Fighting moves to Kordofan as Sudan’s east–west divide solidifies

As Africa’s most fatal conflict approaches its three-year mark, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and its allies managed to retake control throughout central Sudan, while the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) made key gains in Darfur. In previous years of the conflict, the territory under the RSF and the SAF control was more of a patchwork. But the RSF gains in the west and SAF consolidation in the east risk splitting the country into two distinct blocs. 

The solidification of this de facto partition took place as the SAF and its allies made strategic gains in recapturing Khartoum, while the RSF focused on its siege of El Fasher — the last city the SAF and the allied Darfur Joint Forces controlled in Darfur. The RSF eventually captured the city on 26 October, carrying out a brutal campaign that reportedly killed over 1,300 civilians in the first week of RSF control and resulted in the most deadly week of the war. This is a conservative count of the fatalities that week. Due to the rapid, widespread killings and mass graves, it is likely that more civilians were killed but not reported. With the seizure of El Fasher, the RSF gains stronger control over the Darfur region, including its rich gold deposits¹ and a critical supply route to Libya and Chad, and permits the RSF to focus its troops and equipment elsewhere. 

The SAF’s recapture of Khartoum has shifted the fight southward to the Kordofan region. There, the SAF and its allies fight to secure vital supply lines connecting central Sudan to Darfur and to expand its offensive operation westward into Darfur (see map below). Simultaneously, the RSF wants to consolidate its territorial control over Kordofan to anchor its rival administration in western Sudan. 

The de facto partition coincides with the formation of two parallel governments. The SAF re-established a government in Port Sudan in the east of the country. Army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed Kamil Idris as prime minister in May 2025, while the RSF formed a government based in Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, popularly known as Hemedti. Though claiming to be civilian governments, both are power-sharing arrangements among armed groups.² 

Despite clearer eastern and western areas of control, the RSF’s improved drone arsenal permitted the group to strike farther into SAF-controlled territories like Port Sudan. Previously, the SAF dominated aerial warfare through the use of drones and manned aircraft. However, the RSF gained access to an increased stock of FH-95 drones in 2025 and launched numerous long-range attacks against SAF positions (see graph below).³ The RSF also made increasing use of drones when overtaking El Fasher and threatened SAF positions as far away as Khartoum and Port Sudan from its headquarters in Nyala, South Darfur. These strikes forced adjustments to the SAF’s tactical decisions, such as moving aircraft to neighboring Eritrea.⁴

Foreign meddling indeed continues to sustain the ongoing war. The United Arab Emirates provides direct material support to the RSF, which also benefits from a sprawling international network that spans neighboring Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, Kenya, South Sudan, and Uganda. Saudi Arabia aligns itself with the SAF, also backed by Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s roles draw international scrutiny: While enabling the conflict and siding with the belligerents, they are also involved in ongoing mediation efforts to end Sudan’s civil war.

Peace deal unlikely in 2026 as each side consolidates its gains

The prospects for an immediate end to Sudan’s civil war are low. As the eastern area of Sudan comes under SAF control and the western area under the RSF, each side is likely to consolidate gains in the coming year and seek to expand its territory — especially in Kordofan, where fighting is ongoing. As the RSF consolidates its control in Darfur, it could also mount an offensive into Northern State, which has been uncontested since the start of the conflict and remains under SAF control.

International initiatives to end the war have involved the United States, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, collectively known as the “quad” group. The quad is hosting talks with the warring parties with the aim of achieving a three-month humanitarian truce followed by a permanent ceasefire and beginning internal political negotiations to establish civilian rule that would exclude SAF-aligned Islamist groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood.⁵ The SAF has rejected this offer because the proposed exclusion of Islamist groups challenges an important source of manpower: Armed groups affiliated with Islamist groups, such as the al-Baraa ibn Malik Brigade with an estimated 20,000 fighters, play a significant role in the SAF’s fighting power.⁶ However, the SAF denies the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in the military, which may sway away Saudi and Egyptian backing.⁷

Pending developments on the ceasefire deal, two key issues may affect the trajectory of the conflict: the consolidation of rival governments and upgrades to the RSF’s aerial warfare capabilities. Both the SAF and the RSF have to cope with internal fragmentation and infighting over the distribution of ministerial posts and rents between their respective allies, exposing the fragility of their respective power-sharing arrangements.⁸ Though both parties have so far managed to resolve internal disputes, any changes to these power agreements could lead to internecine fighting. 

The allies under the RSF government comprise groups that lack a history of cooperation and a common ideology, the largest of which includes the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu.⁹ For example, al-Hilu’s SPLM-N and the Gathering of the Sudan Liberation Forces ruled out merging their fighters with the RSF troops, although the charter established that the RSF-led government calls for a single army. For its part, despite a longer history of cooperation, the reliance on influential Islamist factions in the SAF risks returning power to those same groups that were removed during the popular revolution that toppled former president Omar al-Bashir and his party, the National Congress Party, in 2019. 

The warring parties are also busy upgrading their arsenals. The increasing use of drones by the RSF and the acquisition of improved jamming technology, surface-to-air missiles, and more advanced anti-aircraft weapons could diminish the SAF’s upper hand in aerial combat — a strategic advantage for the SAF since the start of the war. The SAF will continue to use its own fleet of aircraft and drones, including further reliance on its locally produced “Safrouq” drone, which entered its fleet in 2025. This drone features resistance to jamming and a 600-kilometer range, allowing it to strike well into RSF-held Darfur.¹⁰

Disregard for civilian safety has turned Sudan into the deadliest conflict in Africa for civilians. Populations in contested cities, such as El Obeid, the North Kordofan capital, face a high risk of getting caught in the crossfire or being left defenseless against retaliatory and ethnically motivated mass killings. Several examples from Darfur and al-Jazirah states attest to the severity of the danger. 

The RSF’s mass killings in El Fasher have triggered demands in the US for the group to be labeled a terrorist organization.¹¹ Designating the RSF as a terrorist organization would reshape how states and international bodies aligned with the US engage with the group: It would trigger legal and financial consequences for governments and companies providing the RSF with funding, weapons, or logistical support, making the procurement of weapons and drones riskier for suppliers and harder for the RSF to fund operations via gold exports​​. It could, however, also decrease the likelihood of reaching a negotiated settlement, further isolating the RSF and complicating negotiations. Coordinated international pressure will therefore remain essential to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table.

Visual produced by Christian Jaffe. 

Conflict Watchlist 2026