Escalating Baloch militancy threatens Pakistan’s drive to develop its mineral and energy sector

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Extractive operations are a central focus of separatist attacks

Resource extraction lies at the heart of the conflict in Balochistan. Separatists argue that extraction, whether by the national government or foreign companies, constitutes exploitation of the region’s wealth. Extractive operations are therefore targeted for what they signify rather than simply to generate revenue. As the Baloch insurgency has gained strength, its attacks against these interests have also increased (see chart below). These include attacks directly impacting extraction as well as those carried out around flagship projects.

In the last three years, ACLED records more than 130 attacks directly connected with extractive operations, with just over half targeting mineral extraction and the rest targeting coal or oil and gas operations. The majority of these attacks have taken place during transportation, with only a fifth occurring at the extraction sites themselves — a result of increased security around these sites. 

Separatist attacks at extractive sites mainly target fossil fuel operations

The overwhelming majority of attacks at extraction sites target coal mines and oil and gas sites in northern Balochistan, rather than mineral extraction sites (see chart below). These mainly state- or locally owned fossil fuel operations are less securely fortified than mineral mining projects, making them easier targets. The flagship mineral mining projects in Chagai — the Reko Diq mine, which is expected to be the world’s fifth-largest copper mine, and the Saindak mine, which is Pakistan’s first large-scale copper-gold mine — are both run as joint ventures with foreign partners and protected by rings of security manned by private and state forces.

The data reflect the higher risk that comes with attacking extraction sites: Unlike attacks along roads, a large proportion of attacks at the sites descend into clashes with security forces deployed for protection (see chart below). This security protection is, however, not foolproof and separatist attacks targeting employees and properties have directly impacted operations. After at least 21 laborers were killed in an attack at a Duki coal mine in 2024, workers launched a strike, leading to the shutdown of several mines and a sustained drop in mining activity. 

With regard to mineral mining sites, separatists have instead focused on the broader surroundings, as a way of bypassing the greater security around the sites themselves. According to ACLED data, the most significant increase in separatist violence over the last three years has occurred in Chagai district. These attacks are often unrelated to extractive operations, and directed more at increasing the overall risk profile of the projects by signalling instability in the wider operative environment. Despite the sites being largely spared from major attacks, the overall insecurity prompted warnings of a shutdown from the managing director of the Chinese-operated Saindak project, while Barrick Mining Corp. has slowed work on the Reko Diq project.

Most extraction-related attacks take place on the roads, with mineral mining especially vulnerable

Over two-thirds of attacks directly connected with extractive operations, and nearly 90% of attacks connected with mineral mining, have taken place on the roads (see map below), where militants target vehicle convoys transporting goods and supplies. Access roads are particularly vulnerable due to Balochistan’s vast and rugged geography. State presence is lacking in remote areas, while bends along some sections of the key highways offer favorable terrain for carrying out attacks.

Attacks mainly take place along National Highway 40, connecting the larger mining sites in Chagai with the provincial capital of Quetta, and National Highway 25 (N-25), connecting Quetta with the financial center and port city of Karachi. Given the limited development of road and rail infrastructure in the province, heavy freight vehicles do not have many alternative routes to transportation hubs. 

Access routes getting into and out of Quetta, the main logistics hub in the province, are particularly vulnerable. The mountainous section through Mastung, providing favorable terrain for attacks, accounts for over a fifth of all roadside attacks (see map below). 

For the most part, roadside attacks involve gunfire, usually at tires to disable the trucks, with vehicles then sometimes set on fire. In their propaganda, militants emphasize that Baloch drivers are usually allowed to disembark without harm and that their primary objection is to extractive activities; information on the ethnicity of targeted drivers is not always available. Less than 17% of the attacks have involved more lethal roadside bombs or landmines, suggesting that the purpose is to disrupt activities by creating an atmosphere of instability, rather than by exacting significant harm. The less-discriminate attacks the militants do carry out have largely been concentrated around the coal mining sites in northern Balochistan. 

In order to facilitate attacks along roads, militants have increasingly been establishing road blocks and temporary checkpoints, and ACLED data show that the number of such events in 2026 is on track to surpass 2025 levels. Two roadways are particularly targeted: the Yak Mach–Kharan link road, which connects Chagai with the N-25, and the N-25 itself around Mastung. The Yak Mach–Kharan link road was constructed with the aim of boosting connectivity with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, increasing its salience as an ideological target. Besides controlling traffic, such checkpoints also offer an opportunity for extortion, with militants demanding money in return for passage. Taken together, both methods serve to fuel a perception that the state’s writ along the roads has weakened, and this fear is spreading — in June, members of over a dozen trade bodies, including truckers, went on strike to protest the security risks they face during transportation. 

Outlook: Extractive interests are likely to face heightened risk as rising international interest drives increased securitization

Attacks targeting extractive activities are likely to increase as the separatists gain strength and Pakistan seeks to develop its mineral and fossil fuel wealth, which is centered in Balochistan. Leveraging its resource wealth is a governmental priority: In late July, Pakistan’s petroleum minister met representatives from American and British energy companies to discuss potential investments. This follows Pakistan’s engagement with a Washington-based lobbying firm in May to push for greater American investment in the country’s mineral sector, and an agreement with the British government in April to improve geological data collection. On the part of separatists, sustained targeting of foreign companies, beyond the sporadic attacks currently carried out, would be riskier in terms of the logistics and any subsequent crackdown. It would, however, help bring greater international attention to their long-simmering insurgency, and the militants have already demonstrated an appetite for such attacks. 

The government response has largely focused on increasing the deployment of security forces. In May, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif directed additional deployment of paramilitary forces in the Rakhshan division, which contains Chagai, with the specific aim of protecting mineral assets. Security forces also routinely accompany vehicle convoys and guard construction sites. While necessary to address the real security gaps and assuage investor concerns, increased security presence is unlikely to prove sufficient, especially at a time when separatists are gaining strength. Additional boots on the ground cannot address some of the critical vulnerabilities, such as in intelligence gathering and operational coordination, that are currently inhibiting an effective response. These gaps, largely attributable to weak local governance structures and limited local support, can only be filled with sustained political will and engagement, neither of which seems forthcoming. In their absence, separatist activity is expected to remain on an escalatory path. 

Key risks and implications for the extractive industry:

Lack of well-developed road and rail infrastructure: Existing routes will remain vulnerable to attacks for the foreseeable future, with few alternatives — proposed upgrades to the rail network are not expected to be completed before 2033. This risk is particularly acute for vehicles carrying minerals and supplies for mining projects, as the higher security around these sites themselves has the knock-on effect of directing separatist activity toward logistics and transportation. 

Foreign companies require significant support from Pakistan’s security forces to operate in Balochistan: This association, however, increases the risk to their operations as separatist militants regard state forces as their principal adversary — a claim borne out by the data, which show that the majority of separatist violence involves attacks against or clashes with security forces.

Abuses associated with increased securitization of the province: State excesses related to mining operations, such as abductions of mine workers and reprisals against mining critics, along with close security cooperation between private companies and state security forces, means that the actions of Pakistani security personnel could carry significant reputational costs for companies and impact local community engagement. There is also a risk of liability exposure, given the precedent of foreign parent companies facing lawsuits in their home countries over their subsidiaries’ failure to comply with human rights obligations.