Hezbollah’s shift to attrition offers Iran a lasting tool to pressure Israel and the US

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As drones become central to Hezbollah’s tactics, the protective value of Israel’s buffer zone diminishes

Since joining the US-Israel war with Iran on 2 March, Hezbollah has adopted an attritional strategy aimed at keeping military and political pressure on Israel, while using lower-cost military tactics. The group’s military capabilities and deterrent role were significantly weakened by Israel’s operations in 2024, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed key political and military leaders, disrupted the group’s command and control system, and damaged its missile and drone arsenal and production sites. Nevertheless Hezbollah has maintained military value for Iran: It has shown that it can continue to raise the cost of war on Israel if the Iranian regime faces a serious threat from Israel and the United States. This is reflected in the greater intensity of its attacks on IDF operations in Lebanon, with more than 199 per month since March 2026, compared with nearly 163 during Israel’s October-November 2024 ground invasion.

The group has come to rely on small cells, dispersed launch sites, remote operators, and targeted attacks, rather than visible formations and direct engagement with Israeli forces. Hezbollah has reduced its reliance on direct confrontation with the IDF — armed clashes fell from 34% of total interactions in Lebanon during the ground invasion in October-November 2024 to 11% between March and July 2026 — and increasingly turned to lower-intensity remote attacks on Israeli forces operating in Lebanon. Rockets still account for the largest share of Hezbollah weapon use, but drone use has increased sharply: Hezbollah used suicide drones in 24% of attacks between March and July, up from 6% in October and November 2024. Fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones, which the group did not report using until March 2026, were deployed in 21% of attacks in the last five months.

The reliance on FPV drones marks a shift from Hezbollah’s military operations during the 2024 ground invasion, which focused on missile attacks. With this shift, Hezbollah presents a drastically changed risk profile to the IDF. Rocket attacks are often detected, intercepted, or fall in open areas, while anti-tank guided missiles are more precise but have a limited range. FPV drones, on the other hand, are small, mobile, low-flying, and require limited logistical support. Fiber-optic guidance has also made them less vulnerable to Israeli jamming, while night-vision and thermal-imaging systems allow them to operate in poor visibility.

Israel established a buffer zone in southern Lebanon partly to reduce Hezbollah’s anti-tank missile threat by pushing launch teams farther from northern Israeli communities. While anti-tank guided missiles are most effective within about 6 kilometers, FPV drones have targeted soldiers, vehicles, tanks, bulldozers, fixed positions, and military equipment from distances of up to 20 km. Their range and precision have allowed Hezbollah to threaten Israeli forces inside and around the buffer zone. Israel reported that at least 33 of Hezbollah’s remote attacks since March killed or injured Israelis in Lebanon, while Hezbollah claimed a direct hit in at least 240 other incidents. Hezbollah used FPV drones in more than half of the 33 events that resulted in reported casualties or fatalities. These attacks have not had a decisive military impact, but they show that Hezbollah can still impose deadly costs despite Israeli efforts to weaken its arsenal and push it away from the border.

Rocket fire has continued to disrupt northern Israel

At the same time, Hezbollah has maintained an emphasis on rocket attacks on northern Israeli border towns and the Galilee since March (see map below). Since March the group has launched at least 821 rocket attacks on Israel.

Though the number of these rocket attacks remains below those recorded in October and November 2024, such rocket fire allows Hezbollah to disrupt life in northern Israel and signal its ability to widen the conflict in case of Israeli escalation. The limitations of rockets — their detectability, vulnerability to interception, and tendency to fall in open areas — matter less when the goal is to create fear and disruption rather than directly engage with a military force. These attacks have often coincided with Israel’s expansion north of the Litani River, strikes on Beirut’s southern suburbs, or sensitive stages of US-Iran negotiations.

Outlook: Hezbollah to limit operations while rebuilding lower-cost weapons

Despite losing much of its deterrent leverage over Israel, Hezbollah remains valuable to Iran as an attritional force that can raise the cost of war. It can be expected to continue rebuilding its military capability with Iran’s support. Under sustained Israeli military pressure and growing domestic pressure linked to the trilateral framework between Lebanon, Israel, and the US, however, the group is likely to focus on smaller, low-cost weapons that are easier to obtain, assemble, move, and store. FPV drones, guided missiles, and other precision weapons are likely to remain a priority.

Hezbollah is unlikely to resume a large-scale military campaign without close coordination with Iran. However, its use of FPV drones will likely remain central to attacks on Israeli troops near the buffer zone, alongside suicide drones and short-range rocket fire, including small-scale barrages against northern Israel. Limited clashes with Israeli forces are likely to continue near the buffer zone. Hezbollah attacks on Israeli forces in the Ali al-Taher Ridge on 1 August and in al-Mansouri village on 5 August show that Israel’s continued deployment in southern Lebanon remains a source of friction.

Factors influencing Hezbollah’s military operations

Renewed Israel-Iran escalation: Renewed fighting between Iran and Israel would be the clearest trigger for a wider Hezbollah campaign. Iran will expect Hezbollah to join the conflict because the group’s proximity to Israel allows it to stretch the IDF and pressure its air-defense systems by firing rocket barrages at northern Israel and resuming attacks on Israeli forces deployed in the security zone. Hezbollah also relies heavily on Iranian weapon supplies, financial support, and operational assistance, and it is unlikely to remain on the sidelines if Tehran faces another major Israeli attack. Israel, in turn, could use a wider confrontation to intensify its campaign against Hezbollah and further degrade its capabilities.

Expansion or withdrawal of Israeli forces in Lebanon: Israeli deployment and military operations in Lebanon will maintain heightened friction with Hezbollah. Expanding Israeli operations will likely increase clashes with Hezbollah, especially north of the Litani River and around Ali al-Taher and al-Nabatieh, where Hezbollah has significant military infrastructure. Israel has shown little willingness to withdraw and has limited confidence in the Lebanese army’s ability to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah is also unlikely to disarm while Israeli troops remain in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah’s remaining military capacity: Hezbollah’s military capabilities and weapons stockpiles have been heavily degraded. The timing and scale of any operation in the short term will depend on how much the group can rebuild its arsenal. Hezbollah is unlikely to escalate significantly while it still needs to replenish its weapons, especially given the growing challenges of smuggling weapons through Syria and limited access to commercially available dual use technology.

Table 1: Hezbollah attacks in Lebanon: Comparing March-July 2026 with October-November 2024