Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict

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On 25 January, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N Hilu) clashed with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in several locations of Blue Nile state’s Bau locality, after crossing from South Sudan. Bau county critically lies between the state capital, al-Damazin, and Kurmuk locality — which hosts Yabusa, SPLM-N Hilu’s stronghold in Blue Nile¹ —  and borders South Sudan. This fighting is the first on-the-ground confrontation between the two groups after the SAF’s accusations in recent months that the RSF uses neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia, to train and mobilize fighters.² 

The SAF, RSF, and allied groups have increased deployments in the Blue Nile since at least mid-December 2025, when the SAF publicly accused Ethiopia of providing military support to the RSF. The latest campaign in Blue Nile, though, began in earnest on 11 January, when the SAF carried out airstrikes on a convoy in Yabus, killing an unspecified number of people. The SAF said the convoy carried foreign mercenaries trained in Ethiopia to reinforce the RSF and the Hilu faction. SPLM-N Hilu countered that the strike killed civilians returning from markets and workplaces. SAF airstrikes continued on 22 January in the Yabusa and Bellila areas.

Blue Nile state is central to the RSF’s new push toward central Sudan

Previously peripheral to the war, Blue Nile state is becoming a focal point in Sudan’s conflict.  The RSF and SPLM-N Hilu’s current campaign likely responds to the SAF’s recent rounds of offensive operations against the two groups in North and South Kordofan, creating another front for the SAF to contend with. Since December 2025, air- and drone strikes in South Kordofan — where Hilu’s faction’s main stronghold is located — have quadrupled, while the fight for control of North Kordofan persisted. Since the beginning of this year, the SAF has regained control of at least a dozen locations in South and North Kordofan. At the same time, since February 2025, the RSF and Hilu’s faction have besieged two main cities in South Kordofan, Kadugli — the state capital — and the second biggest city, Dilling. The SAF is attempting to break the siege and link these cities to North Kordofan. Reports indicate that the SAF regained control of Habila town, near Dilling, on 26 January. 

The RSF’s decision to push the fight to the SAF in Blue Nile is crucially aimed at reopening the contest for control of central Sudan – Khartoum, Sennar, and al-Jazirah states. Should the RSF wrest control of Blue Nile, this would open routes toward Sennar, which the SAF has held since early 2025.

Until the first quarter of 2025, the RSF controlled central Sudan, after previously pushing the SAF-led government out of the capital, Khartoum, and into Port Sudan. A series of SAF offensives between September 2024 to May 2025, though, saw a dramatic reversal in fortunes, and the SAF completed its takeover of central Sudan by May 2025.³ The SAF has since returned its seat of government to Khartoum on 11 January 2026.

Were the RSF to cease control of Blue Nile, it would give the RSF an opportunity to revisit and potentially reverse this loss by opening a gateway to central Sudan. However, mass mobilization by the SAF in central Sudan over the past two years presents significant complications for any such RSF push to replicate its earlier successes at the start of the Sudan conflict.