Civilians in Colombia face less deadly — but more pervasive — violence during Petro’s presidency

The start of the year in Colombia was marked by a rekindling of armed groups’ confrontations in several settings, notably in the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander. In mid-January, the National Liberation Army (ELN) led an offensive against Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) dissidents who refused to sign the 2016 peace agreement. The fighting claimed the lives of over 80 people, mostly civilians, and prompted the government to declare a state of emergency for 90 days.¹ Before this latest flare-up of hostilities, Colombia had started to experience a reduction in violence by armed groups targeting civilians. In 2024, these events decreased for the first time since 2019. Some adjustments in President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace plans seemed to have contributed to the reduction: Despite the outburst of violence in Catatumbo, reported deaths from violence by armed groups decreased by 8% in the first 30 months of Petro’s administration. 

Slight improvements in some dimensions of the conflict do not mean civilians experienced a respite from the violence (see map below). In fact, a growing number of Colombians were caught in the crossfire of heightened wars between expanding armed groups in 2024. In some of the places where this fighting was fiercer, civilians continued to be seen as military targets by armed groups and increasingly experienced forced recruitment, confinement, or displacement. They were exposed to landmines and IEDs used by armed groups with the aim of stopping enemy advances. While armed groups mostly targeted civilians to assert their authority in a new territory or when their territory was contested by a rival group, deadly displays of violence became less necessary when they achieved full territorial control. Armed groups also exerted their authority and targeted civilians to increase their revenue through less lethal expressions of violence, such as kidnappings. 

How armed groups’ expansion impacts civilians

After increasing year-on-year since 2019, violence targeting civilians in Colombia dropped by 20% in 2024, when a total of nearly 1,500 events was recorded. Robust security operations in parts of Cauca and some progress in regional peace talks in Nariño may have contributed to this reduction in two of the country’s most violent departments. As a result, Cauca and Nariño experienced a more substantial decrease than the national average. In addition, one achievement of the Petro administration has been to reduce state forces’ abuses against civilians, both in the context of security operations and in the management of protests. ACLED records 37 events of security forces’ civilian targeting in the first 30 months of Petro’s term, resulting in 17 reported fatalities, down from 83 reported fatalities in 163 events in the same period prior. According to a human rights advocate who spoke to the author, this is no minor feat in Colombia, which is still dealing with the wounds left by the case of ‘false positives’ — a practice that spread in the early 2000s, when the army killed over 6,000 civilians, then claimed they were rebels.² 

For their part, armed groups also resorted less to lethal forms of violence against civilians, possibly due to the rising political cost that deadly attacks might carry in negotiations with the government and in attracting security forces’ attention and response.³ This held true until the ELN’s offensive in Catatumbo, which raised doubts about the armed group’s commitment to peace talks, prompting the government to suspend the negotiations.⁴

Despite these trends, armed groups’ activity continued to threaten Colombia’s civilian population. During the first 30 months of Petro’s administration, 26.7 million Colombians were exposed to organized violence, 24% more than in the previous period (see graph below). But civilians were not only exposed to the fighting between armed groups; they were also directly targeted by armed groups. While there was a reduction in 2024, it came after 2023, the year with the highest number of incidents of armed groups targeting civilians — over 1,600 — since ACLED began collecting data on Colombia in 2018. Overall, more of these incidents took place in the first 30 months of the Petro administration than in the previous 30-month period.

Armed groups often target civilians as a means to attack rivals, particularly in settings where turf wars are fiercer. In the recent offensive in Catatumbo, the ELN targeted social leaders, former FARC combatants, and other civilians it perceived to be affiliated with the FARC dissidents.⁵ Similarly, in Arauca, the ELN and another FARC dissident faction affiliated with General Central Staff (EMC) rarely clashed directly but instead opted to carry out attacks on soft targets, such as civilians living in areas under the control of each group.⁶ As a result, in 2024, civilian targeting by armed groups rose in Arauca — the department with the third-highest level of civilian targeting during the Petro administration — contrary to the national trend. 

Turf wars between armed groups also led to increased civilian targeting in Putumayo, Antioquia, and Chocó in 2024 (see map below). In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Gulf clan are caught in a conflict over the control of illegal gold mines and drug and migrant trafficking routes. Tensions between FARC dissidents account for the rise in civilian targeting in Putumayo, and the recent split of the EMC into two conflicting factions could spark a similar dynamic in departments such as Guaviare, Meta, and Caquetá where both factions operate, which may force local communities to take sides as they start clashing.⁷

Civilians have also increasingly become collateral victims of armed groups’ fighting. To beef up their warring ranks, armed groups have stepped up forced recruitments, including of adolescents. This is particularly prevalent in Arauca, Cauca, and Chocó, among other departments where conflict is intense.⁸ In 2024, armed group members numbered over 21,000, according to army estimates, 14% more than in 2023.⁹ Further, in order to limit rivals’ or security forces’ incursions in certain territories, armed groups resorted to massive deployments of landmines and explosives thrown from drones and other devices. This, in turn, contributed to an increase in incidents where civilians were killed or injured by explosives, with 91 events in 2024, 60% more than in 2023, with notable increases in Cauca, Chocó, and Norte de Santander. Nariño is a notable exception. There, the government and the Comuneros del Sur armed group have discussed demining in their negotiations, possibly contributing to halving these incidents in 2024.¹⁰ 

The intensification of wars between armed groups also had serious repercussions for civilian mobility. Armed groups’ impositions — such as the issuing of IDs to restrict access to certain areas¹¹ — and the deployment of mines impeded civilians from moving freely, especially in rural areas. In a few instances, farmers could not reach the fields they worked in.¹²Armed clashes, threats of forced recruitment, and warnings to leave their territory ahead of an incursion caused the internal displacement of at least 180,000 people in 2024, a number that has tripled since 2022, according to the United Nations.¹³ The January outbreak of violence in Catatumbo alone has already displaced around 52,000 people.¹⁴ 

Furthermore, 138,400 people experienced forced confinements: when armed groups prohibit residents of a community from leaving their homes so they can more easily detect and prevent attacks by rival groups or security forces.¹⁵ Nariño remained among the departments most affected by mass displacement in 2024, while Chocó was the department most affected by forced confinements.¹⁶ According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of Colombians seeking asylum abroad increased from 144,210 in 2022 to 392,719 in the first half of 2024.¹⁷ While not all asylum requests will ultimately be granted, and some may even be fraudulent,¹⁸ such an exponential increase may be another indicator of the civilian impact of conflict in Colombia. 

Armed groups’ violent tactics to extort and subdue communities

Armed groups also target civilians with violence as a means to enforce territorial control. In some places, however, a decrease in the number of events of civilian targeting may indicate an armed group’s consolidation of power.¹⁹ For example, in the northern departments of Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, after rapidly and violently expanding in 2022 and 2023, the Gulf Clan reached such a “level of control that it does not need to target civil society organizations, since everyone knows what happens if they go against them,” according to a humanitarian worker who spoke to ACLED.²⁰ In areas with a significant presence of armed groups, access is becoming increasingly difficult — including for humanitarian organizations — and local populations often do not denounce abuses for fear of reprisals, opting instead for either silence or displacement.²¹ 

Armed groups have also increasingly resorted to violence targeting civilians as a means to ensure illicit financial revenues, particularly through extortion and kidnappings for ransom. ACLED records a growing number of attacks with explosives on commercial establishments as retribution for not paying extortion. Extortion has become a thriving business for a myriad of criminal groups operating in the country’s main cities, sometimes on behalf of bigger outfits such as the Gulf Clan.²² However, rebel groups have also increasingly resorted to this practice to diversify their revenue streams. For example, a number of cases have been attributed to FARC dissidents, particularly in the Meta and Huila departments. Also, in the first 30 months of the Petro administration, armed groups were responsible for at least 625 abduction events, increasing by an estimated 122% compared to the previous period (see graph below). ACLED treats abductions as distinct events, with each event involving one or more abductees.

The ELN was reportedly behind almost one in every five abductions, despite the government’s attempts to negotiate a suspension of this practice.²³ These incidents were prevalent in the Arauca and Norte de Santander departments, where the presence of cattle ranching activities and oil pipelines makes kidnappings more profitable — and hence frequent — than other departments with a strong ELN presence, such as Chocó.²⁴The Gulf Clan and FARC dissidents also increasingly carried out kidnappings, especially in the Antioquia and Cauca departments, respectively.²⁵ The sums requested for the release of those kidnapped vary according to the armed group involved and the victim’s profile, and they range from around 2,000 to over 160,000 US dollars for a wealthy cattle rancher.²⁶ Military intelligence estimates that extortions and kidnappings yield over US$4 million per month for the ELN alone.²⁷ In August 2023, Petro’s government announced a plan to tackle thefts, extortions, kidnappings, and homicides, foreseeing over 500 operations with greater coordination among the police, military, and judicial authorities.²⁸ After a five-month trial period, however, there does not seem to have been any follow-up phase, nor any significant impact on criminal activities.

In addition to demanding ransom or extortion payments, armed groups use violence targeting civilians to enforce their governance and social control. For example, abductions can be aimed to punish suspected collaborators of rival groups or those accused of petty crimes and drug consumption, hence acting as judicial authorities. In some cases, abductees remain captive for months while an armed group conducts investigations, and they may be forced to work for the group.²⁹ Armed groups can also carry out symbolic displays of violence to intimidate an entire community. In some cases, explosive devices were reportedly detonated in populated areas as retribution against locals for as little as not protesting enough against the presence of the army during a military operation, according to a humanitarian worker.³⁰

Armed groups’ targets are increasingly political 

While armed groups’ violence and impositions affect the civilian population at large, certain groups remain particularly vulnerable (see graph below). Since Petro took office, some groups have been targeted on fewer occasions, others have suffered from similar levels of violence, and some have experienced a recrudescence of violence.

Social leaders and former FARC combatants remain extremely exposed to armed groups’ violence.³¹ Despite a 15% decrease in events of armed groups targeting social leaders under Petro’s presidency, they fell victim to one in every 10 attacks against civilians. Opposition to armed groups’ rule, illegal mining activities, illicit crop cultivation, and deforestation for intensive livestock activities are among the most common drivers of violence against local leaders. However, local power struggles also underlie some attacks against social leaders.³²The situation is particularly worrisome in Cauca, where organized Indigenous groups try to resist the advance of armed groups and the forced recruitment of their youth.³³ Former FARC combatants are also targeted by their former enemies who still perceive them to be affiliated with the rebels and by former comrades.³⁴ Indeed, FARC dissidents who opposed the 2016 peace deal often sanction those who abide by the reintegration process or turn down their offers to reintegrate the rebel group.³⁵

Among the groups most exposed to violence are farmers, who face threats especially in areas most suitable for cultivating coca in Cauca, and cattle ranchers, who represent a prized target for the sprawling kidnapping economy. Other labor groups can fall victim to armed groups’ violence, such as construction workers stepping on IEDs, truck drivers attacked for not abiding by an ‘armed strike,’ and entrepreneurs targeted in extortion-related attacks or kidnappings — particularly in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, and Arauca. Indigenous people, who represent high percentages of rural and marginalized populations, are likewise targeted in departments such as Cauca, Nariño, and La Guajira. Armed groups also seek to increase their influence over local civil society groups and decision-making bodies, such as the Councils of Communal Action, particularly in Arauca.³⁶ Afro-Colombian ethnic groups along the Pacific Coast similarly face violent threats in Chocó, as a result of the ongoing fight between the ELN and the Gulf Clan.

Yet, armed group violence has increasingly targeted political figures. In the first 30 months of the Petro administration, ACLED records 258 incidents where armed groups targeted political figures, a 71% increase compared to the previous period. Armed groups attacked local officials in at least 94 events in 2023 alone, the year with the highest number of these incidents since ACLED started covering Colombia in 2018. This trend suggests that armed groups are changing tack in their relationship with political authorities, aiming to co-opt them through the use of force and impose their affiliates, particularly around local elections. While the 2023 local elections certainly acted as a catalyst of violence targeting political figures,³⁷ the trend continued well beyond electoral cycles. Armed groups seem to have upped the ante, shooting once at Vice President Francia Márquez’s vehicle and once at her father’s car, without injuring anyone,³⁸ and reportedly plotting Petro’s assassination.³⁹

Preserving civilian protection in the remainder of Petro’s term

The increased violence against political figures and the targeting of civilians in the context of fierce wars between armed groups pose significant challenges for the Petro administration, which had placed the protection of civilians as one of the pillars of its Total Peace strategy. The recent events in Catatumbo illustrate the danger involved in dealing with armed groups — in this case, the ELN — that cease to believe in negotiations as a way to seek a solution to Colombia’s protracted conflict. For his part, Petro has kept the door open to negotiations with those in the ELN who are still moved by ideology rather than pursuing illicit economic gains.⁴⁰ However, the outcry the Catatumbo events sparked among the public added to the already growing disenchantment with his administration and Total Peace.⁴¹ As the 2026 elections approach, a growing number of politicians, including government officials, are likely to distance themselves from his policies.⁴² With Petro’s political capital decreasing, more armed groups could follow the ELN in abandoning the negotiations route, with the risk of triggering an outbreak of further violence. To prevent an escalation and to save Total Peace in the coming elections, Petro should rather focus on preserving and expanding local processes — such as the one with Comuneros del Sur in Nariño⁴³ — that offer greater prospects for de-escalating violence, including reducing harm to civilians.

Correction | 19 February 2025: A previous version of this report referred to the “August 2026 general elections”; legislative elections will be held in March 2026, and the first round of the presidential election is scheduled for May 2026.