Five years since seizing power in Afghanistan, internal tensions test the Taliban’s vulnerabilities

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Anti-Taliban groups seek to exploit internal tensions

Bucking an overall declining trend in internal political violence across the country, political violence has escalated in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan and Herat provinces this year, driven by the Taliban’s disputes with local communities and leaders and attacks by armed opposition groups (see map below). Both Badakhshan and Herat are border provinces with ethnically mixed populations and large sectarian minorities who are not natural allies of the Taliban, whose policies have provoked opposition in both areas, albeit for different reasons. 

In July, anti-Taliban groups actively challenged Taliban control in Badakhshan at the local level. The Homeland Soldiers Front temporarily seized control of Yaftali Sufla district headquarters – a rare occurrence since the Taliban’s takeover – while the Afghanistan Freedom Front reportedly engaged the Taliban in prolonged clashes in Zebak district. The violence in Herat this year, on the other hand, has largely followed the usual pattern of attacks on Taliban checkpoints, only at an increased frequency. 

While it is difficult to accurately assess the credibility of claims of individual attacks by anti-Taliban armed opposition groups, the history of armed resistance in Badakhshan and Herat, and the Taliban’s acknowledgment of recent fighting in Yaftali Sufla and Zebak, make the escalation consequential. These provinces have also been the focus of the ISKP’s attacks in 2026. Of the four attacks claimed by the group this year, three occurred in these provinces and targeted Taliban members.

In both cases, the upswing in armed violence has coincided with active disputes between local communities and the Taliban. In the mineral-rich Badakhshan province, the Taliban’s efforts to regulate mining led to a rift with its local Tajik commander, Juma Khan Fateh, who was presumably reluctant to lose his source of control and share of profits from illegal mining. Tensions have escalated to the point where, at the time of writing, armed clashes are ongoing between Fateh’s loyalists and the Taliban, though there is limited independent reporting from the area. The Taliban also temporarily suspended gold mining activities in several areas, prompting protests from locals concerned over losing their livelihoods. Badakhshan, one of the last remaining outposts of poppy cultivation, was also a flashpoint for demonstrations in May after locals resisted an eradication drive.

In the more cosmopolitan city of Herat, the Taliban confronted Shiite-Hazara locals in early June after its morality police detained several women. This crackdown on one of the last remaining pockets of outward resistance to the Taliban’s more religious-minded decrees prompted rare demonstrations. The Taliban suppressed these demonstrations with live ammunition, killing at least two demonstrators.

The connection between local discontent and an uptick in violence is more opportunistic than causal. There is not enough evidence to suggest that the recent escalation in armed opposition groups’ activity in Badakhshan was connected with the dispute between the Taliban and commander Fateh, and it occurred in districts beyond his strongholds. By striking soon after these developments, however, opposition groups were able to project a somewhat outsized perception of fraying stability in the province. Similar opportunism in terms of timing and messaging also occurred in Herat, when armed opposition groups explicitly framed claimed attacks in June as a response to the morality police’s repression. 

Outlook: The Taliban’s control is not under threat, but local pressures threaten to foment pockets of unrest

The Taliban’s response to signs of instability, as seen after events in Badakhshan and Herat, is likely to remain predictable with a focus on maintaining power through force, loyalty, and repression. In Badakhshan, the centralizing tendencies of the Taliban’s chief, Hibatullah Akhundzada, were once again on display as the Taliban deployed additional Pashtun troops, believed to be more loyal, and transferred local leaders to other areas. They also carried out house-to-house raids and made arrests. In Herat, it used the ISKP threat as a pretext to limit Shiite religious practices. These responses are only likely to further deepen local discontent and risk alienating the few non-Pashtun leaders. 

Public mobilization in Badakhshan and Herat is likely to decline in the immediate term, as heavy repression may drive discontent underground. Opposition groups are, however, likely to maintain focus on these areas, mobilizing the discontent as a rallying cry and seeking to benefit from it operationally, while the ISKP will also seek to exploit any weaknesses in authority as it rebuilds. Its reliance on dispersed cells to carry out isolated, high-profile attacks allows it to shift its focus beyond its traditional strongholds to areas where it sees the highest potential to undermine the Taliban’s authority, leaving Badakhshan, where many ISKP militants have reportedly relocated, particularly vulnerable.

Beyond Badakhshan and Herat, other provinces in the north and west, such as Takhar, Baghlan, Kunduz, and Faryab, that have similar dynamics – ethnic and sectarian diversity, established presence of armed opposition groups, and local grievances rooted in economic discontent – are at a heightened risk of future outbreaks of unrest. 

Key risk factors for further outbreaks of localized violence

Relations with Pakistan: In the northeast in particular, the breakdown in ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan poses an additional risk for the Taliban. A change in approach by Pakistan from mere rhetorical support to more active support for anti-Taliban groups would increase the Taliban’s security challenges.

Internal Taliban divisions: During its campaign to recapture Afghanistan, the Taliban relied on local strongmen with their own power bases to extend its influence in peripheral areas. Centralization of power with Akhundzada’s southern Pashtun Taliban faction and the economic hit from the Taliban’s efforts to regulate mining – a source of revenue for local strongmen – is likely to increase disaffection among these leaders. Many have been weakened by relocation from their natural bases, but if differences are not managed, the risk of more serious unrest increases, either through existing opposition groups exploiting tensions or through these local commanders themselves leading an armed campaign. Such campaigns are likely to remain localized, with no sustained, nationwide campaign expected.

ISKP selection of strategic targets: With only limited resources, the ISKP seeks to strike strategically important areas or assets to maximize damage. For instance, its only attack in 2026 outside of Herat and Badakhshan targeted a restaurant frequented by Chinese nationals in Kabul. Attacks against Chinese interests reinforce the ISKP’s positioning as a defender of Uyghur Muslims and risk undermining the Taliban’s outreach to China – a key partner for investment, aid, and political legitimacy. Where the Taliban are actively challenged by other armed groups or local unrest, security vacuums also heighten the threat of ISKP attacks.

Table 1: Provinces with the highest levels of activity by anti-Taliban armed opposition groups¹