Drones are re-shaping armed group warfare in Latin America

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Colombia leads in the use of weaponized drones, but new conflict hotspots are emerging

Drone technology is spreading quickly both within and across borders in Latin America. ACLED records around 670 events of weaponized drones since 2018, but over 72% of these events have occurred between 1 January 2025 and 21 August 2026. Colombia, in particular, has become the epicenter of drone warfare. Here, the use of weaponized drones is spreading the fastest: 97 of the 182 municipalities where ACLED records events involving weaponized drones in the whole Latin America region are in Colombia, mostly concentrated in Cauca, but with a stark diffusion in Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, and Bolívar (see maps below). Most of these events occur in rural towns located near coca crop enclaves or drug trafficking corridors. 

Two reasons explain this expansion. Firstly, an increasing number of armed groups have been using drones to attack security forces, which is the most common way in which drones are used. Colombia's decades-long conflict has left the state with a dense, dispersed network of fixed military barracks and police stations in rural areas where armed groups operate, leaving the troops stationed there vulnerable to drone attacks. Secondly, drones are becoming embedded in a growing number of subregional conflicts between a wide array of organized crime and rebel groups, in a sort of domino effect: When one group starts using drones in a conflict, its rival will start using them in another conflict setting with a different rival. This helps to explain why the number of armed groups using weaponized drones has increased from five in 2024 to 19 so far in 2026.

In Mexico, armed groups began using drones around a decade ago as a tool to diversify cross-border drug smuggling. However, the use of drones has since evolved. ACLED records events involving weaponized drones in 17 of the country’s 32 federal entities between 2021 and 21 August 2026. Yet, in contrast to the continual geographic dispersion observed in Colombia, after a significant expansion in 2024, drone use has remained mostly concentrated in the states of Michoacán, Guerrero, and Sinaloa (see map below), some of the states where conflicts between armed factions are most violent. Compared with Colombia, in fact, Mexican organized crime groups — particularly the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), La Familia Michoacana cartel, and Los Viagras gang — predominantly use drones to attack local populations in rivals’ territories, rather than targeting security forces.

Beyond these two hotspots, the use of weaponized drones has also expanded to Ecuador, Brazil, and, very recently, Venezuela. Ecuador records eight events of this kind since 2023, most of which targeted prison wings where gang leaders were held. In 2026, these included attacks directed at a prison director and a private house, hinting at a change in organized crime groups’ targeting strategy. Meanwhile, ACLED records the first event of violence involving weaponized drones in Brazil in June 2025 (see map below). Most of the 15 other events ACLED records since then regard Red Command’s attacks on rival police militias in Rio de Janeiro’s Northwest and Southwest communities, but also in Ceará. In August 2026, ACLED records the first use of a weaponized drone against civilians in Venezuela, when Colombian FARC dissidents dropped explosives from drones to intimidate a group of Jivi Indigenous people who were looking for their local community leader. The same dissidents had abducted and later killed the leader.

Armed groups are becoming creative in the way they source, equip, and use drones

Beyond combat, armed groups exploit drones in at least two other ways. First, in terms of logistics, drones have displaced human couriers as the primary contraband vector and are now a preferred method for smuggling drugs, phones, and weapons into prisons, mostly in Brazil and Ecuador, where authorities have intercepted 600 drones linked to gangs en route to the El Encuentro prison facility. But they can be used to smuggle drugs across borders too, as in the case of Mexico, where nearly 35,000 drone flights were detected near the US border in 2025 alone. Secondly, armed groups use drones for surveillance and territorial control to monitor rival incursions; track security-force movements; and protect illicit infrastructure such as clandestine airstrips, illegal mining sites, and coca fields.

Armed groups have also been diversifying the ways in which they obtain and equip drones. Most are still commercial drones that have been artisanally equipped to carry objects and explosives, which limits their precision and lethality, so far leading to roughly one death in every three events. But in Colombia, ELN and FARC dissidents have been using drones with night-vision cameras and fiber-optic drones that resist radiofrequency jamming. These drones are used in trench warfare between Russia and Ukraine. Many Colombians have temporarily joined Ukraine in the war, where they have been learning drone tactics before bringing them back home. In some parts of Mexico and Colombia, particularly Michoacán and Cauca, armed groups have set up laboratories for manufacturing explosives and adapting drones to carry them. Some groups have even developed their own manufacturing centers. In September 2025, Venezuelan military forces destroyed a lab for manufacturing drones and explosive devices in Casigua El Cubo, Zulia, where they found eight 3D printers and 1,232 devices for manufacturing drones, among other items.

Outlook: Technological innovation, access to global networks, and low barriers to entry will drive drone-related conflict

Over the next 12 to 24 months, criminal and insurgent drone use in Latin America is likely to intensify in scale and sophistication. For now, the state’s current counter-drone capacity is focused on reconnaissance and signal jamming, and greater use of technologies such as fiber-optic drones will strain the state’s capacity and increase effective drone use. 

Further geographic spread of drone activity is likely in Colombia, where the new government has announced an all-out offensive against armed groups, who will likely use drones to resist it, as well as Brazil, where the Red Command’s use of drones is likely to be expanded from Rio to other states in which it disputes territory with rivals, such as Mato Grosso do Sul, Bahia, and Minas Gerais. 

Key factors shaping the growing threat of drone use in Latin America

• The spread of know-how: The use of weaponized drones in an increasing number of conflict settings will continue to force groups that find themselves at a tactical disadvantage to close that gap and start using drones themselves. Technological innovations that have been introduced in other active conflicts with high use of drones, such as Ukraine and the Middle East, are also likely to be reflected in the Latin American context, thanks to armed groups’ global networks tied to drug trafficking and money laundering activities. Any such innovations should first be expected in Colombia before dispersing to other locations.
• Low costs, in-house manufacturing, and technological development: Low-cost commercial drones (from as little as $600) will continue to outpace expensive state countermeasures. This is particularly true if armed groups continue expanding their capabilities to manufacture their own devices, particularly in remote areas along the border between Colombia and Venezuela.
• Rising civilian risk from deployment in urban spaces: An increased use of drones in populated and penitentiary settings raises the risk of bystander casualties and fatalities, particularly in densely populated suburbs in Brazil. 

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.