Iran may be a turning point for US regime change objectives in Latin America

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In Venezuela, Operation Absolute Resolve caused no American fatalities, and Nicolás Maduro was captured swiftly and replaced with Delcy Rodríguez, who embarked on normalization of relations with the United States and reforms that benefit US interests. In contrast, Operation Epic Fury in Iran has already seen hundreds of American service members injured and seven killed; Iranian retaliation has inflicted serious political costs on the US and allies; and the replacement for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in US-Israeli operations, is his son, a fellow hard-liner — signaling Iranian defiance rather than concessions. 

The risk of increasing entanglement in Iran will likely weaken US capacity and dampen domestic appetite for further intervention, at least ahead of the November mid-term elections. Sustained US military engagement in the Middle East may further divert some of its resources deployed in the Caribbean, already deprived of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier.¹ This, in turn, may limit the credibility of any threat of further US operations in Venezuela or Cuba, hindering Trump’s ability to extract concessions from Caracas and Havana, particularly those related to democratization. 

Cuba remains a US priority: Trump has reiterated warnings of imminent changes in the island.² However, recent US-Cuba engagement suggests that a negotiated political settlement, rather than a direct and costly military operation as in Venezuela, has gained traction. The US has applied pressure to bring the Cuban regime to the negotiating table. A blockade on oil exports has already triggered several power outages that have affected all sectors of the economy and access to basic necessities, and these are likely to deepen as oil import prices hike. The shortages risk heightening social discontent and increase domestic pressure on the government. Previous spikes in demonstrations in Cuba have been spurred by fuel and energy shortages, and recent protests suggest this dynamic remains potent.³ 

Against this backdrop, US officials have reportedly engaged in backchannel discussions with Havana, arguably with the objective of containing collapse in Cuba and thus preventing large-scale migration flows, maintaining support among its Cuban-American electorate, and preventing wider regional destabilization. While the possibility of violence cannot be completely ruled out, reporting has indicated that negotiations might be focusing on economic reforms rather than on removing the Castro family and increasing political freedoms, which may reduce the likelihood of resistance from the Cuban regime, as already hinted at by President Miguel Díaz-Canel’s recent calls for economic and social reforms. 

Meanwhile in Venezuela, events in the Middle East may alter Rodríguez’s strategic calculations and thus hamper the US’ stated plans to shepherd the country toward a political transition. So far, the thaw in relations hinges on the US’ threat of further military action if Rodríguez fails to comply with its demands, and the promise of economic incentives, such as lifting of sanctions and an influx of foreign investments, particularly in the oil and mining sectors. 

But now, as the conflict in the Middle East raises uncertainties about oil supplies from Gulf states, making oil prices jump — and as US military intervention in Venezuela seems less likely — Venezuela’s government is well-positioned to reap the benefits.⁴ Not only could this situation boost foreign investor’s interests in the country, but a significant increase in oil revenues may help revitalize the country’s economy and thus ease domestic pressures toward a political opening.