Last line of defense? How vigilante groups are transforming Haiti’s security landscape

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As 2026 begins, Haiti enters a pivotal year. Elections are expected on 30 August, with a potential runoff scheduled for 6 December. It will be the first election in a decade, reviving hopes for an end to the country’s political crisis and a renewed political mandate to fight gang violence. At the same time, the United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force (GSF), expected to become fully operational by mid-2026, aims to strengthen state security efforts to curb gang influence. However, the road toward lasting peace remains fraught with obstacles. 

Haiti’s security landscape has evolved in recent years, with security progressively shifting beyond formal state institutions. New tactics have emerged, including security forces’ use of explosive-laden drones, while non-traditional actors such as private military contractors and self-defense brigades have gained prominence as security operators — raising important questions about the effectiveness of state response, the dangers facing civilians, and overall accountability for abuses. At the same time, risks of violence and unrest among political power brokers and gangs remain likely, particularly as uncertainty persists over who will lead the country between the end of the Transitional Presidential Council’s (TPC) mandate in February 2026 and the start of the electoral process.

Vigilante-style acts of self-defense, in particular, have become a key feature of Haiti’s transforming security environment. Community organizations and individuals participating in vigilantism are far from a new phenomenon, having manifested under different circumstances throughout Haiti’s history.¹ However, on 24 April 2023, they gained international traction following the lynching and burning of 14 gang members by residents of Canapé Vert. The incident led to a nationwide wave of self-justice against gang members called “Bwa Kale,” a slang term that predates April 2023 but has since been applied to describe this movement. Since then, lynchings and coordinated actions to push back gangs involving organized and semi-organized citizen groups have remained frequent, and now represent a significant share of overall violence. Yet, discussions around Haiti’s security crisis and its remedies have often failed to acknowledge the prominence of self-defense activity in shaping Haiti’s security landscape and its role within future security efforts, instead focusing primarily on gangs and the state security forces’ response. 

Recognizing the growing role of self-defense in security responses to gang violence in Haiti, this report draws on ACLED data on vigilantism and dozens of interviews to examine its evolution, impact on conflict trends, and the key challenges it poses for future stabilization efforts amid this pivotal year. ACLED records both spontaneous, loosely coordinated violence by rioters, categorized as “mob violence,” as well as attacks seemingly carried out under the banner of an organized militia as “armed clashes” or “attacks.” Both are necessary to consider in the analysis of self-defense activity. This approach aims to account for the heterogeneous nature of self-defense activity and its diverse forms of organization, such as groups that identify by the areas in which they operate, seek to avoid public recognition as a form of protection, or those that may only form temporarily in response to an emerging security threat.

We find that since 2023, self-defense activity has surged in response to a security vacuum, and some groups have developed a more formal structure — though with varying levels of success and taking uneven forms across Haiti. Worryingly, self-defense activity has grown deadlier in recent years, fostered by state forces’ lenience toward extrajudicial killings, including in the context of clashes with gangs. Paradoxically, despite a few victories that contributed to pushing back gang incursions in several areas, self-defense activity has also brought about harsher gang retaliation in communities, exacerbating civilians’ exposure to violence. 

Old strategies, new crisis: The resurgence of self-defense activity in Haiti’s security vacuum

Self-defense activity is rooted in community organizations and local networks, which have played a significant role in Haiti's security, social, and political dynamics throughout its history. These traditions can be traced back to long-held practices, including the concept of “lakou,” a communal living structure that fostered mutual protection of residents and land from external threats; and organized community resistance to the Tonton Macoutes, the political militias that enforced the Duvalier dictatorships in the 1970s.² The underlying ideas behind Bwa Kale predate the more recent popularization of the term and are rooted in a cultural belief in the right to community self-protection that has remained ingrained in society until today.³ Experts on security issues and vigilantism in Haiti highlighted that social demands for security have remained constant since the end of the Duvalier dictatorship. 

Although the threat perceived by communities was not always criminal in nature, it has become increasingly so, leading them to adopt self-defense measures in response to the state’s persistent failure to guarantee security.⁴ Since 2018, gang violence has experienced a year-on-year increase fueled by political instability, particularly following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in July 2021, with a striking 42% increase between 2021 and 2022 (see map below). 

As Haiti’s political crisis deepened in the following years, gangs expanded their influence, seeking greater independence from their traditional political backers by diversifying their sources of revenue, notably through extortion and kidnappings for ransom.⁵ They further strengthened their firing power by joining forces under the Viv Ansanm alliance in September 2023,⁶ which translated into coordinated incursions challenging state authorities in the subsequent years. The alliance enabled gangs to expand their territorial reach in Port-au-Prince and eventually take control of around 90% of the capital. Gangs secured control of the main roads connecting the capital, access to ports, and other key infrastructure,⁷ while spreading to different departments such as Artibonite and Centre.

As gangs expanded their influence in 2023, vigilante violence also experienced a significant surge in the context of the Bwa Kale movement’s rapid spread, specifically after residents of Canapé Vert beat and burned 14 gang members in April. The lynching came in response to a series of gang incursions in middle-class neighborhoods in the upper part of the Port-au-Prince commune and prompted a widespread call for justice that resonated across the country (see map above). Groups of residents engaged in a wave of executions that, a month after the lynching, led to at least 221 suspected gang members killed across nine of Haiti’s 10 departments.

The Bwa Kale wave of vigilante violence and impetus for people in affected communities to protect themselves unfolded amid the Haitian authorities’ persistent difficulties in containing gang expansion, despite increasing police efforts to scale up the security response. In June 2024, the state response was bolstered by the deployment of the UN-backed and Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), with nearly 1,000 foreign police officers to reinforce Haiti’s National Police (PNH). Yet, the state’s security response has failed to curb gangs’ territorial growth and their shift toward a more confrontational stance marked by attacks on government buildings, police stations, and MSS armored vehicles. Gangs have also quickly adapted to the deployment of new forces, exploiting the urban environment to ambush armored convoys.

Security efforts continued to intensify in 2025 with the deployment of a special task force under the helm of the prime minister’s office, reportedly composed of members of the private security firm Vectus Global. Notably, the task force has conducted operations with explosive-laden drones that have contributed to a 54% increase in the number of reported fatalities in clashes with suspected gang members. Despite receiving backup from the MSS, which was turned into the UN-led Gang Suppression Force (GSF) in October 2025 to increase the mission’s operational capacities, the Haitian police and military forces continue to struggle to respond to the opening of multiple fronts by gangs due to chronic understaffing and underfunding.⁸

Amid persisting insecurity and the authorities’ acknowledgment of their own limitations, police and government officials have appealed to residents for support in the fight against gangs, promoting the idea of what they call “marriage police-population.” This idea has been invoked by two former police directors, Frantz Elbé and Rameau Normil, in public statements.⁹

In practice, this call for cooperation blurs the line between law enforcement and community action. Alongside state-led operations, vigilante groups and community brigades have begun to play a more prominent role in the security landscape in the past three years, serving as an informal extension of the state’s response capacity. 

A heterogeneous self-defense landscape with increasing coordination

Since the surge in self-defense incidents in April 2023, some vigilante actors have gained greater access to weapons, likely as a result of close ties with police, and have erected semi-permanent checkpoints around their communities. However, how each group has been able to formalize has depended largely on their access to resources and the geography in which they operate. 

Before Bwa Kale, self-defense violence manifested through sporadic and spontaneous lynchings of suspected criminals by mostly crudely armed residents. For example, in May 2019, residents of Canaan in Croix-des-Bouquets set fire to a gang hideout after members of that gang kidnapped and killed a resident, while in September 2021, members of the community of Mariani in Carrefour stoned four suspected gang members who were trying to establish themselves in the area.

Initially, the Bwa Kale movement was similar to these earlier manifestations of self-defense activity. It consisted mostly of seemingly spontaneous, uncoordinated groups using rocks and makeshift materials such as cars or tree trunks to block roads. Several experts interviewed by ACLED have raised doubts about the spontaneity of the movement, noting that some politico-economic elites — including prominent political and business elites — may have played a role in fueling parts of the wave of vigilantism.¹⁰ 

Nevertheless, this uncoordinated, mob-driven violence contrasts with more recent manifestations of vigilante activity, which, since 2023, has escalated into armed clashes (see graph below), suggesting greater access to weapons, coordination, and planning. In April 2025, reflecting a broader pattern of frequent coordination, armed self-defense members deployed alongside state forces exchanged fire with Viv Ansanm, foiling a gang offensive in Pacot and killing at least 35 suspected gang members. 

This trend indicates that in several urban areas, particularly those exposed to frequent gang incursions, self-defense groups have adopted more structured forms. It aligns with the assessment of several experts interviewed for this report, who reported that the most organized groups have consolidated under clearer hierarchical structures and even wear uniforms.¹¹

The growing level of formalization of these groups has also been visible through the erection of semi-permanent barricades at neighborhood entrances, patrols, temporary checkpoints, and identity checks to control access to communities and detect potential gang members. Between 2023 and 2025, the number of reported roadblocks in Port-au-Prince increased significantly, as this tactic was often used in response to gang offensives (see graph below). A large share of roadblocks recorded in Port-au-Prince commune, over 29%, has been concentrated in Canapé Vert, where the most organized self-defense brigade operates, thus reflecting the group’s capacity to mobilize resources to secure the neighborhood’s perimeter.

This shift is partially attributable to ties and cooperation between self-defense groups and police. Since the rise of Bwa Kale, vigilante groups have increasingly fought alongside police forces as a result of explicit calls from law enforcement officials for the population’s support to fight gangs,¹² with police reportedly assisting with the hospitalization of wounded self-defense members.¹³ Police forces have notably facilitated the issuance of permits to carry weapons, which citizens have a constitutionally protected right to use for self-defense on their property.¹⁴ In Kenscoff, the Communal Brigade of Kenscoff (BRICK) has been integrated into police and task force operations, offering back-up to security efforts following the Viv Ansanm offensive in early 2025.¹⁵ 

The links between vigilante groups and police forces are also facilitated by the fact that many police officers live in the neighborhoods where these groups operate. Current and former police officers frequently participate in the defense of the neighborhood where they live and have contributed to the organization of local self-defense groups by facilitating their access to equipment and tactical know-how.¹⁶ For instance, the self-defense brigade of Canapé Vert, one of the most prominent groups, is led by Samuel Joasil, a former member of the presidential palace’s security team.¹⁷ 

However, the level of formalization and coordination of self-defense activity is far from a homogenous phenomenon across the capital or the country as a whole,¹⁸ and is contingent on its environment. Unlike some of the most organized self-defense groups, such as the Canapé Vert and Solino brigades, some groups operate as loosely organized neighborhood watch groups that mobilize in response to the imminence of external threats. 

Factors such as the sociodemographic makeup of a neighborhood, its proximity to political and business elites, and ties to diaspora communities can play a crucial role, especially as many brigades rely on voluntary financial and material contributions to purchase equipment.¹⁹ Less-organized groups with fewer resources sometimes rely on temporary support from more-organized groups to repel gang incursions. While there is little evidence of substantial cooperation between brigades, ad hoc cooperation to repel gang incursions may facilitate the transfer of weapons, increase operational know-how, and contribute to the emergence of temporary hierarchical relationships between more formalized brigades and other groups.²⁰

Geography also plays a large role. The remoteness of an area and its proximity to transit routes contribute to residents’ access to resources.²¹ For instance, the Artibonite and Centre departments have a rather large-scale mobilization of their residents, mostly in response to weak police presence,²² but they seem to lack, thus far, the structure and hierarchy observed in some urban neighborhoods. 

Likewise, proximity to zones controlled by armed groups can affect the likelihood of such initiatives forming. While an imminent threat might enable the formation of vigilante groups,²³ they are also unlikely to emerge or grow under direct and strong gang domination. This is notably the case in Croix-des-Bouquets and Cité Soleil, both areas under the control of several gang leaders, and where gang threats of retaliation have likely disincentivized communities to engage in self-defense.²⁴ In fact, Cité Soleil has been home to several retaliatory massacres in recent years. In December 2024, members of the Wharf Jérémie gang led by Micanord Altès killed 242 people for allegedly sharing information with the press on ongoing violence in the neighborhood. As a result, vigilantism has remained a rare occurrence — with no incidents reported in recent years — compared to other communes in the capital (see map below).

While the overall trend since the surge of the Bwa Kale movement has been toward greater formalization and coordination among self-defense groups, questions remain about their actual effectiveness in pushing back gangs and about the broader consequences of their actions for the very communities they seek to protect.

Between protection and abuse in Haiti’s self-defense landscape

Uneven success in pushing back gangs

In light of Haiti’s deficient state response to gang violence, self-defense activity has become a key component of the security landscape, representing the last line of defense against gangs in many areas. Self-defense activities have successfully repelled gang incursions and prevented further advances, although with varying degrees of effectiveness. 

Following the coordinated Viv Ansanm-led incursions across Port-au-Prince in February 2024, several neighborhoods in the capital, including Canapé Vert, Pacot, and Turgeau, came under fire. The intensity of the violence was such that it notably prompted the temporary withdrawal of humanitarian organizations such as Doctors without Borders (MSF). In these areas, the intervention of self-defense groups alongside state forces contributed to repelling gang incursions, eventually leading gangs to reorient their operations to other areas, such as Kenscoff.²⁵

Several factors led to the relative success of self-defense brigades in Canapé Vert, Pacot, and Turgeau. First, the geographic positioning of Canapé Vert, around the base of a steep hill, provided self-defense brigades with a strategic advantage against gangs,²⁶ allowing them to act defensively and close access points to the neighborhood and higher areas using semi-permanent barricades. Second, affluent neighborhoods like Canapé Vert, Pacot, and Turgeau are often high-stakes targets for gangs, and are therefore more likely to be more heavily protected.²⁷ These neighborhoods are the last bulwark against gang expansion in the capital: Control over these areas would give gangs access to the rest of the capital, including Pétion-Ville, an affluent residential area for the political and economic elite.²⁸ As a result, self-defense groups received timely support to deter the incursion through the coordinated deployment of state forces, and thus prevented these areas from falling under gang control. 

However, self-defense activity has not displayed this level of efficiency everywhere in the country. Despite the presence of active and organized brigades, gangs succeeded in capturing several neighborhoods — such as nearby Christ-Roi and Solino — following an incursion launched in November 2024. More exposed than Canapé Vert due to their proximity to gang-controlled areas and the absence of significant geographic barriers, self-defense brigades in these areas failed to mobilize on time to counter a surprise and highly coordinated Viv Ansanm incursion.²⁹ Similarly, in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite, vigilante groups resisted gang incursions with the support of nearly 10 police officers present in the city. Still, gangs entered the city in January 2023 after the withdrawal of police officers, but were later driven out with the return of law enforcement in December 2024, thus highlighting the significance of timely resources and coordination to defending territories.³⁰ A Haiti expert interviewed for this report further emphasized that the distance between communities and vigilante actors in the Centre and Artibonite departments has hampered local communities from organizing a timely response to gang incursions.³¹

Overall, self-defense groups’ activities remain largely defensive in nature, as many of their successes are rooted in preventing gang expansion rather than retaking lost territories. As an example, residents in Solino were able to return to their homes only after gangs allowed them to, in a move likely intended to use civilians as shields in response to anti-gang operations and drone strikes conducted by the prime minister’s task force. 

The return of displaced residents raises the question of possible coexistence between gangs and members of self-defense groups. In general, both the population and active members of vigilante groups have maintained a zero-tolerance stance toward gangs, making collaboration or negotiation difficult. In Solino, gangs explicitly excluded security forces from their call for residents to return.³² Nevertheless, an evolution in these relationships, and more broadly in the role of community organizations in mitigating violence through negotiations rather than confrontation, remains possible. Information collected by organizations monitoring human rights abuses suggests that in cases in which residents lack resources to resist gangs, such as in heavily gang-controlled areas like Croix-des-Bouquets, the strategy has been to negotiate informal agreements to reduce extortion and ensure the continued functioning of schools.³³

Rising costs and human rights concerns

While self-defense groups have positioned themselves as the last resort to gang expansion and enjoy widespread popular support, their actions outside a legal framework have raised growing concerns. While self-defense activity is inherently extrajudicial, state forces themselves have normalized extrajudicial violence — notably under the controversial commissioner Jean Ernest Muscadin in the Nippes department, who has been directly involved in summary executions of criminals,³⁴ an approach that another commissioner in the Nord Ouest department appears to be moving toward.³⁵ Together with a broader surge in the deadliness of security operations, these developments have fostered a climate of permissiveness toward extrajudicial executions, including in the framework of self-defense activity. In fact, reports of abuses perpetrated during self-defense activity have surfaced,³⁶ coinciding with an increase in reported fatalities resulting from self-defense violence. Self-defense violence has become deadlier, not only when acting in coordination with security forces, but also from attacks on civilians arbitrarily accused of gang affiliation (see graph below). 

Testimonies of abuses within self-defense activities include the arbitrary identification of alleged gang affiliates. For example, vigilante actors have at times treated clothing style or living in marginalized neighborhoods as sufficient grounds for gang affiliation, and individuals have deliberately destroyed their documents to prevent being associated with neighborhoods under gang control.³⁷ This dynamic has fueled social discrimination but also resulted in extrajudicial killings. People suspected of being gang members have been executed for failing to present identification, but according to human rights organizations and security analysts, this has often happened in a context where the state institutions’ collapse has hampered access to official documents.³⁸ In November 2024, the press reported that self-defense groups intercepted an MSF ambulance with aid workers, and subsequently executed two wounded suspected gang members in Delmas.

Such abuses are prominent in the Artibonite department, where vigilante groups have been involved in several mass killings. In May 2025, the Coalition des Révolutionnaires pour Sauver l’Artibonite, also known as the Jean Denis coalition, a local group that has been described both as a self-defense group and criminal actor, killed at least 55 residents in Préval. This came in response to the killing of a Jean Denis member and suspicion that residents held ties with the Gran Grif gang. Similarly, in December 2024, self-defense group members, with the support of residents, killed at least 150 suspected members of Gran Grif and their alleged relatives in Petite Rivière de l’Artibonite. 

The embedded nature of self-defense members within their own communities makes residents — including individuals not participating in self-defense activity — particularly vulnerable to reprisals. In fact, self-defense activity in communities has often prompted gangs to adopt more predatory and indiscriminate forms of violence against the population. Since 2024, the use of punitive actions against entire communities by gangs has gained prominence, evidenced by a sharp increase in gang-led massacres. On 11 September 2025, Viv Ansanm killed at least 50 people in retaliation for the killing of one of their leaders during a clash with police and self-defense members. Likewise, any acts of rebellion or suspected collaboration with non-gang actors, whether with self-defense groups, police forces, or journalists, can provoke severe retribution.

Looking ahead: Toward the morphing of new gangs?

Since 2023, self-defense groups have established themselves as critical actors, acting as community protectors in the context of a security vacuum that the state’s response to gang violence struggles to fill. Despite their growing relevance, self-defense activity continues to take place outside of a legal framework that weak institutions have failed to provide, raising concerns as some of these groups have started to drift into patterns of abuse, politicization, or semi-criminal behavior, which could deepen insecurity rather than resolve it. 

Haiti's history offers important cautionary lessons around the future of self-defense groups. Some of the gangs known today trace their roots to the “chimères,” political militias that operated under then-President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the early 2000s. They, too, began as community-based defenders before being instrumentalized as tools of political control. In light of the upcoming 2026 electoral process, self-defense groups — particularly those that have become more organized and influential within their communities³⁹ — remain at risk of being co-opted by political and economic elites, who may seek to leverage their local influence to secure voting constituencies. The brigade of Canapé Vert is one example of how political pressure can impact these groups’ activities. The leader of the local brigade, Samuel Joasil, has coordinated demonstrations to demand a swift state response.⁴⁰ His efforts, however, were muted following pressure from elites, suggesting the existence of political back channels.⁴¹ Similarly, diaspora networks that have reportedly supported self-defense initiatives are yet another example of potential political influence on those groups.

Beyond the electoral agenda, the risks of gang-like predatory behavior toward the very communities these groups claim to defend remain present. The Coalition des Révolutionaries pour Sauver l’Artibonite is illustrative of the thin line between vigilantism and criminal activity, warranting a cautious and nuanced assessment. While some reports have described it as a self-defense group fighting the Gran Grif gang in Artibonite, others have referred to the group as a gang that engages in extortion and direct targeting of civilians.⁴² Similarly, the self-defense group of Piatre, formed to defend land and investments amid a land-related conflict, has reportedly emulated gang repertoires and installed tolls along National Road 1 to finance its activity.⁴³ The line between voluntary community support and coerced contributions to support the operations of the brigade and provide security is often blurred, which heightens the risk of groups sliding from collective defense into control and extortion — especially when trying to secure resources and sustain their operations.

The future of self-defense activity will depend largely on the evolution of the broader security environment. Should the security response, with the support of the UN-backed GSF,⁴⁴ succeed in curbing gang violence, some brigades may lose their original purpose and demobilize, or even lose legitimacy. Most formalized self-defense brigades in Port-au-Prince that collaborate closely with police bodies have notably established clear oversight mechanisms, and even set disarmament processes in recognition that their role as security providers should remain temporary.⁴⁵ Still, some experts have questioned the likelihood of spontaneous disengagement, particularly where such mechanisms might not exist.⁴⁶ Demobilization also appears to be a distant prospect as gangs show no signs of laying down arms, uncertainty lingers over the funding of the GSF, and the likelihood of a peaceful electoral process and transition as the country’s elites continue to fight for power.

The current security landscape remains highly critical and fragmented, further complicating any path toward long-lasting peace. It includes a myriad of actors such as domestic forces, foreign forces, and private security firms, and a multitude of self-defense groups with varying levels of coordination. Bringing self-defense groups under some form of regulation, or integrating them into security frameworks, could be critical to any durable peace or security-sector reform effort. Without clear oversight, coordination, or demobilization strategies, these groups will continue to be at risk of following a historical trajectory: from grassroots defenders to politicized militias and, eventually, to the next generation of armed gangs.

Correction: Footnotes 16, 19, and 43 have been amended to reflect that one of the interviewees was a non-affiliated independent expert.