In Jammu and Kashmir, new risks for security forces and civilians threaten regional peace

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The author consulted a number of experts from Jammu and Kashmir for this report. Those not cited prefer to remain anonymous.

In May 2025, India and Pakistan engaged in some of the most intense and widespread fighting in decades. The casus belli, as is so often the case in the two countries’ history, was Kashmiri separatism. In response to an attack by separatist militants on Hindu tourists in the Pahalgam area of Indian-administered Kashmir, India struck suspected militant bases across the border in Pakistan, triggering the latest round of hostilities.¹ 

India has long accused Pakistan of training and arming militants who favor the secession of the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.² Some of the most prominent armed separatist groups, including the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), operate from Pakistan. While the extent of Pakistan’s support for the Kashmiri insurgency has varied over the years, India claims that militants of Pakistani origin primarily drive the current phase.³ For its part, Pakistan asserts that its support is only moral and diplomatic, and that the Kashmiri armed insurgency is a wholly indigenous movement.⁴ 

The May 2025 conflict erupted at a time when overall separatist violence levels in Jammu and Kashmir were at record lows. The security and political clampdown, instituted by the Indian government after ending the territory’s special autonomous status in 2019, largely succeeded in quelling a surge in violence, particularly in the Kashmir Valley (see map below). 

The Pahalgam attack and the subsequent hostilities, however, highlight that, albeit weakened, Kashmiri militancy could still bring two nuclear powers to the brink of war. One year later, this report unpacks recent militancy trends in Jammu and Kashmir and argues that, while overall militancy has undoubtedly reduced, evolving militant tactics have increased the vulnerabilities of Indian security forces and certain civilians. These emerging risks mean that potential for regional escalation remains high.

What characterizes Kashmiri separatist militancy today?

The Kashmir Valley has long been one of the most militarized regions in the world.⁵ Security restrictions only increased after 2019, forcing a change in militant tactics. Two distinct trends are now visible — violence against civilians is more indiscriminate, and the locus of militant activity has shifted toward the Jammu division.

Civilians are increasingly vulnerable to mass fatality attacks

In recent years, militant violence against civilians has increasingly involved collective targeting focused on broader group identities, such as Hindus or non-Kashmiris, rather than targeting specific members of those groups. The underlying pattern follows trends seen since 2019: Civilian victims are selected to signal opposition to political developments and, in particular, to any demographic change in India’s only Muslim-majority state. 

The risk to civilians, however, now increasingly comes from mass fatality attacks, meaning attacks in which more than five people are killed (see map below). Militants typically open fire at gatherings of targeted groups, resulting in a far larger number of people being killed or injured in a single attack. ACLED data over the last three years show that only three militant attacks account for half of all civilian fatalities. 

The April 2025 Pahalgam attack, which was the deadliest attack against civilians in decades, was emblematic of this shift. In fact, the deliberate targeting of Hindu tourists crossed a red line. Separatists had previously attacked Hindu pilgrims, but tourists, who are important for the local economy, had largely been spared. But with the government frequently highlighting rising tourism numbers as proof of its security achievements, tourists became an obvious target.⁶ The October 2024 attack in Ganderbal was similar: Militants killed seven civilians, both locals and non-locals, who were working in a tunnel construction project aimed at improving Kashmir’s connectivity. The attack took place only days after much-delayed provincial elections, which the government had hailed as another milestone toward what it describes as normalcy.⁷

The shift toward more indiscriminate attacks may have been an adaptation to increasing security restrictions, as such tactics require only occasional success to make an impact and, paradoxically, involve less precise planning than targeted assassinations. While scattered attacks may get lost in the din of an ongoing conflict, such mass fatality attacks undeniably garner attention. Not only do they pose a more flagrant challenge to India’s official narrative of normalcy, but they are also more likely to galvanize public opinion and spur demands for a forceful response.

Militancy shifts toward Jammu

Increasing security restrictions in the Kashmir Valley, the historical and ideological epicenter of the conflict, have also prompted a shift in militancy toward the Jammu division. Like the Valley, several districts in Jammu lie along the Line of Control (LoC) — the de facto border separating the Indian- and Pakistani-administered sides of Jammu and Kashmir — and encompass many of the traditional routes for the cross-border movement of militants. However, Jammu was previously considered more of a conduit for reaching the Kashmir Valley than a conflict site in and of itself. 

This seems to have changed. In 2025, over 60% of all violent militant activity in the region occurred in the Jammu division, a sharp increase from only 5% in 2018 (see map below). In shifting operations to Jammu, militants have benefited from gaps in the security framework. The redeployment of troops to the Line of Actual Control, separating India and China, after the 2020-2021 border skirmishes between the two countries created a security vacuum.⁸ More damaging perhaps was a breakdown in human intelligence,⁹ caused in particular by growing distrust between the government and the nomadic Gujjar-Bakkarwal community who have long served as the Indian military’s “eyes and ears” in the border areas.¹⁰ 

Tactical expediency also explains why militancy is concentrated in Jammu’s Pir Panjal mountain belt and the Chenab river valley belt. Pir Panjal’s twin districts of Poonch and Rajouri lie along the LoC and have long been used as infiltration routes from Pakistan into Kashmir.¹¹ Since 2019, a third of militant activity has consisted of clashes with Indian security forces attempting to foil reported infiltration attempts. The hilly and forested terrain in both areas also facilitates militant movement (see map below). 

A foothold in the Pir Panjal mountain range and Chenab river valley areas also serves a strategic purpose: Their geography keeps militants within striking distance of the Kashmir Valley and ready to exploit any security lapses that may occur. The Pir Panjal mountains act as a natural barrier between the Jammu division and the Valley, while the forested regions of Doda and Kishtwar in Jammu’s Chenab river valley belt provide direct access to Kashmir. 

These increasing militant operations in Jammu are likely temporary, driven by tactical necessity. Nevertheless, they have expanded the conflict to a region that was relatively peaceful for decades, negating some of the security gains made by India in Kashmir and stretching security forces’ resources.¹²

New risks in Jammu

Increased militancy in Jammu has brought with it fresh challenges both for Indian security forces and civilians. The region’s terrain leaves security forces more vulnerable, while its Hindu-majority demographics mean that the conflict could exploit — and inflame — existing religious fault lines. 

Security forces are more vulnerable

Militants are increasingly engaging with Indian security forces in direct clashes or through ambushes and hit-and-run attacks. The hilly, forested terrain favors these tactics and provides militants with natural hideouts. With the shift away from urban warfare, grenade attacks, which were previously a distinctive characteristic of Kashmiri militancy but rarely caused significant damage, have declined markedly.

On the other hand, the security forces’ favored approach of cordon-and-search operations, in which they surround and block access to a village where militants are believed to be hiding before tracking them down, is obviously less effective in these landscapes. As a result, anti-insurgency operations are now more drawn out. While earlier operations rarely lasted more than two days, ACLED data now show a growing number of multi-day operations, with the majority occurring in Jammu. 

The new terrain and tactics have directly translated into greater risk for Indian security forces. ACLED data on armed clashes show that security forces are suffering more losses for every militant they kill than before. In 2019, security forces killed around five militants for every loss incurred, but by 2025, this ratio had narrowed to 3-to-1 (see chart below). This change became evident from 2023, coinciding with the shift in militancy to the mountains and forests of Jammu.

Besides the favorable terrain, Indian officials offer another explanation for the increased dangers its security forces face. They claim that the latest iteration of Kashmiri separatism is mainly driven by militants of Pakistani origin who are better trained and better equipped, and are thus better matched in clashes with security forces.¹³ Militant successes in anti-insurgency operations lend credence to these claims. 

That Pakistan varies the extent of its support for Kashmiri militancy is well-acknowledged.¹⁴ In this regard, the appointment of Field Marshal Asim Munir as the head of Pakistan’s all-powerful military in November 2022 is significant. He has taken a notably hard-line stance over Kashmir compared to some of his recent predecessors, who favored caution and back-channel diplomacy with India.¹⁵ Days before the Pahalgam attack, Munir pledged that Pakistan would not abandon their “Kashmiri brethren in their heroic struggle against the Indian occupation.”¹⁶ This confrontational rhetoric continued after the attack, when he referred to the Kashmiri militancy as a “legitimate struggle.”¹⁷ Munir’s public statements suggest a more active posture toward Kashmiri militants, and it is instructive that the shift in militant tactics and operational focus to Jammu neatly followed after his ascension in late 2022.

The risk of communal spillover has increased

Unlike the Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley, Jammu is a Hindu-majority area. Inevitably, as militancy increases here, Hindus will more frequently find themselves in the crosshairs, whether by design or by accident. Kashmiri militancy, while largely motivated by separatism, does have an Islamist bent, as underscored by the selective targeting of Hindus in the Pahalgam attack. This makes the region’s Hindu majority a potent symbolic target for militants seeking to incite fear and stoke communal divisions.¹⁸

Fear of being targeted is palpable among the region’s Hindu population, who have asked to be armed and trained to defend themselves.¹⁹ In recent years, the Indian government has revived civilian militias, known as Village Defence Guards (VDG), creating new units,²⁰ providing them with training, and upgrading their weapons.²¹ Hindus primarily make up these VDG groups,²² which creates an uneasy dynamic in areas with large and unarmed Muslim communities. 

The district of Kathua offers a glimpse into these evolving dynamics. Bordering Pakistan’s Punjab province below the disputed LoC, the Hindu-majority district has not traditionally been considered a militant hotspot. In recent years, however, it has recorded among the most significant increases in militancy across all districts in the territory, driven primarily by the People’s Anti-Fascist Front and The Resistance Front. These are two of the newer, local groups formed after 2019’s political realignment with links to Pakistan-based JeM and LeT, as alleged by Indian security officials.²³ They mainly target security forces, but are more explicit in their propaganda about opposing Hindu majoritarianism. Their growing presence has, in turn, spurred calls for expanding VDG groups in Kathua, reflecting anxieties among the Hindu majority.²⁴ 

Heightened militancy in Jammu also coincides with growing religious polarization and an increasing assertion of the Hindu identity across the country. Between 2023 and 2025, the second-highest number of demonstrations led by Hindu groups across all Indian states and union territories took place in Jammu and Kashmir, highlighting the growing salience of religious identities in a region formerly known for its syncretic culture. 

As the Hindu community asserts its identity more publicly, militancy could take a more religious turn.²⁵ Concerns that Kashmiri Muslims and other religious minorities and tribal groups are at risk in a Hindu-majority India led by a majoritarian government are ripe for militants to exploit. Militants may play on these fears to expand their support networks, and use them as a pretext for attacks. Increased militancy could, in turn, fuel suspicion of local Muslims, whose loyalty is already questioned far too easily. Heavy-handed security crackdowns on Jammu’s Muslim communities after previous attacks have furthered alienation. Both dynamics risk entrenching religious polarization and setting off a vicious cycle which, if left unchecked, could easily spiral into wider societal unrest. 

These new risks also mean that the decline in militancy in Jammu and Kashmir may not necessarily translate into peace for the wider region; rather, they heighten the potential for renewed clashes between India and Pakistan. A tougher operating environment for Indian security forces, coupled with Munir’s hawkish rhetoric, has reinforced India’s assessment that Pakistan is driving Kashmiri militancy. Meanwhile, the shift to Jammu has created opportunities for militants to exploit India’s existing religious fault lines and provoke an outsized response, both internally and externally. 

Jammu and Kashmir is still a powder keg for regional conflict

Insurgencies that benefit from both local sympathies for the overall cause and cross-border state support are hard to defeat through unilateral military means. Pakistan’s struggle to control the resurgence in Islamist militancy and Baloch separatism is a testament to this. The same dynamic is evident in Jammu and Kashmir.

The current low levels of militancy should not be mistaken for evidence that popular support for separatism is dying. In fact, the state’s heavy-handed approach, which has brought about this decline, is likely to engender resentment and fuel the very grievances that usually inflame separatist sentiments. The Kashmiri insurgency first erupted in the late 1980s out of local grievances against the Indian state. The national government’s rigging of the provincial elections was the trigger in the 1980s, and in 2026, the provincial government, although elected through a free and fair mandate, is still widely seen as powerless against nationally appointed bureaucrats.²⁶

At the same time, a crucial element in how the insurgency develops is Pakistan’s backing, which has been compared to a “tap” that can be turned down to a trickle or opened up as needed.²⁷ For now, the current level of militancy serves Pakistan’s purpose — it is enough to keep the issue alive without embroiling both countries in active hostilities. At a time when it is facing a deteriorating security situation along its western borders, Pakistan would prefer a calmer eastern front. Yet, even the best-laid strategies can be overtaken by events on the ground. As the Pahalgam attack showed, it only takes one incident to spark a wider conflict. 

After the Pahalgam attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi adopted a more interventionist stance, vowing to respond aggressively to all acts of “terrorism” and claiming that India would henceforth not make any distinctions between militants and their state sponsors.²⁸ This doctrine lowers the threshold for armed confrontation between the two countries, at least in theory. For its part, Pakistan, emboldened by its performance during the May 2025 conflict and increased global standing as it acts as a mediator in the Iran war, is also not likely to shy away from responding in kind to any Indian offensives. 

Of course, not all militant attacks, even seemingly high-profile ones, will elicit cross-border retaliation. For example, the Indian government decidedly downplayed the November 2025 attack by Kashmiri separatists in New Delhi, even after reports emerged that the handlers may have been based in Pakistan.²⁹ Given that it was the first attack in the national capital in decades, it would ordinarily have been considered a provocation.  

India’s response to the New Delhi attack illustrates the logical limitations of its new doctrine, as several variables, including geopolitics and internal political dynamics, will influence its decision-making. Among the most compelling of these factors is domestic pressure. In this regard, the targets most at risk in Jammu and Kashmir’s new conflict landscape — security forces and Hindus or non-Kashmiris — are politically sensitive, and the new militant tactics favoring headline-grabbing mass fatality attacks are most likely to whip up nationalistic fervor. Modi, who has built his political career on projecting a strongman image, especially vis-à-vis Pakistan, may be particularly susceptible to such pressures. In this context, Jammu and Kashmir will remain a flashpoint, just as it has been since 1947.