Leaders tighten control as repression shapes Iraq’s 2025 elections

Two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s political system has evolved into a tightly managed order where elections recur regularly but rarely redistribute power. The November 2025 parliamentary vote — Iraq’s seventh since 2005 — takes place amid a paradoxical calm: Violence has declined dramatically, yet competition has been hollowed out. The cycles of insurgency, protest, and elite bargaining that once defined Iraq’s political life have given way to a subtler form of containment.

Years of conflict and the “muhasasa” power-sharing system have entrenched sectarian and ethnic leaders who now command the levers of state and patronage. With control over courts, ministries, and security agencies, these actors have turned elections into exercises in managed continuity. Ahead of the 2025 vote, competition has been preemptively contained through both violent and increasingly nonviolent means that redefine the political playing field. The 2025 elections are marked by a tightening of control through familiar mechanisms: manipulation of electoral laws, selective disqualification of candidates, pervasive vote-buying, and the intimidation or co-optation of reformist and protest-linked actors.

This consolidation has brought relative stability at the cost of democratic erosion. The 2025 elections will therefore test not whether Iraq can hold a peaceful vote — it likely will — but whether its political system can withstand growing internal and external pressure to reform. The real contest lies beyond the ballot: over the future of arms, accountability, and whether Iraq’s post-2003 order can continue to reproduce itself without renewed coercion.

Elections reshape power through repression rather than democratic rupture 

Over the past decade, Iraq has experienced a marked decline in armed conflict and political violence.¹ ACLED data show monthly incidents dropping from IS-era peaks of over 1,000 to fewer than 100 in most of 2024 and 2025 (see graph below). The November 2025 parliamentary elections are, therefore, unfolding in a relatively calmer environment. Yet, this relative calm and continuity have not translated into a more functional democracy. 

The political order that emerged after 2003 divides power through the muhasasa system, which parcels out authority and state resources among sectarian and ethnic parties. Designed to prevent domination by any single group, it has instead entrenched bargains that guarantee established factions access to state power. 

Elections take place regularly, but their outcomes are shaped more by backroom deals, militia influence, and patronage networks than by the will of voters.² In practice, elections have functioned more as recalibrations of leadership than as moments of democratic rupture. As a result, they are not the central arena of competition; elites primarily battle over rents, ministries, and influence, at times resorting to violence or extra-parliamentary tactics when negotiations fail.³ 

This dynamic helps explain why Iraq’s election cycles do not correspond to sharp spikes in domestic unrest. As ACLED data illustrate, major peaks in political violence and demonstrations are linked to broader crises rather than election timing: The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) war (2014-2017) and the Tishreen, or October, protests and subsequent crackdown on demonstrations and activists (2019-2021) dwarf election-related unrest. Even clashes and riots that follow elections in Iraq, such as the 2022 clashes in Baghdad between Shiite rivals, are typically tied to negotiations and government formation, rather than the ballot itself, illustrating how the fiercest political battles in Iraq often take place after the vote, during the bargaining over coalition-building and control of state institutions. 

Compared with earlier cycles, election‑day violence has also decreased. In 2018, violence was more overt, with assassinations of candidates, ISIL attacks on polling sites, and widespread protests in Kirkuk over alleged fraud. By 2021, incidents had shifted toward localized clashes, sabotage, and occasional ISIL attacks. The December 2023 provincial polls and the 2024 Kurdistan regional elections reflected a further decline in lethality, though intimidation and small-scale attacks persisted.⁴ 

In 2025, ACLED data show a continued decline in political violence, punctuated only by brief spikes concentrated in localized flashpoints such as Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk and episodes of tribally motivated violence in the country’s south. Election-related violence has also remained limited, with only a few incidents targeting electoral candidates and campaigns — most notably the assassination of Safaa al-Mashhadani, a Sunni Siyada Coalition candidate in Baghdad, who was killed by a bomb placed under his car.⁵ These violent episodes indicate that more incidents could materialize as election day approaches. However, the trend also suggests a steady narrowing: Violence has become episodic and place‑specific, while the state’s expanded security footprint has kept most incidents brief and geographically contained. 

At the same time, the decline in large‑scale conflict highlights how elites have consolidated control nationally by pushing contention into localized forms while relying on institutionalized nonviolent suppression. Having weathered the wars, insurgencies, and waves of protest that once challenged their authority, ruling factions now rely less on overt violence and more on institutional capture to pre-empt competition and shape the 2025 elections in their favor. The electoral system has been rolled back to governorate-wide districts, reversing the 2019 protest-driven reforms that had favored independent and local candidates. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) has disqualified dozens of candidates, including reformists and figures linked to protests, often on grounds that are vague or politically motivated. Vote-buying has reached unprecedented levels, with candidates and parties openly distributing prepaid phone cards, fuel coupons, or cash in exchange for support — an entrenched form of economic coercion. 

Meanwhile, intimidation and co-optation have become central instruments of control of independent and opposition actors. Protest-born movements face infiltration or inducement into alliances with dominant parties, and journalists and civil society groups encounter surveillance, licensing barriers, or defamation charges that curtail their ability to monitor campaigns. Across provinces, ministries, and security agencies aligned with ruling blocs use appointments, service delivery, and security access as levers of electoral pressure.

In this context, the decline in open political violence does not reflect democratic stabilization but the success of elite containment. By monopolizing the state’s administrative, financial, and legal apparatuses, Iraq’s power brokers have turned elections into managed contests — rituals that preserve their dominance while marginalizing alternative leadership. The 2025 vote thus serves less as a test of democratic competition and more as a reaffirmation of who commands the machinery of the state.

How Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish politics are shaping the 2025 elections

Cycles of violence and contestation have allowed dominant factions to consolidate control across sectarian and regional lines. Ahead of the 2025 election, competition has not disappeared; it has been reshaped and constrained (see map below). Shiite coalitions now channel their dominance through state institutions, Kurdish parties manage rivalry through repression in their respective governorates, and Sunni blocs remain fragmented under sustained marginalization. Across these arenas, elections are increasingly defined by the containment of competition rather than by open conflict. 

Shiite politics: From armed confrontation to legal and institutional control

Shiite parties, many of which maintain armed wings, have historically relied on violence and intimidation to consolidate power, particularly within Baghdad and the south (see map below). From the killing and abduction of activists during the 2019-2020 October protests, to assassination attempts on critics and the intimidation and co-optation of independent members of parliament after the 2021 vote, coercion has long underpinned their dominance. 

Intra-Shiite fighting has also been common in past cycles, most dramatically in August 2022 between Muqtada al-Sadr, the populist Shiite cleric and leader of the Sadrist movement, and the Coordination Framework (CF), the main coalition of Shiite Islamist parties.⁶ The episode ended with Sadr’s withdrawal from politics, which allowed the CF to consolidate control over parliament, ministries, and the security sector.⁷ Since then, the coalition has focused on weakening its remaining rivals across the political spectrum.⁸ Through judicial rulings and targeted investigations, it removed Sunni Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi in 2023 on corruption charges. In parallel, it undermined Kurdish leverage by using the Federal Supreme Court to halt budget transfers to the Kurdistan Regional Government in 2024. Protest-born movements and parties were co-opted through offers of administrative posts, state funding, and inclusion in local councils. Together, these measures further cemented CF’s dominance ahead of the 2025 elections.⁹

Yet competition persists within the CF itself, a hallmark of post-2003 Shiite politics. In 2025, the main divide concerns the future of arms. Mounting United States sanctions and the weakening of Iran’s axis of resistance after its conflict with Israel have raised pressure over disarmament, exposing differences within the Shiite camp. The October 2025 assassination of Mashhadani, who was critical of militias, and the July 2025 Kataib Hezbollah clash in Baghdad, where a policeman and a civilian were killed, highlight the volatility surrounding this debate. CF-aligned Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s alignment with the pro-disarmament wing has deepened CF divisions as he seeks re-election. The 2025 polls thus feature limited pre-election violence but intensifying intra-elite struggle over who controls coercion after the vote — a contest that is likely to shape post-election negotiations and government formation.

Kurdish politics: Violence, repression, and managed competition

Kurdish politics in Iraq have long been dominated by two rival parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by the Barzani family and rooted in Erbil and Duhok, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), historically led by the Talabani family and anchored in Sulaymaniyah.¹⁰ The KDP-PUK duopoly has managed to retain relative stability since the 1990s, but violence remains very much a political tool.¹¹ The KDP has consolidated its dominance over the Kurdistan Regional Government and institutions, reducing the risk of inter-party clashes. However, campaign seasons still trigger tensions, as seen in the October 2024 clashes in Erbil following a fiery PUK rally during the 2024 Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary elections. 

While competition between the KDP and PUK has remained largely nonviolent, smaller parties have been the target of violent crackdowns and repression (see map below). Since June 2025, Kurdish authorities have arrested three opposition leaders in Sulaymaniyah: Shaswar Abdulwahid, president of the largest opposition party, the New Generation movement (NGM); Aram Qadr, leader of the National Coalition; and Lahur Sheikh Jangi, head of the People's Front party.¹² Jangi’s August 2025 arrest sparked heavy fighting that left several people dead and dozens of Jangi’s loyalists wounded.¹³ Amid this climate of intimidation, other groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, announced they would boycott the elections.¹⁴

Alongside the targeting of small opposition parties, both dominant parties have systematically conducted assaults on the media and civil society. Kurdish and international monitors have recorded repeated arrests of journalists, unfair trials, intimidation of activists, and even prolonged detentions of vocal critics, which has created a chilling effect that discourages protest mobilization and investigative reporting.¹⁵ In Erbil, authorities have prosecuted and extended prison sentences for critics such as journalist Sherwan Sherwani, while security forces recently beat and detained reporters covering protests.¹⁶ 

The normalization of both violent crackdowns and nonviolent restrictions has become especially pronounced in parts of the Kurdish region where party control is disputed. This entrenched pattern narrows the space for opposition candidates and discourages mobilization, further weakening electoral competition. 

Sunni politics: Managed repression and fragmented leadership 

Unlike the Shiite and Kurdish blocs that have secured dominance within their own constituencies and control of state resources, the Sunni political arena remains fragmented and unstable (see map below). Cycles of marginalization and manipulation have weakened both voter participation and party organization. Former Speaker Halbousi’s efforts to consolidate control over the Sunni house were blocked by Shiite rivals who used courts and rival alliances to curb his influence, leaving the Sunni camp divided among two wealthy power brokers: Halbousi and his long-time rival, Khamis al‑Khanjar of the Al-Siyada Coalition. They are now joined by Muthanna al-Samarrai of the Al-Azm Coalition, whose growing tribal backing positions him as a third contender in an increasingly transactional race.¹⁷ The 2025 elections are therefore highly competitive, with at least five major Sunni alliances contesting dominance.

Since 2023, judicial interventions, de‑Baathification vetting, and the disqualification of high‑profile Sunni candidates have further narrowed political space.¹⁸ With limited access to state patronage, Sunni competition has become increasingly transactional and centered on tribal buyouts, local patronage, and external sponsorship from Turkey and Gulf states. Halbousi’s Taqaddum party relies on Anbari tribal networks and ministerial allies; Khanjar’s Siyada and Samarrai’s Azm court Turkish support and provincial elites. These rival strategies have deepened local factionalism rather than producing a unified agenda.

The post‑Islamic State order continues to constrain Sunni civic life. In Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al‑Din, and Diyala, the enduring presence of Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) limits local autonomy, while security restrictions and displacement continue to suppress voter participation. Thousands of displaced families still face barriers to registration, and in many districts, PMF checkpoints shape access to polling centers and local administration. Together, coercive and procedural tools have institutionalized Sunni marginalization, leaving the community with little leverage at the national level even as intra‑Sunni competition intensifies before the 2025 vote.

Beyond violence: Consolidation, contained contestation, and mounting grievances

As the graph below highlights, violent and nonviolent repression shape protest dynamics differently across Iraq. In Shiite provinces such as Basra, nonviolent measures like surveillance, legal prosecutions, and patronage networks have reduced large‑scale demonstrations compared to the 2019-2020 season. In Sunni areas, structural barriers — displacement, lack of documentation, and militia control of mobility — have muted protest activity. In Kurdish governorates, especially Sulaymaniyah, coercive arrests and targeted violence against opposition parties and journalists have produced repeated but highly localized demonstrations. 

These regional variations show how elites tailor repression: violent crackdowns when rival factions openly contest power, and institutional or economic pressure when they want to prevent opposition before it emerges. The overall outcome is a sharp reduction in nationwide protest frequency and intensity. Public opinion surveys confirm that trust in elections and political institutions has fallen to historic lows, with turnout dropping to the low 30s in Baghdad, the mid‑40s in much of the south, and under 40% in Sulaymaniyah in the 2021 parliamentary election.¹⁹ Voter disengagement reflects disillusionment: While independents and protest-born movements like Emtidad or New Generation retain some support, their space has narrowed considerably.

This consolidation extends to the control of narratives. State-aligned outlets and militia platforms have systematically monopolized media space, while dissenting journalists, comedians, and activists face harassment and prosecution under defamation, cybercrime, or public morality laws. The prosecution of journalists under Article 226 of the Penal Code, the suspension of Ahmed Mulla Talal’s popular talk show, and the “indecent content” campaign against influencers exemplify how criticism is criminalized.²⁰ By framing repression as law and order, political leaders cast dissent as instability and consolidate their version of legitimacy. This control of the narrative ensures that even as discontent persists, public debate remains tightly managed.

Repression has, therefore, brought relative stability but undermined state legitimacy. Demonstrations have become fewer and more localized, but grievances continue to mount beneath the surface. Civil society actors adapt by moving between electoral, street, and civic arenas, but the system blocks transformative change. Iraq’s 2025 elections, therefore, reflect a paradox: They are more controlled and predictable than ever, but they point to an order under growing strain from citizens who continue to reject its foundations.

Visuals produced by Ana Marco.