Is civil unrest poised to escalate in Lebanon?

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The Hezbollah-Israel ceasefire, brokered by the United States, pauses the conflict and paves a way forward to peace negotiations between Israel and Lebanon. However, any negotiations with Israel — deeply unpopular among Hezbollah’s support base — risk stoking the country’s brewing civil unrest. 

Since the war began on 2 March, Israel has pummeled Lebanon with air- and drone strikes and artillery shelling and engaged in armed clashes with Hezbollah militants (see map below). At least 2,000 people have been killed and 6,000 others have been injured, according to the Lebanese Ministry of Health.¹ The Lebanese government has blamed Hezbollah for the hostilities, and effectively issued a ban on the group’s security and military activities following its attack against Israel.² This has further exacerbated domestic tensions and sparked protests against Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s government, mainly in Beirut. Domestic tensions are likely to continue to escalate and civil war remains a possibility that, however distant, cannot be ruled out. 

How a civil war could materialize

In recent weeks, Hezbollah and Iranian officials warned the Lebanese government that its decisions against the group risk plunging Lebanon into instability. On March 19, the deputy head of Hezbollah’s political council, Mahmoud Qamati, described the government as “incapable” and of colluding with Israel to destroy the group.³ A senior adviser to the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, sent a message to Salam when he said that “ignoring the role of the resistance and Hezbollah would expose Lebanon to irreparable security risks,” adding that the “stability of Lebanon is only possible through the synergy between the government and the resistance.”⁴

In the face of an existential threat, Hezbollah could attempt to oust the Lebanese government. Salam’s sudden cancellation of his trip to the US on 12 April, along with the deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops in Beirut to prevent riots, sparked rumors of a Hezbollah-backed coup plan against the prime minister, although no credible evidence of the plot has surfaced so far.⁵ 

Despite the current government’s confrontational stance toward Hezbollah, the LAF has so far avoided any clash with the group due to fears of stoking a civil war. But Salam’s designation of Beirut as a demilitarized city could escalate tensions if the LAF begins arresting Hezbollah militants there. In a worst-case scenario, armed clashes could lead to fractures within the LAF along sectarian lines, as some Shiite soldiers, commanders, and officers retain sympathy for Hezbollah. Such a split could also spark intra-LAF clashes.

Regions like southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley would likely be hotspots for Hezbollah-LAF clashes due to the majority presence of the Shiite community and vast areas where Hezbollah maintains operational presence. Despite a year of deploying to the south of the Litani River sector, the LAF has not yet asserted its full control. In fact, Hezbollah has re-established its footprint in the region, especially along the border areas, since the start of the war on 2 March. This explains how the group quickly confronted Israeli soldiers invading Khiyam and other villages in the eastern sector.

In addition, the Israeli military is likely to benefit from a state of chaos in Lebanon, as Hezbollah would be overstretched between an internal and external front, further constraining the group’s capabilities. That prospect likely explains why the US has reportedly urged Syria to intervene⁶ in Lebanon and engage with the Israeli army to clamp down on Hezbollah in the Bekaa Valley, where the group’s precision-guided missiles and advanced weapons are believed to be stored. 

A full state collapse is unlikely for now

Several factors make full-blown civil war unlikely in the short term. First, the underfunded LAF remains a cohesive national institution that enjoys support from the Lebanese public⁷ and international partners. Internally, the army limits the ability of non-state actors and militias, including Hezbollah, from seizing critical infrastructure such as Beirut’s international airport, the Beirut port, and major arteries connecting the capital to surrounding areas. The LAF acts not only as an army, but also as a security force preventing the escalation of internal sectarian, political, and security tensions. 

Second, the Lebanese government’s directives issued on 5 and 7 August 2025, which instructed the LAF to restrict arms to state security services and assert control south of the Litani River, have been implemented without direct confrontation with Hezbollah. This suggests that the group has exercised strategic restraint. Soldiers from the Shiite sect may also be unwilling to fight against Hezbollah, but also to defect and fight with Hezbollah against the LAF, minimizing the possibility of a clash. 

Third, the election of Salam and President Joseph Aoun has increased the viability of the current government’s international partnerships. Their appointments have already helped restore a degree of international confidence, reflected in renewed diplomatic engagement with Western and Gulf states and re-engagement with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 

Rather than outright state collapse, a more likely scenario in the near term is a period of sustained civil unrest, potentially involving protests, riots, and localized clashes. In particular, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement are likely to mobilize their supporters against the government, especially as US President Donald Trump has invited Aoun and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to the White House for peace negotiations.⁸

Public rhetoric from Hezbollah’s support base continues to label Salam as a Zionist,⁹ increasing the likelihood of demonstrations that could escalate, particularly in mixed or politically sensitive areas like Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Sidon, and the Bekaa Valley. 

This scenario is potentially reminiscent of 2008, when short-lived civil clashes with factions loyal to the anti-Hezbollah March 14 movement — a coalition of political parties loyal to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, Samir Geagea, and Walid Joumblatt — broke out in Beirut. At that time, the government took steps to limit Hezbollah’s security network communications, effectively dismantling its security apparatus. 

Even if civil war remains a distant prospect, the looming threat of civil unrest is high and increasing. This threat is likely to be further exacerbated by upcoming engagements between the Lebanese and Israeli governments amid comprehensive talks of peace.  

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.