calibrated escalation (see graph above).

Claims of links between the Houthis and AQAP are sporadically reported by pro-STC²⁵ and pro-IRG²⁶ sources, often citing the alleged presence of Houthi officials alongside AQAP militants. Pro-STC sources have also claimed instances of coordinated attacks on different fronts, including concurrent Houthi drone strikes on Lahij’s Karish front and AQAP activity in Wadi Awimran on 7 January 2025.²⁷ However, their frequency does not demonstrate consistent coordination, and hard evidence remains lacking.

The security vacuum created by the STC’s withdrawal is likely to facilitate an expansion of smuggling activities along the southern coastline, one of the most recent focal points of STC counter-terrorism operations. A potential territorial advance by AQAP could expand the geographical scope of its drone attacks, enabling the group to target IRG forces further inland, even without acquiring longer-range systems.²⁸ By contrast, deeper operational or military coordination between the two groups appears less likely in the short term.

The fine line between coopting and coercing local communities

AQAP’s enduring presence in Yemen has been sustained by its effective engagement with local communities and its deep embedment within tribal structures and customs. The organization’s difficulties under Batarfi’s tenure were partly attributed to his lack of tribal connections, whereas Awlaqi’s solid tribal base could bolster AQAP’s local credibility and acceptance. Ultimately, the contest between AQAP and its opponents is also a fight to win over local communities and secure their support.

The relationship between AQAP and Yemen’s tribes is constantly negotiated, and rather than exerting control, the group often seeks coexistence. AQAP members frequently retain their tribal affiliation and may seek refuge in their tribal areas, yet such arrangements are volatile and shift with local interests and power dynamics. A case in point is the al-Ali bin Ahmad branch of the Awlaqi tribe in Shabwa, which in 2014 affirmed the primacy of tribal identity over an allegiance to AQAP, tolerating AQAP’s local members’ presence, while barring its gatherings and foreign members. In September 2023, however, it publicly reversed this position, categorically rejecting the presence of what they called “terrorists.”²⁹

Recent confrontations between pro-STC forces and AQAP are concentrated in areas broadly associated with the Dathina and Upper Awlaqi tribes — particularly al-Fathan, al-Rubayz, and al-Qumush (see map below) — which have a long history of internal rivalries and shifting political alignments that predate the ongoing counter-terrorism operations and continue to shape their relationship with AQAP. The Qumush categorically banned AQAP in 2016, but the situation is less clear-cut among the other tribes,³⁰ reflecting overlapping political affiliations and long-standing tribal rivalries. 

Tensions between the Rubayzi and Fathan offer an interesting case study. In September 2021, AQAP fighters fleeing al-Bayda to Mudiya district in Abyan killed a Rubaizy tribesman before seeking refuge in Fathan territory.³¹ The incident sparked a feud between the two tribes, mirroring their divergent political alignments with the STC and AQAP.

The Rubaizy are broadly aligned with the STC: They endorsed the STC’s self-administration declaration in 2020³² and are home to Ahmad al-Rubaizy, vice president of the STC’s Advisory Council.³³ Accordingly, several tribesmen from the Rubaizy tribe have joined counter-terrorism operations, prompting direct retaliation from AQAP. In a rare instance of tribal targeting, an AQAP drone struck a gathering of Rubaizy tribesmen in May 2024, injuring a civilian.³⁴ This is an extreme example of direct AQAP intervention to deter tribal meddling, whereas the organization usually resorts to threats and deterrence.³⁵

In contrast, the Fathan clashed fiercely with the STC after some of its members were accused of planting an IED in Wadi Ithrib, which killed four Security Belt soldiers on 23 January 2023.³⁶  The STC responded by besieging and shelling al-Buqayra village, killing nine civilians and violating what is regarded as the “sanctity” of local homes — sparking strong tribal reactions, including a gathering of Abyan’s central tribes.³⁷ Although tensions eased after an agreement on 27 January,³⁸ critics accused the STC of using security campaigns to suppress tribal opposition³⁹ and discontent persisted, with renewed calls to expel the STC from Mudiya district.⁴⁰

In the aftermath of AQAP attacks, pro-STC forces have often ramped up repression of tribes under the guise of counter-terrorism. Arbitrary arrests disguised as counter-terrorism operations have been carried out in several areas, prompting tribal condemnations — such as that issued in July 2024 by the Tawasil tribes in Shabwa⁴¹ — and armed confrontations, including clashes with Al Walid tribesmen in Mudiya, where the SBF raided a village under the pretext of carrying out a counter-terrorism operation⁴² after villagers protested their presence.⁴³ Overall, these cases illustrate how the repression of tribes and civil society can ultimately backfire and serve AQAP’s strategy by fuelling resentment toward the STC and discouraging local cooperation.

In parallel, AQAP is proactively fuelling these divisions. Since its revival in late 2023, following the Gaza crisis, AQAP’s media branch — al-Malahem Media — has been extremely active. The release of confession videos depicting people it alleges are STC spies has conveyed the message that local communities are infiltrated with the aim of deterring popular cooperation with counter-terrorism forces.⁴⁴ Meanwhile, AQAP seeks to co-opt local communities, or at least ensure they remain neutral. In February 2023, Awlaqi — then the emir of Shabwa — released his first-ever video message, urging tribesmen in Abyan and Shabwa to join AQAP against the STC.⁴⁵ More recently, he has stopped demanding ransom for the release of people kidnapped by AQAP, accepting tribal mediation instead — likely indicating a new course in his relationship with the tribes.⁴⁶

With the withdrawal of STC forces from Abyan and Shabwa, AQAP is likely to recalibrate its engagement with local communities, shifting from mobilising against a common adversary to consolidating its social and political embeddedness. Local sources interviewed by the author point to a symbolic shift on the ground, with “STC slogans replaced by AQAP ones.”⁴⁷ In the absence of STC pressure to stigmatize cooperation with AQAP, local communities may be less inclined to actively marginalize or expel AQAP-aligned members, thereby lowering the social barriers to the group’s integration into tribal networks.

Toward a new AQAP narrative in southern Yemen?

The anticipated strategic shift under Awlaqi’s leadership doesn’t appear to have materialized: Since early 2024, AQAP has operated within a framework of strategic continuity, a new normal characterised by pragmatic cooperation with the Houthis and low-level insurgency against pro-STC forces in Abyan and Shabwa.

Yet, the organization is not the same as under Batarfi’s tenure, and several indicators point to a latent threat that could suddenly erupt. After initial successes, STC counter-terrorism operations struggled to deliver a decisive blow, with new territorial gains appearing short-lived at best. At the same time, the new AQAP leadership appears more attuned to AQAP’s Yemeni militant networks and to local communities, with signs of increased recruitment among the tribes, as noted by an informed Yemen analyst.⁴⁸ The non-aggression pact with the Houthis provides AQAP with a secure rear area, while enhanced cooperation in arms smuggling could give the group access to new technologies that enable it to carry out unprecedented attacks. 

The crisis in southern Yemen calls into question both counter-terrorism efforts and AQAP’s strategy. The United States remains a prominent counter-terrorism actor in Yemen. Washington’s drone strikes have surged under the Trump administration, targeting AQAP leaders and operatives that remain concealed beyond active theatres across several Yemeni governorates — including Marib, Hadramawt, and al-Mahra. However, historically, UAE-backed forces — including the SBF and the Elite Forces — played a pivotal role in counter-terrorism operations. Ongoing reforms within the IRG’s military and security apparatus are now set to merge these forces into a new structure, as confirmed by the recent establishment of the National Security Forces⁴⁹ — a unified security body led by Abu Zaraa al-Mahrami that incorporates the SBF. Against the backdrop of mounting instability within the IRG camp, there is a tangible risk that counter-terrorism priorities will be pushed into the background.

Meanwhile, AQAP is already exploiting the ongoing crisis by expanding into new areas in Hadramawt, after looting arms depots left vacant by withdrawing STC forces.⁵⁰ The group portrayed the STC’s pullback as a victory,⁵¹ but the latest developments also deprive AQAP of a central foe in its propaganda. In recent years, AQAP invested significant resources in constructing a narrative that casts the STC as its primary enemy. With this framing now weakened, AQAP will face pressure to develop a new narrative and recalibrate its strategic objectives in Yemen, potentially leading to increased attacks against IRG forces. Furthermore, insurgent attacks against the IRG could be readily attributed to AQAP, offering the UAE a convenient cover for any spoiler activity aimed at damaging the Yemeni government.

AQAP’s new leadership appears intent on boosting AQAP’s morale and projecting ambitious goals. While foreign operations or the establishment of a new Islamic caliphate remain unlikely in the near term, it is plausible that high-profile attacks — including car bombs — will increase in both frequency and scope: The withdrawal of the STC creates a greater operational space for AQAP and may incentivize the group to signal its new strategic posture. In view of the growing coordination between AQAP, the Houthis, and al-Shabaab in Somalia, leaving AQAP unchecked risks compounding instability in southern Yemen that may reverberate across the wider Red Sea security environment.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.