Israel recalibrates its military campaigns in a region still on edge

From Palestine to Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and even Qatar in its pursuit of Hamas leaders, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) projected military power across the region in 2025. It conducted attacks on the territory of more foreign countries than any other military worldwide (see graph below). After degrading key adversaries and securing major gains in 2024, the IDF settled into periods of “lessfire” in some arenas, while escalating its campaign in others. Israel’s post-7 October doctrine sought not only to restore deterrence but also to prevent future threats and to impede adversaries from rebuilding capacity. Moving from a status quo power toward a more revisionist one, Israel established or expanded buffer zones and military outposts in three countries.

Gaza remained the deadliest arena; the IDF killed thousands — the majority civilians — in strikes. Despite a broad consensus that Hamas no longer posed a military threat, including within Israel’s own security establishment,¹ Israel broke the January ceasefire and pursued an undefined goal of “total victory.”² By October, the IDF had confined Palestinians in Gaza to less than 25% of the enclave and was pushing to establish full control over Gaza City. Israel’s seemingly miscalculated strike on senior Hamas negotiators in Qatar — a United States ally whose economic weight appeals to Trump — proved a turning point, prompting the US president to push Benjamin Netanyahu into accepting a ceasefire. Yet Israel still controls over half the Strip, and its sporadic attacks have killed over 360 people since the 10 October ceasefire.

Beyond Gaza, the situation in the West Bank also remained highly volatile. In January, the IDF conducted its largest operations in decades, displacing tens of thousands from the Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur al-Shams camps and establishing outposts inside areas nominally under Palestinian self-rule. While the campaign significantly curbed local Palestinian armed groups, the IDF’s increased presence in the northern governorates and around settler outposts, the proliferation of checkpoints, and the loosening of rules of engagement led to more than double the IDF attacks on unarmed civilians compared to 2024. Settler violence also surged to its highest level in a decade, with the IDF doing little to curb attacks.

To the north, the IDF Northern Command withdrew its ground troops from southern Lebanon in February, but it established five outposts on strategic hills along the border. Despite the ceasefire and Hezbollah’s halt to cross-border attacks, the IDF did not cease operations entirely (see map below). Maintaining pressure on Hezbollah, Israel conducted hundreds of near-daily strikes, mainly in the south but also in the Bekaa Valley and Beirut. These operations have killed hundreds of Hezbollah fighters, including nearly 25 commanders in 2025, notably the group’s chief of staff in late November. 

Nowhere were Israel’s foreign operations more strategically consequential than in Iran, where Israel launched a 12-day military campaign consisting of over 350 airstrikes across 27 provinces, including in the capital Tehran. Supported by broad intelligence operations, the IDF struck missile sites, military bases, nuclear facilities, and government buildings, and assassinated senior military leaders and nuclear scientists. Israel also secured limited US participation in targeting strikes on three nuclear facilities.

Syria and Yemen were also targets of Israel’s military activity. In Syria, the IDF targeted Syrian military assets despite al-Assad’s ouster on 8 December 2024. Israel also established six additional outposts in the demilitarized buffer zone, which it invaded in late 2024,³ deploying up to 15 kilometers inside Syria to carry out security operations.⁴ In Yemen, Israel escalated attacks on the Houthis after limited US and Israeli strikes in 2024 failed to deter attacks in support of Gaza. The IDF conducted operations on 16 separate days in 2025, killing over 120 people. Its strikes decimated the Houthi de facto government and killed the military chief of staff, dealing a significant setback to the Iran-allied group.

Without sustained diplomacy, 2026 risks sliding back into escalation

Israel’s military campaigns over the past two years have produced a fragile equilibrium: Its short- to medium-term security has improved, and its regional leverage has increased. Yet sustainable peace or long-term deterrence remains elusive. Diplomatic developments now offer a chance to anchor more durable stability — if the opportunity is seized before the next escalation. The lessons of the 7 October attacks have reshaped Israel’s strategic thinking, producing a far lower tolerance for risk and a posture favoring preventive intervention against the buildup of adversarial capabilities. In this new environment, Netanyahu’s electoral incentives may further drive escalation: As the 2026 Israeli elections near, he could launch a military move to sustain a security-centric agenda, particularly if domestic developments weaken his electoral prospects. Sustained US pressure will be needed to prevent Israel from defaulting to force. 

Optimism must be employed cautiously when dealing with the protracted Israel-Palestine conflict. The 20-point Trump plan, which is heavily tilted toward Israel, is far from a comprehensive peace framework and contains multiple pitfalls. Yet it was the only proposal on the table that was broad and vague enough to secure reluctant buy-in from both sides. Doubts persist over Hamas’ willingness to fully disarm or relinquish its political role in post-war Gaza — a prerequisite for further Israeli withdrawal. The composition and mandate of the International Stabilization Forces also remain unclear. Therefore, the risk of a prolonged phase one of the 20-point plan that leaves Gaza divided between Israel-controlled zones and Hamas-run areas remains high.

Avoiding such a stalemate will require sustained US pressure, alongside regional powers conditioning further normalization and economic ties on meaningful progress. Meanwhile, Israeli political elites across the spectrum continue to categorically reject the creation of a Palestinian state,⁵ suggesting that beyond declarative steps aimed at diplomatic gains — including potential normalization with Saudi Arabia — no practical measures are likely to follow.⁶ Israel’s West Bank policies, including the expansion of the settlement project, are therefore unlikely to shift in any significant way, particularly as long as Netanyahu’s far-right government is in office.

IDF strikes on Hezbollah strongholds are likely to continue next year and may intensify. Lebanon’s government has launched an unprecedented push to reassert state authority, dismantle Hezbollah positions in the south, and curb the group’s autonomy. Yet, given the risk of sectarian fracture, the Lebanese army has adopted an incremental approach. Israel argues that the pace and scale of these measures remain insufficient⁷ and is now accusing Hezbollah of attempting to rearm.⁸ Further escalation thus remains a credible risk, though outcomes will also hinge on increased US pressure for direct negotiations between Lebanon and Israel, border demarcation, and a broader security arrangement. 

Israel seeks a demilitarized zone stretching from Damascus to Syria’s southern and western borders — a proposal rejected by the Syrian leadership, which ties any security agreement to Israel’s withdrawal to the 8 December lines.⁹ Despite growing international recognition of the new Syrian leadership, Israel remains skeptical of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s past and is intent on preventing future threats near its border. The Trump administration’s push for a security agreement between Israel and Syria may impose some restraint on Israeli activity, but even if diplomacy progresses, Israel will likely retain operational freedom in Syrian airspace.

Lastly, while Israel maintains that its 12-day campaign achieved its stated objectives by inflicting major damage on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities,¹⁰ there is broad agreement — including among Iranian political elites¹¹ — that Israel is unlikely to view the job as complete. Iran remains a formidable adversary, its nuclear program not fully dismantled, and its anti-Israel foreign policy unchanged. As Iran rebuilds aspects of its defense capabilities¹² — while avoiding overtly provocative steps on the nuclear file — and with Trump not showing much appetite for a prolonged confrontation, the next round of conflict may not be imminent. But the ingredients for another escalation remain firmly in place.

Israel may have to reckon with the possibility that Trump will impose restraints on its previously unchallenged operational latitude, as it increasingly competes with Gulf states whose influence in Washington is growing alongside deeper economic ties. But regardless of how overwhelming outside pressure may be, Israel is unlikely to yield on what it views as existential threats. Its campaign of targeted strikes and limited operations is therefore unlikely to cease in 2026. Israel will remain the region’s dominant — though unpopular — military hegemon.

Visual produced by Ana Marco.

Conflict Watchlist 2026