The battle for the borderlands: The Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan challenges the state’s control

In December 2015, the Pakistani army announced “phenomenal success” in its fight against militancy, as Operation Zarb-e-Azb, a military operation launched to eradicate militant strongholds in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, entered its final phase.¹ Pakistan appeared to have finally regained control in the region once referred to as “the most dangerous place in the world,” inspiring hope for a more peaceful future after years of deadly militant attacks against civilians across the country.² The gains were, however, short-lived. 

Only a decade later, the largest of these militant groups, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), often referred to as the Pakistani Taliban, has re-emerged as one of the biggest national security threats to the state, and it is only getting stronger. Although the group is not yet as powerful as in its heyday in the late 2000s and early 2010s, ACLED data show that the TTP engaged in at least 600 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the past year alone. Its activity in 2025 so far already exceeds that seen in all of 2024 (see graph below).

The TTP now finds itself in a changed geopolitical environment. Its remarkable resurgence has coincided with, and benefited from, the return of its ideological namesake, the Taliban, across the border in Afghanistan in 2021. At the same time, part of its original raison d’être, namely the removal of foreign troops from tribal lands, has lost much of its urgency with the withdrawal of United States and NATO forces from Afghanistan and the end of Pakistan’s cooperation with them in the “war on terror.” Instead, its principal aims have shifted to establishing a sharia-based legal system within Pakistan, or at least in the country’s tribal belt, and restoring semi-autonomy in that region.³ 

This report unpacks how the TTP’s tactics have evolved in its latest iteration, as it pursues these recalibrated objectives. Through sustained attacks against security forces alongside an increase in strategic violence against civilians associated with the state apparatus, the TTP aims to undermine the state’s authority in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). As it advocates for the restoration of semi-autonomy, it is also tapping into existing socio-economic grievances to position itself as an alternative center of power. 

But first, how did the TTP become a potent threat once again? Three factors played a major role: organizational reforms under the leadership of Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, the Afghan Taliban’s return to power, and internal political schisms within Pakistan. Mehsud, who took over as TTP emir in 2018, focused on consolidating different factions and adopting a centralized internal structure modeled on the Afghan Taliban.⁴ Meanwhile, the Taliban reportedly provides the TTP with material, monetary, and moral support.⁵ At the same time, the Pakistani government failed to consolidate the gains made during Operation Zarb-e-Azb, as its military and civilian leadership remained embroiled in political turmoil surrounding former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s ouster.

A renewed push in a familiar battleground

Like before the Pakistani army’s crackdown, the TTP’s activities are concentrated in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly in its southern parts and in the predominantly Pashtun-inhabited district​​s that previously comprised FATA. In May 2018, the Pakistani government passed a landmark constitutional amendment merging these former FATA regions with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and extending the same legal and electoral rights to them as applicable in the rest of the country.⁶ This ended more than a century of semi-autonomy and governance under the repressive, colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation.

These areas, now known as newly merged districts (NMDs), have once again emerged as the TTP’s strongholds. According to ACLED data, 40% of all TTP violence since 2021 has occurred in the seven NMDs (see map below, in which striped districts represent the NMDs). This concentration in the NMDs has remained nearly consistent over the years, even as the frequency of TTP attacks has increased exponentially. Here, the group has a very visible presence on the ground, openly staging roadblocks and conducting patrols, although unlike in the past, it has not yet been able to hold any territory.⁷

Why has the TTP concentrated its efforts here?

That the TTP’s resurgence began from, and remains concentrated in, the former FATA region is unsurprising; both its politics and geography provide a fertile ground for militant activity. The twin districts of North and South Waziristan, which are the epicenters of TTP activity, comprise the area where the TTP was founded in 2007.⁸ Its leadership hails from the Mehsud tribe and shares close ethnic ties with the local population, especially in South Waziristan. Meanwhile, the area’s rugged and mountainous terrain provides ample hideouts and favorable conditions for ambushes. And, of course, there is also the deeper ideological basis for the TTP’s focus in this region, as one of its primary aims is the removal of security forces from the tribal belt and the restoration of its previous semi-autonomous status.⁹ 

The NMDs’ location on the border of Afghanistan also partly explains the concentration of militancy in the area. While large numbers of TTP militants fled to Afghanistan during Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the porous border between the two countries facilitated their return once the threat subsided.¹⁰ The group reportedly continues to operate out of Afghanistan and has opened new training camps in the border provinces of Kunar, Nangarhar, Khost, and Paktika since 2024.¹¹ ACLED data corroborate claims of cross-border movement facilitating militancy: The areas within Pakistan that have seen the most TTP activity border the Afghan provinces that reportedly house the group’s training centers (see map above). This issue has soured relations between the two countries, as Pakistan accuses the Afghan Taliban of providing a safe haven to the TTP.¹² Though Afghanistan has officially denied this claim, its policy toward the TTP has generated internal dissent, as some within the Afghan Taliban have been unwilling to betray their former brothers in arms even as others advocate for a more pragmatic approach attuned to geopolitical concerns.¹³

However, the TTP is not the only active militant group in the region. The Islamic State Khorasan Province and the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group also maintain a strong presence in Bajaur and North Waziristan districts, respectively. Well-established smuggling routes run across these border regions and, as a result, US and NATO weapons left behind after the US’ withdrawal have made their way to militants in Pakistan, contributing to elevated levels of overall militant activity in these districts.¹⁴ 

What is notable, however, is that inter-group clashes do not significantly contribute to the escalation in militant activity. Inter-group and factional violence constitutes less than 1% of the TTP’s overall activity, despite the group being in direct competition with other militant groups for resources and territorial control. Its accommodation of these other groups speaks to emir Mehsud’s desire for unity. This supplements his strategy of minimizing fragmentation, which is also evidenced by the consolidation of factions under his leadership.

Expanding into new frontiers

Leveraging its base in the NMDs, the TTP has also significantly expanded its activities in the southern districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province outside the NMDs, notably in Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Lakki Marwat districts. The southern part of the province now accounts for nearly 60% of all TTP violence since 2021 (see map above). Dera Ismail Khan and Lakki Marwat are strategically important provinces, as they provide a gateway to Punjab, the center of Pakistan’s economic and political life. In particular, Dera Ismail Khan also borders the restive Balochistan province. Owing to this geography, these districts are existing hubs for drug trafficking, a network that the TTP seeks to tap into to boost recruitment.¹⁵ This is a key focus for the group, as despite its resurgence, its reported strength is far below the TTP’s estimated peak of 30,000-35,000 members around the early 2010s.¹⁶ 

The TTP’s activity in southern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa clearly demonstrates its expansionary intent. Beyond ideological motivations, the group’s sustained focus on NMDs shows that it wants to secure the region as a possible sanctuary where militants can retreat when faced with more intense policing operations elsewhere, such as southern Punjab, which has a stronger state presence. An analysis of the TTP’s tactics reveals a calculated strategy to displace the state’s authority and position itself as an alternative center of power in the NMDs. 

What lies beneath the TTP’s rhetoric of restraint?

As it regrouped, the TTP’s leadership announced fresh rules of engagement, with a clear focus on military and state institutions. This stemmed from its belief that its indiscriminate attacks against civilians in the early 2010s had led to a reduction in public support, ultimately contributing to the success of Operation Zarb-e-Azb.¹⁷ It was, in fact, the 2014 attack on Army Public School in Peshawar, which claimed the lives of more than 100 children, that helped generate the political consensus to launch a comprehensive military operation. Does the TTP’s rhetoric of restraint, however, match the situation on the ground?

In the initial years after its resurgence, the TTP’s activities primarily targeted security forces. ACLED data show that in 2021 and 2022 combined, more than three-fourths of all TTP activity involved attacks against, or clashes with, state forces. However, there is a marked shift from 2023 onward, as targeted violence against civilians increased more than elevenfold between 2021 and 2024, more than doubling its share of the TTP’s overall activity (see graph below). In 2025 so far, ACLED records over 200 incidents where the TTP has targeted civilians.

This violence is tactical rather than indiscriminate, and it is mainly directed at those associated with formal and informal governance structures (see chart below). The TTP employs a loose definition of who counts as a combatant, as its rules of engagement explicitly identify ruling elites and members of the judiciary as legitimate targets.¹⁸ Under this expansionary understanding of the wider state apparatus, TTP militants frequently target tribal elders and those who form part of the wider local governance structures, such as civil servants and polio vaccinators. Laborers, on the other hand, are targeted either as part of extortion attempts or to disrupt ongoing developmental work. 

According to ACLED data, off-duty security personnel are among the biggest targets (see chart above). Attacks against off-duty as well as former security personnel, the overwhelming majority of whom are police, generate weariness among serving security personnel and contribute to an overall feeling of lawlessness. They are also soft targets, as they are typically unarmed at the time of the attacks. Last year, police in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa staged rare protests against the targeted killings of their colleagues and demanded more resources. Policing in the region is challenging due to police and paramilitary forces being poorly equipped and trained compared to the military.¹⁹

The rationale behind other attacks against civilians is often unclear: Some are killed accidentally due to landmine explosions, while others are killed in targeted attacks without a clearly identifiable motive. Although this remains a small proportion of the TTP’s overall violence directed against civilians, the lack of a discernible motive for some killings further contributes to a sense of insecurity among locals.

Threatening the state’s grip on power

The shift in the TTP’s approach can be understood as part of its broader strategy to undermine the state’s writ. Attacks against formal and informal power structures, such as attacks against tribal leaders, create a sense, both real and perceived, of a governance vacuum, opening up opportunities for the group to step in. These targets are also typically vulnerable, and attacks against them offer an attractive option for the TTP to showcase its strength while incurring minimal costs. In parallel to the increase in violence targeting civilians linked to the state, the TTP has also increased its use of explosive and remote violence since 2023. Such methods, which are by their very nature unpredictable, further deepen the sense of instability and erode public trust in the state’s ability to maintain law and order.

At the same time, being strategic in its civilian targeting allows the TTP to avoid the backlash caused by its previous bout of indiscriminate attacks and maintain a facade of mainly fighting the Pakistani state and what it deems to be the state’s collaborators. ACLED data provide some support to the TTP’s rhetoric of restraint: Despite the increase in violence targeting civilians, it still constitutes a lower proportion of the TTP’s overall activity as compared to clashes with security forces. It is also not happening on the same scale as when the TTP was at its strongest. The TTP’s approach toward tribal elders is instructive. It rode to power in the late 2000s through killing tribal elders, who wield enormous power in these parts.²⁰ This time, its attacks have been more limited in comparison, selectively targeting tribal elders whom it regards as state collaborators. It has also sought to publicly negotiate with some tribal groups, seeking to portray itself as a reasonable party that’s attuned to the concerns of the locals and accepting of local justice customs.²¹ 

Violence is, however, only one tool in the TTP’s toolbox as it seeks to position itself as an alternative center of power. As the TTP has simultaneously strived to tap into existing local grievances, Pashtun nationalism has found increasing prominence over more religious messaging in the group’s propaganda.²² Many Pashtuns remain resentful of the loss of autonomy following FATA’s merger, especially as many of the promised socio-economic benefits have been slow to materialize.²³ They also have a common adversary in the form of Pakistani security forces, whom the locals accuse of committing serious human rights violations under the pretext of anti-militancy operations.²⁴

Seeking to capitalize on this sentiment, the TTP’s leadership expressed support for a national jirga (assembly) organized by the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM), the largest advocacy group focused on the protection of Pashtun human rights, in 2024.²⁵ The gathering brought together thousands of leaders, politicians, and tribespeople from across the country in a stunning display of Pashtun unity.²⁶ Serving as a deliberative forum to discuss Pashtun grievances, the outcome resolution called for the demilitarization of Pashtun lands, encompassing both militants and military forces. Despite the jirga’s disavowal of militants, the supportive statement by the TTP was perhaps an attempt to show empathy with local concerns and to contrast the TTP with the state, which violently cracked down on the gathering, reportedly killing four participants.²⁷

Taken together, the TTP’s strategy appears to be to create such an unsustainable situation within the NMDs that the state is compelled to intervene more heavily militarily in its strongholds. Although the TTP would be outnumbered and outmatched, it likely hopes to exploit public resentment against military operations, which previously resulted in massive displacements, to spur support and recruitment.²⁸ Simultaneously, it is positioning itself as a champion of local interests. This would place it in a position to sustain a protracted insurgency. A collapse in law and order in the region may then bring into play the TTP’s more limited political goal — the reversal of FATA’s merger with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and restoration of semi-autonomy in the tribal areas. 

A looming confrontation

For Pakistan, there are no easy choices. The status quo cannot hold — the loss of lives is too high and the security situation too precarious. However, another military operation along the lines of Zarb-e-Azb is also unlikely. Locals remain hostile to the idea, and the political consensus that precipitated previous operations no longer exists.²⁹ Pakistan is also in a difficult place economically to be able to afford such a large-scale military operation. On the other hand, negotiations between the TTP and tribal elders may not offer a sustainable solution, either, given the TTP’s unwillingness to follow through on promises in the past and the absence of any formal mechanism to enforce agreements. Direct talks between the TTP and the state remain elusive as the TTP’s key demand of implementing sharia is fundamentally incompatible with Pakistan’s constitutional ethos. 

Thus, we may continue to see more of the same — smaller-scale, localized anti-militancy operations, as launched in July 2025 by military forces to clear militants from Bajaur district. Such operations, however, are unlikely to be successful in the long run. While they may be effective in temporarily clearing militants from certain areas, without a strategy and boots on the ground to hold on to these areas, the militants will return. 

Such temporary operations could have more success if the state also focused on strengthening the governance framework on the ground, allowing it to build on, or at the very least maintain, military gains. This would require addressing some of the genuine socio-economic grievances which, in part, led to the rise of the TTP. However, there seems to be an unwillingness to reckon with the same. The state has cracked down on Pashtun nationalist organizations, limiting alternatives for peaceful engagement on these issues. The decision to ban the PTM over national security concerns, days before its planned national jirga to discuss Pashtun rights, gives an indication of the state’s chosen, and rather blunt, approach toward combating rising militancy.³⁰ Pakistan’s response has instead focused externally, directing its ire toward neighboring Afghanistan and India for fomenting secessionist ethnic nationalism and spurring militancy.³¹ 

Far from being resolved, two relatively recent developments indicate that civilian grievances are likely to increase in the next phase of the insurgency. First, the TTP is facing greater resistance from armed local militias. Unlike the state-sponsored militias of the past, the new groups seem to have been formed directly by locals in organic opposition to the militancy.³² The absence of formal oversight or control mechanisms over these militias may lead to abuses of power in the region and leave local communities unprotected against retaliation by militants. Secondly, there has been an uptick in the use of drones, mainly armed quadcopters, by both militants and military forces to carry out attacks. Restrictions on media access make the independent verification of claims difficult, but it is clear that these tactics, as yet, remain experimental and imprecise, and civilians are likely to continue bearing the brunt. Both developments point toward greater instability in the region and play into the TTP’s narrative of a breakdown in law and order, as it attempts to wrest control from the state in this restive region.