Exhausted Ukraine faces military and diplomatic pressure to cede the Donbas

Russia’s war against Ukraine escalated as it entered its fourth year despite efforts to impose a ceasefire. 

ACLED records an all-time high of over 26,500 battle events in Ukraine in the first 11 months of 2025 (see graph below). The 53% increase compared to 2024 is a result of Russia doubling down its efforts to seize the remainder of the Donetsk region, increased fighting in the Zaporizhia region, and the spillover of fighting to the Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy regions. The increase in and diffusion of battles were indicative of Russia’s drive to overwhelm short-staffed Ukrainian forces, capture more territory, and force its settlement terms upon Ukraine and its backers. 

Russian forces seized about 200 settlements in the frontline regions, slightly less than the previous two years combined. Of these, only the Pokrovsk-Myrnohrad agglomeration in the Donetsk region is large and tactically significant, while about half of all occupations were closely knit villages at the junction of the Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions. There, Russian forces exploited Ukraine’s acute shortage of infantry while meeting stiff resistance in the central part of the Donetsk region.

The air war between the two countries escalated but remains asymmetrical. Russia ramped up its use of drones, with the number of strikes involving drones increasing by nearly 150% year-on-year (see graph above). Descending on Ukraine in their hundreds every night, they also became more difficult to intercept.¹ Russia’s indiscriminate bombing of densely populated areas of Ukraine led to a 30% increase in strikes that led to civilians being killed or injured (see graph above). In the fourth quarter, Russia unleashed yet another attempt to knock out Ukraine’s energy infrastructure amid falling temperatures.

Despite producing fewer long-range drones than Russia and only beginning to catch up on more destructive missiles, Ukraine escalated its campaign against Russia’s oil infrastructure, both in terms of the number and the reach of its drone strikes (see map below). Unlike the “mosquito-bite” attempts that characterized the previous two years, repeated targeting of Russian oil refineries led to a 20% reduction in output and forced Moscow to rely on crude oil exports to fund its war machine.² Ukraine also escalated its assassination and sabotage campaigns in Russia-occupied areas of Ukraine and Russia itself. 

United States-led efforts to stop the war bore no fruit. Under the threat of sanctions, Russia paid lip service to settlement efforts by sending a second-tier delegation to Istanbul, where Ukraine and Russia broached irreconcilable positions³ and only agreed on exchanging greater numbers of prisoners of war and fallen troops. Publicized talks ended in July. As the US vacillated between imposing Russian demands on Ukraine and pressuring Russia to meaningfully engage in negotiations,⁴ Europe largely stood by Ukraine.⁵ 

Russia responded with provocative behavior in and over the Baltic Sea and scaled up its covert drone campaign that targeted European airports and other sensitive sites. While suspected Russian or Russia-linked actors staged sabotage events and overflights of critical infrastructure across Europe in previous years, the level of disruption was unprecedented and echoed Ukraine’s campaign against Russian airports at the height of the holiday season in the middle of the year.

Ukraine will face both military and diplomatic pressure in 2026

While half-heartedly engaging in negotiations, Russia will strive to rout Ukraine in Donetsk, exhaust civilians elsewhere in Ukraine with long-range strikes, and divide Ukraine’s allies over the costs of the war.

Russia has brushed aside the US’ offer of halting hostilities in exchange for sanctions relief and US recognition of Russia’s jurisdiction over Crimea.⁶ Apart from the need to emerge victorious by claiming the entire Donbas region to justify an otherwise disastrous attempt to conquer Ukraine, Russian authorities also have practical reasons for seizing the remainder of the Donetsk region. They have been unable to alleviate long-running shortages of running water in the Donetsk city urban sprawl⁷ as water sources remain in the Ukraine-held part of the region. Ukraine will have no choice but to defend the part it still controls to avoid Russia rolling past major fortifications into central Ukraine.⁸ 

The battle for the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk urban agglomeration may determine whether Ukraine succumbs to Russia’s demands that boil down to legitimizing its annexation of Ukrainian territory, precipitating a change in government in Kyiv, and hobbling the Ukrainian army. Russia will also press along other sections on the 1,200-kilometer frontline, with the dual goal of stretching Ukrainian forces and ensuring the steady occupation of settlements, however small and destroyed, to reassure Russian leadership of being on a winning streak and provide it with bargaining chips in talks. 

Despite being on the offensive since October 2023, Russia appears to be nowhere near running out of steam — a looming budget squeeze notwithstanding.⁹ Its key advantage is a seemingly infinite supply of infantry.¹⁰ After a domino-like loss of the southern part of the Donetsk region at the end of 2024,¹¹ Ukraine relied on drones to counter Russian assaults throughout 2025. However, the tactic appears to be less efficient due to Russia’s infiltration tactics and focus on disabling Ukrainian drone operators.¹² Given the chronic shortage of mobilized recruits Ukraine is facing, it may struggle to hold the line in and near larger cities as Russian troops infiltrate Ukrainian positions — regardless of how many get killed or injured in the process.

Russia’s relentless blitz against Ukraine’s hinterlands and energy infrastructure specifically will test the resilience of its population and neighbors. In its fourth winter of war, Ukraine faces an uphill task of securing enough air defense assets and parts to protect its cities and reduce Russia’s advantage in the long-range air war by producing and/or securing enough missiles to target Russia’s air force and drone manufacturing sites. Scaling the production of its own long-range missiles to avoid supply bottlenecks and constraints on their use may help Ukraine further increase the price of war for Russia. If blackouts caused by Russian strikes displace even more civilians — triggering a renewed wave of refugees — the external pressure to agree to Russia’s terms may grow, despite a record of such settlements only postponing further attack.

Ukraine’s key diplomatic challenge will be to maintain the support of its European allies, especially after the Trump administration cut hardware military aid, repeatedly halted agreed-upon deliveries of weapons and intelligence, and appeared to be leaning toward accepting Russian settlement terms. The US’ determination to end the war, even if on unfavorable terms for Ukraine, will pressure Europe, which now foots the bill for arming Ukraine and needs to plug a gaping hole in Ukraine’s finances in early 2026.¹³ Russia’s suspected sabotage campaign and the disruption caused by unidentified drones in Europe test the remit of mutual defense clauses and the US’ will to underwrite them. These pressure points may sway Europe’s public opinion and policies toward prioritizing its own security. Although Ukraine has consistently defied expectations in its fight against a behemoth invader, it now faces formidable challenges as the war enters what may be the endgame.

Visual produced by Christian Jaffe.

Conflict Watchlist 2026