Conflict Watchlist 2024 | The Sahel: A Deadly New Era in the Decades-long Conflict

The central Sahel states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger — all of which are now ruled by military juntas — are engulfed in a decade-long regional jihadist insurgency driven by al-Qaeda’s Sahelian branch Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel). ACLED data illustrate the deteriorating security situation in central Sahel as the region hit another record year of violence. In 2023, the number of people killed by acts of political violence doubled in Burkina Faso, placing highest after Nigeria in West Africa. Across central Sahel, conflict fatalities from political violence increased by a staggering 38%, and civilian deaths by over 18%. Mali and Burkina Faso, most affected by the crisis, are categorized as experiencing high levels of violence in the latest update to the ACLED Conflict Index. High levels of violence in all three central Sahel states are likely to persist in 2024 as counter-insurgency efforts escalate to meet the insurgency’s increasingly aggressive tactics.

Burkina Faso faced a severe escalation of deadly violence in 2023, with more than 8,000 people reportedly killed as the country grappled with a nearly nationwide conflict of civil war-like proportions. Despite the army’s efforts, launching several ground offensives supported by the use of unmanned drones and helicopters, it has failed to rein in militants and suffered setbacks in many regions. Mass atrocities, variously attributed to security forces, militants, and self-defense militias such as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), persisted at a regular frequency. Djibo, the capital city of the northern Soum province, was the site of heavy fighting between JNIM and military forces supported by the VDP and home to massacres of civilians.¹ Subsequently, power often shifted between these competing forces. Over the course of the year, the momentum alternated between scaled-up military and VDP operations and renewed offensives by JNIM and IS Sahel.

In neighboring Mali, an offensive led by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and the Wagner Group caused violence to shift northward toward areas previously under the control of militants and rebels. The offensive reawakened a rebellion by predominantly Tuareg and Arab armed groups operating under the banner of the Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) coalition.² Starting in August, the offensive gradually extended across the northern regions of Tombouctou, Gao, and Kidal. Russian mercenaries played a key role in enabling FAMa to achieve strategic and symbolic victories,³ including the pivotal moment in this campaign — the capture of the rebel stronghold Kidal.⁴ In particular, elements of the Wagner Group were similarly involved in the indiscriminate killing of hundreds of civilians, destruction of infrastructure, and looting of property, as well as triggering mass displacement.⁵ In the ongoing offensive, Wagner mercenaries introduced drone-delivered explosives and explosive barrels — tactics new to the region.⁶ The mercenary outfit’s engagement in violence more than tripled in 2023 compared to 2022. 

Niger joined its central Sahel neighbors when a military junta overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in July 2023. Despite grappling with several attacks perpetrated by insurgents in the country’s western and southeastern regions, Niger’s security situation was slightly improving ahead of the coup. After IS Sahel defeated JNIM in March 2023 and consolidated its control over most of the Menaka region, the group was able to shift its operational focus to Niger.⁷ Niger has since become a more frequent target of IS Sahel attacks, leading to an uptick in casualties among both military forces and civilians. The response of Nigerien forces has been proactive and cross-border in nature, by actively engaging in ground operations and airstrikes within Mali to target IS Sahel strongholds.

The escalation and spread of deadly violence in Burkina Faso and Mali have contributed significantly to the vulnerability of civilians, who are increasingly caught in the crossfire. Ongoing military offensives are likely to continue, and FAMa and Wagner operations in Kidal led to the depopulation of several towns with tens of thousands of inhabitants having fled, many to neighboring Algeria.⁸ Mauritania is also preparing for the predicted arrival of 100,000 additional Malian refugees fleeing from border areas in the coming months.⁹ The Djibo area in Burkina Faso was already one of the areas most affected by the ongoing humanitarian crisis and internal displacement before the latest rounds of fighting, as it has been under militant blockade for almost two years.¹⁰