Do states of emergency in the Caribbean suppress gang violence or spread it? The cases of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago

“We need to launch a war on gangs of a similar magnitude and nature to the war on terror.” Those were the words of Jamaica’s Prime Minister Andrew Holness upon assuming the chairmanship of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in July 2025. In his keynote address, he highlighted the rise in gang violence across the Caribbean, which has emerged as a key drug and weapons trafficking hub for transnational criminal organizations. While the international community has mostly focused on the critical spiraling of gang violence in Haiti, other countries in the region have also struggled with a surge in gang violence. At the same time, renewed US interest in the region — with organized crime framed as a counterterrorism challenge — is also influencing how governments approach security.

In response to rising violence, several CARICOM member states, including Belize, Haiti, Jamaica, and, more recently, Trinidad and Tobago, have resorted to declaring states of emergency (SoEs) to fight crime. Although these measures have seduced several political leaders across the region, their effectiveness in sustainably curbing gang violence remains contested. Thus far in 2025, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have both experienced a decrease in violence, which political leaders were prompt to attribute to emergency powers. 

However, there is little evidence pointing to a direct correlation between the declaration of SoEs and significant drops in violence, and security gains appear uneven in time and across territories. Despite the targeting of gang leaders in the framework of emergency powers, gangs’ mobility, their ability to draw on wider criminal networks, and the resilience of their structures indicate that such decreases may be short-lived. 

At the same time, the militarization of security operations in the framework of SoEs have given way to a rise in police brutality, extending even beyond emergency powers. While police killings have sparked public outcry in some communities, especially in Jamaica, governments seem to have capitalized on popular demands for greater security to advance hardline agendas and consolidate political support — especially ahead of elections. These dynamics not only heighten long-term risks to the upholding of human rights standards and trust in law enforcement but also call into question the use of SoEs as a long-term crime-fighting strategy.

Once designed as extraordinary measures, states of emergency have increasingly become part of the law enforcement toolkit in the Caribbean. Yet, evidence from Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago suggests that while SoEs may contribute to temporary reductions in violence, their repeated use has shown little result in suppressing gangs and affiliated violence in the long run. Trinidad and Tobago first made a declaration of SoE in December 2024, a decision Kamla Persad-Bissessar's government renewed in July. After Holness’ re-election as prime minister in Jamaica on 3 September, both countries are likely to double down on hardline security strategies. Having declared over 20 SoEs since 2018, Jamaica stands as a case in point to assess the impact of emergency powers on criminal violence dynamics and the enduring consequences on civilians. The Jamaican experience provides critical insights into Trinidad and Tobago’s possible trajectory of violence dynamics where SoEs are adopted. Beyond the Caribbean, the cases of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago provide a basis for cross-regional comparisons with other Latin American countries that have resorted to similar approaches. 

Rising gang violence and fragmentation: from transnational influences to local rivalries

For decades, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have consistently been among the Caribbean countries with high homicide rates,¹ a trend that has largely been attributed to gang violence and the proliferation of firearms. This grim record reflects a broader surge in gang violence across the region. Between 2020 and 2023, violence increased by 74% in Jamaica and by 116% in Trinidad and Tobago. This surge coincided with and prompted the declaration of SoEs in both countries; but despite a relative lull, violence and retaliatory killings have proven resilient, continuing to shape security dynamics.

Behind this rise in violence is a diverse set of transnational and domestic factors.

Transnational trafficking networks

Although Caribbean gangs are generally not transnationally organized, the region's strategic location along key trafficking routes has made it a transit platform for drug shipments coming from South America and heading toward North America and western Europe (see map below). Since 2010, this trafficking corridor has gained prominence as a result of increased pressure from the United States on routes through Mexico and Central America.² The resurgence of the Caribbean route happened alongside the growing influence of transnational criminal groups such as Colombian drug trafficking groups and Mexican cartels,³ as well as emerging transnational actors like Venezuela’s Tren de Aragua that operates in Trinidad and Tobago.⁴ Additionally, diaspora networks have facilitated these transnational linkages.⁵ 

Against this backdrop, local drug economies have expanded and opened opportunities for Caribbean gangs who have positioned themselves as contracted affiliates of these larger transnational groups. In turn, the expansion of local criminal markets has contributed to an escalation of domestic power struggles among gangs competing for control of smuggling corridors and market share, leading to the fragmentation of the local gang landscape. 

Weapons proliferation and heightened deadly gang rivalries

Although Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago do not produce weapons, the steady influx of small firearms from abroad has also contributed to ongoing gang conflicts. Between 2018 and 2022, an estimated 73% of firearms seized across the Caribbean came from the United States, facilitated by straw purchasers.⁶ For example, in September, Trinidadian national Shem Wayne Alexander was indicted for conspiring to smuggle weapons from Florida to Trinidad and Tobago.⁷ Weapons are also believed to transit from Venezuela, and other Caribbean countries — notably Haiti — where Jamaican and Haitian gangs have reportedly exchanged marijuana for weapons.⁸

Traffickers exploit porous borders, weak enforcement capacity, and corruption within customs and security institutions in both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Many shipments pass through maritime routes and ports with limited government oversight,⁹ making it difficult to accurately estimate the total volume of weapons trafficked. Although firearm seizures from the US to the Caribbean increased between 2020 and 2023,¹⁰ this could be linked to several factors, including an actual rise in trafficking flows or improved law enforcement efforts.

Despite renewed commitments and international cooperation — most notably through the CARICOM framework¹¹ and bilateral agreements — illicit weapons trafficking remains a major challenge and a key driver of gang violence. In June 2025, Jamaican authorities seized 233 firearms and 40,000 rounds of ammunition, one of the largest seizures in the country’s history.¹² Concerns over the implications of transnational arms flows are heightened by the growing trafficking of semiautomatic rifles and grenades, as well as gangs’ increasing ability to modify weapons domestically to enhance their firepower.¹³

Fragmentation of the domestic criminal underworld

While the influence of transnational criminal dynamics has likely exacerbated competition, the rise in gang violence also reflects domestic pressures. One such critical driver includes the fragmentation of the criminal landscape, which has, at times, also been linked to law enforcement operations. In Jamaica, the splintering of criminal groups can be traced back to 2010 following the arrest and extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke, leader of the Shower Posse gang, which dominated the criminal landscape in the 2000s.¹⁴ The power vacuum generated by his arrest gave rise to smaller groups, whose competition has driven rising levels of violence in recent years. 

Although Holness’ government claims gang numbers have declined in 2025 relative to the 381 gangs in 2018, it still reports around 100 active gangs.¹⁵ Among these groups, the Klansman gang and its rival One Order gang appear to be among the main criminal organizations in Jamaica (see table below). Since 2020, their violent dispute over Spanish Town — a strategic location for intercepting illicit goods — has fueled surging violence in the Saint Catherine parish. 

Main active gangs in Jamaica since 2018

The fragmentation of Jamaica’s gang landscape is best evidenced in 2023 (see graph below): Amid an escalation of violence, both groups, as well as Klansman factions such as One Don, sought to fill the power vacuum left by the arrests of several Klansman leaders and the 2023 Klansman trial, including that of One Don leader Andre “Blackman” Bryan.¹⁶

In Trinidad and Tobago, a similar fragmentation process has precipitated insecurity. During the 2000s, the criminal landscape saw the consolidation of the Muslim gang — that originated among Afro-Trinidadian Muslims affiliated with the Islamist fundamentalist group Jamaat-al-Muslimeen, which attempted to overthrow the government in 1990 — and its rival, Rasta City. However, the latter fragmented during the 2010s.¹⁷ The 2017 split of Rasta City led to the emergence of Sixx and Seven gangs, which compete with rival groups such as the Anybody Gets It (ABG) gang (see table below). Longtime rivals, the Sixx and Seven gangs agreed to respective truces in February and November 2022. 

Main active gangs in Trinidad and Tobago since 2018

The breakdown of truces in October 2023 highlights the fragmentation of the gang landscape (see graph below) and contributed to escalating violence in Port of Spain,¹⁸ where these groups continue to contest historically significant neighborhoods and control over drug and arms logistics hubs, including the main shipping port. Similarly, the 2021 killing of the Muslim gang leader Anthony Boney¹⁹ triggered an internal power struggle and violent push from rival gangs to fill the vacuum, significantly increasing violence in Laventille. 

To confront the multiple drivers of violence, governments have turned to SoEs. Yet, the influence of transnational criminal dynamics further complicates the equation and already hints at some of the potential limitations of SoEs as a sole crime-fighting tool.

A turn to emergency powers 

In response to escalating violence, the governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have both opted to rely on hardline security policies: SoEs and other exceptional measures. The repeated use of SoEs to curb the spike in violence in Jamaica, and similar steps in Trinidad and Tobago thus far in 2025, suggests both countries are using SoEs as long-term crime-fighting strategies rather than to address punctual emergencies, with little evidence of their long-term efficiency. To understand how SoEs may have affected gang violence trends, it is essential to review the scope of these measures, what their implementation entails, and how their use differs between the two countries.

In both countries, similar legal provisions rule over the implementation of SoEs. The executive branches can declare an SoE for 14 days in Jamaica and 15 days in Trinidad and Tobago. Parliamentary approval is required for extensions beyond those periods.²⁰ During an SoE, security forces enjoy temporary extended powers, including the ability to conduct searches without a warrant and detain individuals without charges or a trial for extended periods. The governments can temporarily suspend certain civil liberties, notably through curfews, restrictions on freedom of movement, and arrests. 

Despite similarities in these legal frameworks, the two countries’ historical use and implementation of SoEs differ. Jamaica's governments first introduced SoEs in the 1960s and 1970s in response to politically driven violence, especially around elections. Beyond the two declared after natural disasters in 2004 and 2007, SoEs have been almost exclusively used for political violence and crime. They were introduced as a crime-fighting strategy in 2010 following the arrest of Christopher “Dudus” Coke, and again in 2018 under Prime Minister Holness to curb rising gang violence.²¹ Since 2018, the Jamaican government has declared over 20 SoEs within seven years, sometimes extending previous ones.²² SoEs are often localized, implemented in specific parishes or even individual police districts, and in response to a perceived risk or surge in violence. 

For instance, the government declared an SoE on 28 January 2025 in the Saint Catherine parish North Police division in response to violence and unrest that followed the killing of the One Order gang leader Othniel “Thickman” Lobban during a police operation.²³ In addition, Jamaica has combined SoEs with other security measures such as standalone curfews or Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs), which consist of sustained militarized presence in specific communities alongside social intervention programs.²⁴ Together, these security approaches have likely influenced broader gang violence trends over the past years.

In contrast, Trinidad and Tobago has used SoEs sparingly in recent years. In the 1970s, the government declared SoEs in the context of political instability and labor unrest linked to the Black Power Revolution. It did so again in 1990 following the Jamaat-al-Muslimeen coup attempt. During her first mandate, current Prime Minister Persad-Bissessar declared the first crime-related SoE in 2011 to tackle gang violence in specific areas.²⁵ A few months before elections, the government of Keith Rowley proclaimed an SoE on 30 December 2024 in response to a series of gang-related retaliatory killings.²⁶ This lasted until 13 April after an earlier extension. The government declared another SoE on 18 July, shortly after Persad-Bissessar began her second mandate, in response to a gang plot against security and judicial officials.²⁷ 

Unlike Jamaica’s more localized approach, the authorities have implemented the recent SoEs nationwide. While Trinidad and Tobago’s use of SoEs for crime control is more recent and less frequent, the second adoption of an SoE in July suggests that the measure could become a more prominent security tool in the future, similar to the Jamaican use between 2018 and 2023. 

The enforcement of SoEs has produced similar effects in both countries. Law enforcement agencies in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are arresting more people in recent years,²⁸ while the army is increasingly assisting police forces to combat crime, enforcing curfews and checkpoints, and conducting increased patrols.

States of emergency: a fragile respite in violence

In Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, SoEs have coincided with a decline in gang violence, particularly in clashes between criminal groups and their targeting of civilians. Such violence in Jamaica has visibly declined since 2024, a trend that has continued in 2025 despite the more sparse use of emergency powers. ACLED records a 60% drop between January and August 2025 compared to the same period in 2024. Similarly, Trinidad and Tobago experienced a 44% decrease over the same period. 

Authorities have been quick to attribute these improvements to SoEs. Attorney General of Jamaica Derrick McKoy credited the reduction in homicides to a combination of SoEs and investment in police infrastructure.²⁹ Likewise, Trinidad and Tobago National Security Minister Marvin Gonzales stated that SoEs played a significant role in reducing murder and facilitating weapons and drug seizures.³⁰ 

While yearly violence levels may appear to be declining, the timing of the declines does not always clearly coincide with the declaration of SoEs in specific parishes (see graphs below). This points to either a lag effect of the measures, insufficient evidence to sustain a direct causal link, or other policing improvements.³¹ Even when SoEs appear to coincide with temporary drops in violence, they often fail to prevent gang feuds in the longer run, as gangs often postpone attacks during SoEs.³² This raises questions about the longer-term effectiveness of SoEs.

For instance, between 14 and 29 June 2020, the government declared a state of emergency in Kingston Central and Kingston Western, a measure later extended twice to other parishes until 3 September 2020.³³ Weeks after the lifting of the measure, a gang dispute led to a series of retaliatory killings in Southside.³⁴ Consequently, the limitations observed in Jamaica suggest that similar violence declines in Trinidad and Tobago must be interpreted cautiously. 

Uneven and localized drops in violence

The lull in violence spurred by the implementation of SoEs in 2024 and 2025 appears to be geographically limited. In Jamaica, gang violence has spread beyond the traditional hotspots of Kingston and Spanish Town into other parishes and cities. Between 2020 and 2024, gang clashes and attacks on civilians increased in northwestern parishes such as Hanover, Trelawny, Saint James, and Westmoreland (see map below), driven by gangs seeking revenue from the tourism sector and lottery scamming.³⁵ Heightened security measures, including 13 SoEs in Saint James and nine in Westmoreland between 2018 and 2023, did coincide with some reduction in violence in 2024 compared to the previous year. However, the effect in Hanover was far less visible, despite the implementation of at least nine SoEs. And in Trelawny, violence appears to have spread to areas excluded from emergency measures. A potential explanation advanced by law enforcement officers is that heightened police pressure in one area has often pushed gangs into neighboring parishes, as gangs take advantage of their mobility and preexisting cross-parish networks.³⁶ 

One illustration of the mobility of violence is that the leader of the Katon Defense Force, a gang based in Saint James, was linked to a violent attack in Saint James but killed in Hanover. This example underscores how gangs exploit gang networks that enable movement and operations across parishes.³⁷ In Trelawny, security forces acknowledged that an October 2024 crackdown in Clark’s Town likely displaced the gang’s leadership to other parishes, from where they continued to orchestrate violent crime.³⁸ Even in Westmoreland, where violence levels decreased more significantly, security measures failed to prevent killings between the King’s Valley and Ants Posse gangs in Grange Hill in 2024, where authorities alleged gang members from Saint James have traveled via less-policed routes.³⁹

While the uneven drop in violence in Jamaica could be attributed to the localized nature of SoEs, similar patterns and limitations are visible in Trinidad and Tobago, despite its adoption of SoEs on a nationwide scale. SoEs have produced noticeable declines in violence in Port of Spain and San Juan-Laventille thus far in 2025. Still, the levels of violence in other regions, such as Couva-Tabaquite-Talparo, Penal-Debe, Diego Martin, and Arima, have remained similar (see map below), suggesting that SoEs could contribute to displacing crime rather than eradicating it.⁴⁰ Accounts from law enforcement and a community worker suggest that gangs could rely on similar coping strategies, keeping a low profile during heightened security operations or relocating to less policed areas through established criminal connections in rural or peripheral communities.⁴¹ Major gangs have preserved ties with local affiliates, which have sustained themselves through local criminal economies that include protection rackets or extortion — activities that are likely to run uninterrupted despite the implementation of SoEs in December 2024 and July 2025.

Resilience of gang networks and structures

Meanwhile, both governments have sought to dismantle criminal groups through arrests facilitated by emergency powers. However, despite numerous raids conducted within the framework of SoEs, the structures of criminal organizations seem to remain largely unaffected. Leadership decapitations and reshuffles are often temporary disruptions rather than dismantlements of a group. In Jamaica, the killing of Lobban, the leader of One Order, in an anti-gang police operation in January 2025, was the latest episode in a cycle of leadership replacements. He had succeeded Fitzroy Mathias “Scuffler,” who died of cancer in 2018. Scuffler himself had taken over from Andrew “Bun Man” Hope, who was killed, and his brother Rohan “Placka” Hope, who was arrested.⁴² This repeated succession underscores how removing a gang leader rarely dismantles the organization, but instead paves the way for the next figure to step in. 

In fact, in some cases, the arrests or killings of leaders have intensified violent competition within and between gangs. The 2018 arrest of One Don’s leader triggered splinter groups and turf wars, which contributed to increased violence in Saint Catherine between 2020 and 2023.⁴³ Even in 2025, after at least seven SoEs were adopted in that parish, the reduction in violence remains fragile. The finding suggests that removing a gang leader may only bring a brief lull in violence before gangs adapt and reassert control,⁴⁴ sometimes continuing to target civilians from behind bars to maintain territorial influence.

Although there have been few signs of the escalation of criminal disputes linked to the arrest or killing of gang leaders thus far in Trinidad and Tobago, criminal structures also appear generally unaltered. SoE crackdowns have pushed gang leaders to flee abroad, notably in the United Kingdom, without, however, disrupting their operational reach. For example, the leader of Seven gang allegedly met with some of its members in December 2024 to plot the killing of rival Sixx gang members as a preemptive strike against retaliatory killings of his relatives.⁴⁵ 

This case further highlights how gang influence often extends beyond immediate territories and even prison walls.⁴⁶ The July SoE — which was declared because imprisoned members of a criminal syndicate were planning targeted attacks on law enforcement officials, members of the judiciary, and state prosecutors — is indicative of how criminal groups continue to pose challenges to security from within detention facilities.

Overall, criminal violence patterns highlight that SoEs and heightened security pressure have pushed gangs to adapt through greater mobility and established criminal networks. This has exposed some of the limitations of increased security resources in localized hotspots and targeted operations against leaders. In addition, emergency powers have also sparked growing concern over the impact on human rights, which is tainting initial security gains.

Security at a cost: deadlier law enforcement and rights abuses 

In both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, the intensified presence of security forces in gang-affected areas, combined with targeted operations to arrest gang members under emergency powers, has led to a significant increase in clashes between state forces and gangs. However, the spike in security operations and use of SoEs to curb crime has come with growing concerns over compliance with international human rights standards. 

In Jamaica, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has warned against the repeated use of SoEs to combat crime, as they limit the guarantees of fundamental rights and should be used only in exceptional circumstances.⁴⁷ On 16 May 2025, the country’s constitutional court ruled that several SoE declarations between 2018 and 2023 were unconstitutional. The court cited insufficient conditions to justify their use and a breach of the division of power after the government carried out several extensions without the approval of parliament.⁴⁸ Beyond concerns over the legality of SoEs, the escalating use of lethal force in security operations has become a pressing issue.⁴⁹ Since 2022, the number of reported fatalities during clashes between security forces and gangs has increased steadily. ACLED records a marked escalation in 2025; reported fatalities recorded between January and August 2025 have already surpassed yearly levels in 2024 (see graph below). 

While state forces have often justified these incidents by saying they were in response to armed threats, there is a growing number of extrajudicial killings and contested cases, in which witnesses assert that the deceased was unarmed and the killing unlawful. This increase in the excessive use of state force appears to be linked to the intensification of operations in the context of SoEs, but has persisted even as SoEs have been implemented less frequently. It has prompted growing calls from civil society organizations and the Independent Commission of Investigations (INDECOM) — which was established in 2010 as an independent state body in charge of investigating actions by members of the security forces — for oversight mechanisms such as body-worn cameras.⁵⁰

While Trinidad and Tobago’s resort to emergency power is more recent, early signs suggest that the country may soon face similar challenges. Figures from the December 2024 and July 2025 SoE declarations show that the reported fatalities in clashes between state forces and non-state armed groups between January and August 2025 already exceed 2024’s yearly levels. Echoing those findings, the Police Complaints Authority highlighted that the number of fatal police shootings more than doubled between 1 January and 19 March compared to the year prior. Police have attributed the rise in deadly encounters to both stepped-up anti-gang operations and gangs having greater access to high-powered weapons. However, as in Jamaica, cases of conflicting accounts in which witnesses claim that the victim was unarmed or did not threaten law enforcement officers have also surfaced, including outside of SoE periods. 

Amid the intensification of security operations, serious concerns have emerged over the use of lethal force. For many residents, calls for protection from gang violence exist side by side with concerns over the abuses these measures can produce, reflecting the persistent tension between the need for security and the protection of rights on the ground. 

Exporting hardline security under US influence

The demand for security and the perceived decline in violence due to the implementation of SoEs have contributed to their popularity, both within the political sphere and among the general populace.⁵¹ Although SoEs are in themselves not an innovation, they have generated enthusiasm across Latin America and the Caribbean, notably following the drastic drop in homicides in El Salvador as a result of President Nayib Bukele’s 2022 SoE declaration. However, thus far, there is little evidence in the region that the emergency approach has been effective in sustainably dismantling criminal networks. 

Similar to Ecuador and Honduras, the experiences of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are further examples of the limitations of emergency powers. The cases of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago show that, while SoE declarations can lead to a decline in violence, these declines are often short-lived and geographically limited, suggesting that instead of removing gangs and their rivalries, SoEs could have rather contributed to gang mobility and the spreading of violence. In addition, SoEs have been accompanied by violence from state security forces amid growing concerns of human rights abuses. 

Despite these shared caveats across most of the countries in Latin America and the Caribbean that have resorted to SoEs, the Caribbean appears to be moving toward heavy-handed security responses, shaped in part by US influence. Recognizing the impact of transnational factors driving violence, such as the circulation of weapons and drugs, during the Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM, Holness has stressed the need for regional efforts and a “war on gangs.”⁵² These calls have been echoed by the Trump administration, which repeatedly advocated the use of military forces against cartels, with more than a dozen criminal groups designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This framing was reinforced by the deployment of 4,000 marines and sailors to the Caribbean Sea, as well as fighter jets to Puerto Rico⁵³ in a bid to weaken transnational drug trafficking organizations.⁵⁴ 

While such an approach may act as a deterrent to trafficking routes in the Caribbean, it is also likely to enable Caribbean governments to adopt heavy-handed security measures domestically, compounding existing human rights concerns. Trinidad and Tobago has already shown signs of emulating the US approach, designating Venezuelan criminal group Tren de Aragua a terrorist organization and publicly endorsing the US strike on a vessel allegedly carrying its members on 2 September.

Amid these challenges, it is critical to continue monitoring not only the evolution of gang violence but also the risks hardline security approaches pose, particularly weakened human rights protections and the deepening of cycles of violence under the guise of restoring order.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.