Gaza after two years: As Israel expands control and sows chaos, Hamas adapts to survive

Since Israel’s inception, the country’s national security strategy has centered on short, decisive wars. Yet, after nearly two years, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) remains engaged in a war of attrition in Gaza, during which the Israeli government has refused to curb military action or develop plans for the postwar stabilization of the enclave. Since Israel unilaterally ended the January 2025 ceasefire in mid-March — abandoning a second phase that would have opened talks on ending the war — the IDF has taken control of 75% of Gaza, Israeli airstrikes have continued at a higher rate than during the pre-ceasefire period, and — amid the chaos around aid distribution centers — fatal shootings at civilians by IDF troops have reached their highest quarterly level since the start of the war. 

The civilian toll has been staggering. More than 12,000 people — the majority believed to be civilians¹ — have been killed in less than six months since the resumption of fighting, alongside the escalating destruction of housing and infrastructure. Added to this, a 78-day halt in the entry of aid into Gaza has contributed to acute food insecurity and deteriorating public health conditions. But despite the high human cost and Israel’s use of every available lever to weaken Hamas, the group has neither been fully defeated nor agreed to surrender and disarmament in negotiations.

Israel is now expanding its military control of the territory — beginning with the ground offensive into Gaza City launched on 16 September — despite facing opposition within the military and security establishment. The IDF chief of staff opposes the plan,² and Israel’s most senior former security leaders have publicly warned that the war has lost its strategic rationale and is now driven by “messianic and extremist goals.”³ Furthermore, the majority of the Israeli public supports a deal that would end the war and bring all the remaining hostages home.⁴ However, the Israeli political leadership, which began the war by pledging to destroy Hamas both militarily and as a governing authority, continues to pursue the fundamentally political objective of “total victory.”⁵ With little realistic prospect of entirely eliminating Hamas — a movement whose ideology of resistance is embedded in the society — continued fighting instead points to a long-term strategy of control: degrading Hamas while obstructing alternative Palestinian governing arrangements, pushing Gaza toward unlivable conditions to advance voluntary emigration, and ultimately blocking any path to Palestinian sovereignty.

This report examines Israel’s campaign to degrade Hamas since March and what remains of the group’s strength today. Despite heavy losses, Hamas continues guerrilla operations and maintains fragments of governance in the absence of alternatives. Israel has also weaponized aid, worsening civilian suffering without forcing Hamas to surrender. Continued Israeli operations now appear driven more by domestic political and ideological goals than by any realistic plan to free hostages or secure lasting stability.

Despite sustained Israeli operations, Hamas’ armed wing continues to resist through guerrilla tactics

Ongoing IDF military operations have continued to weaken Hamas through intense airstrikes and ground operations that have killed hundreds of Hamas fighters, as well as dozens of senior commanders, and extended Israeli control to more than three-quarters of Gaza’s territory. Yet Hamas sustains resistance through loosely coordinated, decentralized cells. 

Before the ceasefire came into effect on 19 January 2025, the IDF carried out its last major operation in North Gaza, concentrated in Jabaliya Camp, Beit Lahiya, and Beit Hanun. The campaign involved besieging large areas and conducting intensive air and ground assaults. During the operation, which lasted from 4 October until the days immediately preceding the truce, Hamas regrouped in cleared areas. The group engaged in dozens of clashes with Israeli soldiers and also conducted dozens of explosive attacks that killed over 50 soldiers. Hamas remained active until the ceasefire and, along with its allies, killed another 15 soldiers in Beit Hanun in just the last two weeks of fighting in January. 

Given that Hamas’ military capabilities had not been fully dismantled, and with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu continuing to vow total victory, fears that Israel would unilaterally break the ceasefire remained elevated. 

These concerns materialized when Israel resumed airstrikes on 18 March, launching over 3,500 across the Strip in the approximately six months that followed. These airstrikes have killed over  9,500 people, the majority believed to be civilians, but also combatants. ACLED records at least 40 commanders and key operatives in Hamas’ military wing who were killed by Israeli airstrikes during this period. This includes Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas’ military wing, and Mohammed Shaban, the Rafah Brigade commander. Their deaths have left only one senior commander from Hamas’ pre-7 October military council still in command.⁶ 

While the air campaign has inflicted heavy losses, Israel also expanded its ground operations after the launch of Operation Gideon’s Chariots on 16 May. Israel's post-ceasefire operation strategy has shifted from conducting quick raids followed by withdrawal to controlling territory and maintaining a presence on the ground. The buffer zone maintained during the ceasefire has been significantly expanded since the resumption of war, with Israel expanding its control to more than 75% of Gaza’s territory (see map below). Israel’s ground forces have operated in and taken control of areas they had never entered before the ceasefire, such as southwest of Dayr al-Balah.⁷ The IDF has reoccupied the entire Rafah governorate, enlarged the eastern and northern buffer zones, established the Morag Corridor to separate Rafah from Khan Yunis, and taken control of large parts of Khan Yunis, North Gaza, and eastern Gaza City. 

​​IDF units have advanced cautiously, first surveying suspected Hamas positions and hidden explosives. They then demolish buildings — often with the assistance of civilian contractors — to reduce the risk of casualties before troops move forward.⁸ Over 40% of all IDF property destruction incidents recorded by ACLED since the start of the war have taken place after the ceasefire. While partly tied to operational needs such as destroying tunnels and preventing Hamas from regrouping — since any standing structure is treated as a potential threat capable of concealing snipers, tunnel entrances, or explosives — these demolitions also appear to be clearing land for an expanded and potentially permanent Israeli presence, particularly along buffer zones and corridors. Although there is no official Israeli policy mandating such large-scale destruction, in practice, this “unprecedented engineering project”⁹ — as one Haaretz columnist described it — has rendered vast areas of Gaza uninhabitable for years to come. 

Hamas moves away from battles, favoring guerrilla strategy

Against this backdrop of expanded Israeli control and destruction, Hamas has adapted its tactics. The group has prioritized survival over direct confrontation, evacuating most of its fighters to areas outside Israeli control in order to limit casualties and preserve capabilities.¹⁰ This is consistent with the group’s view that survival itself is a form of victory. At the same time, Hamas has maintained a notable level of guerrilla-style attacks, including the use of IEDs, some repurposed from the remnants of Israeli munitions;¹¹ ambushes from parts of its remaining tunnel network; and booby-trapped buildings. Hamas has lost thousands of fighters — including in the post-ceasefire period. Since 18 March, Israel claims it killed more than 2,100 operatives,¹² though ACLED data indicates that the number is closer to 1,100, and includes Hamas’ political figures, as well as fighters from other groups.¹³ But Hamas has been able to replenish its ranks,¹⁴ and new recruits require little training to carry out guerrilla attacks. 

This tactical approach is reflected in the data. From mid-March to mid-September, Palestinian armed groups fought about 65% fewer battles with the IDF compared to the six months prior to the ceasefire. Hamas’ own participation dropped even more sharply. Explosive and remote violence also declined over the same period, though by a smaller margin of roughly 35%. More than 100 incidents since mid-March have been linked to Hamas (see graph below). Since fighting resumed, Hamas and allied groups have killed about 50 Israeli soldiers.

Beyond guerrilla attacks, Hamas has also demonstrated the ability to carry out larger-scale operations. Its August assault on an Israeli site in Khan Yunis — involving heavy weapons and attempted kidnappings — illustrates the group’s capacity to sustain complex operations nearly two years into the war.

It is likely that Hamas has retained some operational capacity. Israel has thus far not been able to thoroughly screen all those displaced who are evacuating combat zones to ensure they do not include Hamas fighters. The group continues to maintain two active strongholds — one in central Gaza City and another in Dayr al-Balah. The IDF’s newly launched offensive in Gaza City poses far greater challenges: The tall, dense buildings there require heavier force and specialized equipment to demolish, while Hamas has had months to prepare defenses, booby-trap structures, and rebuild tunnel networks.¹⁵ Israel expects to encounter small but well-prepared guerrilla cells deploying explosives, anti-tank missiles, and sniper fire in this urban terrain, where Hamas’ last surviving senior commander, Izz al-Din al-Haddad, remains in command.¹⁶ 

Hamas’ governance system has been eroded but remains adaptive in the absence of alternatives 

While Israel’s operations have focused on dismantling Hamas militarily, its campaign has also targeted the civilian and governance systems that underpin the group’s rule in Gaza. Understanding how these governance systems have been eroded — and how Hamas has adapted — is essential to assessing the movement’s overall resilience.

Hamas has exercised de facto governing authority in the Gaza Strip since 2007. After Hamas violently seized power in the Strip, the Palestinian Authority (PA) ordered government workers to go on strike and remain at home.¹⁷ Over the coming years, Hamas hired nearly 40,000 public employees — many of them loyal to the group¹⁸ — of which, about 35% were for the security forces.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the PA continued to pay the salaries of its own employees. In 2007, this included 70,000 employees,²⁰ a number that was reduced to 23,000 by 2024,²¹ although only a few thousand of its people continued to actively work within the ministries in Gaza to coordinate affairs with Ramallah. While Hamas’ Government Administrative Committee has run daily governance and law enforcement separately from the group’s military wing, ultimate decision-making in Gaza has rested with the movement’s political leadership in coordination with its military wing. For years, successive Israeli governments bolstered Hamas’ rule in Gaza as a counterweight to the PA — from allowing Qatari cash into the enclave, to increasing work permits for Gazan laborers, tolerating smuggling from Egypt, and quietly acquiescing to Hamas’ local taxation and customs collection. 

This divide-and-control strategy ultimately backfired on 7 October, when Hamas — having consolidated its position in Gaza — launched the deadliest attack inside Israel’s borders in the country’s history. Since then, Israel has targeted not only Hamas’ military infrastructure and fighters but also the broader civil structures that underpin the group’s control of the Strip. Israeli forces have destroyed over 230 government buildings and inflicted extensive damage on essential infrastructure, including electricity and water networks, as well as the health and education systems.²² Hundreds of civil servants and public workers have also been killed during this period, including nearly 800 police and security personnel, over 170 municipal employees, and more than 120 civil defense officers.²³ 

Despite the widespread targeting of Hamas' governance and civil structures, by January 2025, Hamas’ governing capacity was not fully dismantled, and the fragile remnants were able to maintain domestic dominance. Some ministries managed to sustain operations throughout the war; the Ministry of Health, for instance, has continued functioning despite severe shortages of facilities and medical supplies.²⁴ Other remains of Gaza’s weakened government capacities were reactivated during the 60-day ceasefire: Hamas’ police forces were redeployed and helped secure the aid distribution,²⁵ while municipalities began clearing rubble, reopening roads, repairing water systems, and preparing areas for displaced residents. The Ministry of Education partially restarted school classes, the Ministry of Economy took action against merchants exploiting the crisis, and the Ministry of Finance paid partial salaries of 1,500 NIS (then about 415 US dollars). Sharia courts and prosecutors resumed operations in police stations.²⁶

In the post-ceasefire period, Israel has aimed to further weaken Hamas’ civil control. Its strategy has increasingly focused on Hamas’ civil authorities responsible for managing daily life in Gaza.²⁷ Since the start of the war, ACLED has recorded nearly 100 airstrike events targeting individuals and facilities linked to Hamas’ governance, municipalities, and police forces — about a quarter of which were targeted strikes carried out after hostilities resumed in mid-March (see timeline below). These strikes killed the head of Hamas’ Government Administrative Committee and his successor, the head of the justice authority, the deputy interior minister, and the head of internal security forces. The IDF has also continued to target police officers — including those tasked with securing aid convoys and preventing looting. In addition, Israel has destroyed trucks, bulldozers, and heavy machinery used for rubble removal and rescue operations, as well as municipal headquarters and infrastructure.²⁸

As a result, chaos has deepened as law enforcement agencies struggle to operate effectively. Israel’s control of over 75% of Gaza, combined with the halting and restriction of aid delivery and the forced relocation of the population into three zones in the western areas between Khan Yunis and Gaza City, has further exacerbated the crisis. Merchants have exploited the vacuum by raising prices and monopolizing goods, while the informal cash trade has spread amid a shortage of circulating currency, worsening the economic hardship for ordinary Gazans.²⁹ 

Looting of aid, theft, and violent activity by gangs, clans, and armed groups have become widespread. Since October 2023, ACLED records over 220 intra-Palestinian violent incidents that have resulted in the deaths of around 400 Palestinians — among them police officers, clan and gang leaders, thieves, anti-Hamas activists, individuals accused of collaborating with Israel, and merchants accused of profiteering (see graph below). Notably, nearly 70% of these incidents occurred after the ceasefire ended in March 2025. 

Yet amid this breakdown of order, Hamas has adapted by endorsing new mechanisms of control, most prominently the Sahm Unit — a plainclothes security force composed of former police officers, clan members, and volunteers tasked with maintaining order.³⁰ Since its creation in late 2024, ACLED has recorded nearly 120 incidents involving the unit — making up a significant share of the intra-Palestinian violence noted above. The Sahm Unit has sought to contain the chaos created by gangs, clans, and profiteering merchants. Its activities have included field punishments against individuals accused of theft — often by breaking or shooting their legs — detaining suspected collaborators, and enforcing curfews around aid distribution sites. Notably, the Sahm Unit has also targeted Hamas’ emerging rivals, including the Yasser Abu Shabab militia, also known as Popular Forces, which is believed to control several kilometers of territory in eastern Rafah under the protection of Israeli forces.³¹ While presented as efforts to restore order, these actions highlight how Hamas has found new channels to project influence and maintain control amid the breakdown of its formal governing structures.

These security initiatives have been complemented by efforts to sustain core government functions. Drawing on its long-established bureaucratic apparatus, Hamas has demonstrated resilience even under extraordinary wartime pressure. During the conflict, it adopted a decentralized system, allowing staff to operate independently in each area while maintaining communication through encrypted channels.³² A secret cash-based system has allowed it to continue paying partial salaries to about 30,000 employees³³ — including security forces — while emergency committees composed of Hamas affiliates, government staff, and loyal clan activists — whom Israel has regarded as legitimate targets that it has struck again and again during the war — have been tasked with aid management and community engagement.³⁴ These committees have assessed needs, helped displaced people where possible, resolved daily issues, prepared aid distribution lists, and reported on social and security conditions. 

Furthermore, Gaza’s municipalities — controlled by Hamas — have continued to manage the most visible civilian services. They have remained key providers of essentials such as water, electricity, road maintenance, and infrastructure. After nearly two years of war, the municipalities of Khan Yunis,³⁵ Dayr al-Balah,³⁶ al-Nusayrat,³⁷ and Gaza City³⁸ are still able to deliver limited services to Gazans and to displaced people housed in emergency centers. 

Together, these measures have enabled Hamas to maintain a degree of civil control and presence in everyday life, even as its capacity has been sharply reduced. Hamas’ ability to govern now depends less on institutional strength than on the lack of a viable alternative authority in Gaza.

Israel’s use of aid as leverage has deepened civilian suffering but has not forced Hamas to capitulate 

Restrictions on the movement of people and goods into and out of Gaza date back to the early 1990s, but the situation changed dramatically in 2007 after Hamas seized control of the Strip. Israel responded by sealing Gaza’s land, sea, and air borders, with the stated objectives of preventing weapons smuggling and restricting materials deemed to have dual civilian-military use — particularly to curb the expansion of Gaza’s tunnel network. At the same time, Egypt closed the Rafah crossing, citing security concerns in northern Sinai. Beyond the stated security aims, the blockade was used as part of Israel’s broader strategy of containment: keeping Hamas weak but still in power. While Israel did not seek a full-blown humanitarian crisis, it aimed to prevent Hamas from governing Gaza effectively, underpinned by the logic that if life under Hamas rule was marked by poverty, deprivation, and isolation, Palestinians would be less likely to support the movement.

Since the outbreak of the war in October 2023, this long-standing strategy has sharply intensified, with the United Nations³⁹ and humanitarian organizations⁴⁰ accusing Israeli leaders of using hunger as a “weapon of war.” At times, Israel has fully blocked aid, and for much of the war, allowed in only small amounts. Before the war, approximately 500 trucks entered Gaza daily, mostly carrying commercial goods. During the first 16 months of the war, this figure dropped to an average of just 116 trucks per day.⁴¹ The overarching goal has remained to weaken Hamas’ resources, erode popular support for its rule, and put pressure on it to accept Israel’s conditions in negotiations.

In anticipation of the war, Hamas reportedly stockpiled around $700 million in cash and hundreds of millions of shekels in tunnels before launching the 7 October assault.⁴² Yet, as the war enters its second year, the group is facing a mounting financial crisis. Its external cash flow has been halted by Israel’s full blockade, while internal revenues have collapsed after Israel cut off Hamas’ tax streams — including the roughly $30 million collected each month from customs and duties at the Rafah crossing.⁴³ These funds had been used not only to sustain Hamas’ military wing but also to govern the enclave and pay civil servant and police salaries. With these sources now gone, humanitarian aid may be one of the few remaining avenues of revenue for Hamas, as is often the case in conflict and post-conflict environments.

No systematic Hamas looting, though diversion may occur

Israel has accused Hamas of diverting humanitarian aid,⁴⁴ citing this as justification for the 11-week total halt in aid deliveries that took place between 2 March and 18 May. Yet Israeli officials have not provided evidence of direct looting. A USAID bureau analysis in late June found no evidence that Hamas is systematically looting US-funded aid, while senior Israeli officials told The New York Times that Israel had found no proof that Hamas is systematically stealing from the UN delivery system,⁴⁵ which Israel has long criticized and sought to undermine. 

In fact, if Hamas were to systematically divert aid, this would impose a high cost on its legitimacy among Palestinians. Hamas-affiliated outlets regularly post reports and videos showing arrests and punishments of people accused of looting aid, reinforcing Hamas’ claim that it protects civilians from exploitation. Until May 2024 — before the closure of the Rafah crossing following the IDF’s ground invasion — Hamas civilian officials coordinated and secured aid arriving through the crossing by relying on police officers and aid security committees frequently targeted by Israel. ACLED data indicate that the theft of aid remained low during this period (see graph below). 

Following the Rafah crossing’s closure, Israel allowed limited deliveries through crossings it controlled, mainly Kerem Shalom and Western Erez, prioritizing commercial supplies in a shift that coincided with a surge in looting. Between June 2024 and the January 2025 ceasefire, ACLED records a rise in looting incidents, particularly in areas under Israeli control where armed groups and gangs often seized aid, including in Rafah. The gang affiliated with Yasser Abu Shabab — previously involved in arms smuggling and drug trafficking, and more recently backed by Israel and tasked with safeguarding humanitarian aid convoys entering Rafah⁴⁶ — is believed to have been involved in much of the looting during this period.⁴⁷ Aid looting largely stopped during the ceasefire, when Hamas police once more protected convoys.

Nevertheless, partial diversion of aid by Hamas may have occurred at different stages of the war through mechanisms other than direct looting by, for example, manipulating beneficiary lists to favor Hamas loyalists. Aid has entered Gaza at different phases through various suppliers and mechanisms, including UN-coordinated aid; smaller aid agencies; commercial supplies, which Israel also refers to as aid; bilateral assistance; and local and regional Red Crescent societies. UN mechanisms are generally viewed as reliable and less vulnerable to interference due to their long-standing operations on the ground, direct management of supply chains and distribution inside Gaza, and the high level of scrutiny from and accountability to donor states, including the US and European countries. However, when delivered through smaller organizations that do not have a presence on the ground to oversee distribution, aid has been more susceptible to diversion.⁴⁸ It has also been suggested that aid provided through regional Red Crescent societies has also been more susceptible to diversion by Hamas, as it lacks the same level of international oversight and accountability as UN-coordinated assistance.⁴⁹ Trucks entering Gaza to deliver commercial aid may also have, at times, paid fees to Hamas, including taxes.⁵⁰ 

Despite the relative reliability of UN-coordinated aid, Israel — which has long had strained relations with UN agencies, especially the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East — introduced a new distribution mechanism in late May 2025 through the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF), which is backed by the US. Under this system, aid is delivered to the population through four main distribution centers located in areas under Israeli control, with IDF checkpoints along the routes. The initiative was presented as a way to prevent Hamas fighters from benefiting from aid. In practice, however, the GHF centers have become sites of severe disorder and violence. 

According to ACLED data, more than 1,300 Palestinians were reportedly killed while seeking aid between late May and 12 September at or around GHF centers — the majority by IDF fire (see map below). Despite this high civilian death toll, distribution through the GHF has not guaranteed that Hamas is excluded from receiving aid. Deliveries are often poorly organized: Boxes are placed in open areas, gates are opened only briefly, and thousands of desperate people rush forward. Eyewitnesses on the ground report that individual Hamas members may also have been among those collecting aid for their families.⁵¹

Furthermore, the 11-week halt in deliveries created widespread hunger and led to unprecedented looting of aid that was brought in through other channels, including the UN, once limited entry of aid resumed. ACLED data show a sharp increase in such incidents during this period. While much of the seized aid was taken by desperate civilians, the chaos may have created opportunities for Hamas-affiliated actors to benefit, though likely not in a systematic way that would damage Hamas’ reputation among Gazans.

Amid international uproar over the humanitarian situation in Gaza, by late July, Israel increased the flow of aid and introduced daily pauses in military operations in some areas to facilitate delivery. Despite the significant costs inflicted on Gaza’s civilians, Israel did not succeed in bringing Hamas to its knees in negotiations by militarizing aid, as the group maintained its refusal to disarm. Hamas’ ideology, after all, is rooted in a worldview that sanctifies death as part of the struggle for ultimate victory and downplays concern for civilian suffering or the loss of fighters and leaders. The group views such sacrifice as both necessary and honorable.

Furthermore, despite the severe toll on civilians and widespread criticism of Hamas, Gazans have not risen up against the group. ACLED has not recorded large-scale protests in Gaza, likely both because Hamas can suppress dissent through violence and intimidation and because many Gazans still see no viable alternative.

To prevent Hamas from benefiting from aid — through any form of diversion — an alternative governing authority would be required, rather than policies that starve the population.

What appears to be a lack of strategy in Gaza is Israel’s strategy of chaos and control

Nearly two years into the war, Hamas is battered and degraded, no longer able to launch large-scale attacks against Israel from Gaza. Yet remnants of both its military and governing capabilities persist. As long as Israeli soldiers remain on the ground, the insurgency can continue for the foreseeable future. While Hamas has expressed a willingness to shed the burden of governance, its influence remains deeply embedded in Gaza after years in power and as an ideological movement. If Israel blocks the emergence of a feasible Palestinian governing body beyond the rule of clans and gangs, Hamas can continue to hold sway.

Without pressure from United States President Donald Trump or persistent and severe public outcry from Israeli society, the Gaza reoccupation plan is already proving to be more than just a maneuver to corner Hamas in negotiations. But even if a temporary ceasefire is reached, as long as Israel maintains full security control over Gaza and its political elites block political solutions and any credible stabilization plan, the country will remain locked into a long-term posture focused solely on the use of force. Israeli society will ultimately have to reckon not only with the moral cost of a security policy built on perpetual war and control, but also with the strategic risks — prolonged troop exposure in Gaza, the drain of economic resources, and growing international isolation.

Two decades after the disengagement and evacuation of Israeli settlements from Gaza, the prospect of reoccupation has become a looming threat. Netanyahu insists — especially in his English-language statements aimed at an international audience — that Israel does not plan to occupy Gaza, but to “liberate” it; that it is a temporary takeover, not a permanent occupation; and that Israel will maintain overall security control while handing civilian management to “Arab forces.”⁵² Time will tell whether any Arab country will take responsibility for governing Gaza without a commitment — however rhetorical — to an eventual Palestinian state, without an invitation from the PA, and whether this temporary takeover will turn into a permanent de facto occupation. For now, the signs point to the continuation of Israel’s long-standing strategy of control without granting Palestinians sovereignty, while Gaza becomes increasingly ungoverned and unlivable.

Israel’s far right has long advocated for taking control of Gaza and relocating much of its population through so-called voluntary emigration. While Netanyahu is sometimes portrayed as being pushed and pulled by his coalition, his long-term vision appears closely aligned with theirs. For years, his governments weakened the PA and bolstered Hamas’ rule in Gaza in order to block any viable path to Palestinian statehood. Since 7 October, Israel has shifted to fighting Hamas with every possible tool, yet the long-standing paradigm of perpetual control and efforts to extinguish aspirations for Palestinian self-determination continue. Instead of strengthening the PA and preparing it for a governance role in Gaza amid pledged reforms, Israel has left it hanging by a thread, while generating such destruction and instability in Gaza that a credible Palestinian governing arrangement becomes hard to imagine.

Amid the ongoing humanitarian crisis, Israel is reportedly in talks with several countries about resettling some Gazans. Netanyahu himself indicated that Israel wants to “allow the population to leave, and then … go in with all [its] might against the enemy who remains there.”⁵³ In this light, the current trajectory — marked by violence, destruction, and the absence of a credible day-after plan — may not signal the absence of strategy. It is the strategy.

Correction: A previous version of this report said that more than 1,300 Palestinians were reportedly killed while seeking aid between late May and the end of August at or around GHF centers. The report has been updated to reflect that more than 1,300 Palestinians were reportedly killed while seeking aid between late May and 12 September at or around GHF centers.

Footnote 13 was added after publication to direct readers to ACLED's methodology related to fatalities in Gaza.

The authors would like to thank all those who contributed their insights during the research phase of this report, including officials from UN agencies, international and Palestinian NGOs, and journalists — including those based inside Gaza.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.