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Recent strikes on paramilitary forces signal intensified efforts to weaken the Islamic Republic’s internal structures.
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Israeli drone strikes on Basij checkpoints on 11 March signal a new push to bring the conflict closer to Iran’s internal security apparatus. The strikes on state paramilitary operating at the street level, reported across several neighborhoods in Tehran and in Karaj and Shiraz, put the regime’s coercive forces more directly in the line of fire, likely in an effort to limit the state’s ability to contain unrest. The United States and Israel may be aiming to stoke fractures among the security forces’ rank and file and improve conditions for dissent — but a mass anti-regime mobilization is unlikely to materialize in the short term.
The 11 March strikes represent an acceleration of the US and Israel’s efforts to weaken the state’s internal structures. Since the start of the war on 28 February, at least 30% of the more than 900 US and Israeli strikes recorded by ACLED have targeted core facilities linked to the Islamic Republic’s system of domestic control.
The strikes hit police facilities in over 100 events, Basij facilities in more than 70, intelligence-linked sites in over 30, and local governorate buildings in at least 12 instances. In more than 100 events, strikes hit Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) facilities that may be involved in both military and domestic security operations, including provincial commands, local headquarters, and barracks.1 Tehran province accounts for the largest number of strikes, with a second major cluster in Kurdish-inhabited provinces along Iran’s western border (see maps below).
The targeted facilities form the backbone of the state’s internal security system and are central to surveillance and the suppression of dissent, protests, and unrest across the country. The Islamic Republic’s internal security system is multi-layered: It combines regular state institutions with ideological forces designed as much to ensure regime survival as to maintain public order. Since the beginning of the war, security forces have maintained a visible presence in major cities, with checkpoints, patrols, and additional deployments reported across the country.
As such, strikes on security infrastructure alone may not be enough to limit the state’s ability to suppress unrest. Even where installations or command facilities have been damaged, many security units remain operational. Reports indicate that personnel and equipment have been dispersed across alternative sites, with some units temporarily relocated to facilities such as schools, mosques, and sports complexes.2 While some human rights organizations estimate that about 4,000 security personnel may have been killed since the start of the campaign,3 hundreds of thousands work for the Islamic Republic’s internal security services. Further, eastern and northern provinces have seen relatively fewer strikes, leaving security structures there largely intact and available as additional reserves.
On the first day of the conflict, US President Donald Trump called on Iranians to rise up and overthrow the regime.4 Subsequently, Israeli, US, and opposition figures abroad, including Reza Pahlavi, have repeatedly suggested that conditions for internal mobilization may emerge later in the conflict. However, a population fatigued by the ongoing war and still reeling from the previous wave of violent repression in January may be reluctant to mobilize again at this stage. Iranian officials have also issued repeated warnings against staging anti-government protests during wartime.5
These developments come amid wider speculation about escalation scenarios — including operations by Kurdish armed groups along Iran’s western border, US or Israeli special forces operations at nuclear facilities,6 or attempts to seize strategic oil export infrastructure such as Kharg Island7 — raising the prospect that sowing domestic unrest could form one element of a broader multi-front campaign aimed at stretching the state’s security apparatus.
Visuals produced by Ana Marco.
Daily updates on the conflict unfolding in Iran and the wider region
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The IRGC figure refers only to sites with potential internal security roles and excludes purely military infrastructure such as missile, naval, air, or weapons production facilities.
Iran International, “Reports indicate the deployment of Basij, police, and IRGC forces in several cities across Iran.” 12 March 2026 (Farsi); @HengawO, 3 March 2026 (Farsi)
Hengaw, “At least 4,300 killed, including 390 civilians, in first ten days of war,” 10 March 2026