Pakistan battles rising militancy that risks spreading beyond the frontiers

The security situation in Pakistan deteriorated further in 2025, as militant violence, concentrated in the frontier provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (see map below), has surpassed levels seen in 2024, which was one of the most violent years in over a decade. 

Baloch separatists carried out increasingly complex attacks, such as the hijacking of the Jaffar Express train in March. In a departure from their typical modus operandi of hit-and-run attacks, they temporarily occupied public areas in at least five towns. The announcement of a new strategy by separatist groups in March paved the way for even more joint operations and supported the growing sophistication of their attacks.¹ Separatists also ramped up pressure on security forces through traditional tactics: IED and grenade attacks, mainly targeting convoys and police stations, increased by more than 65% in the first 11 months of the year compared to the previous year. 

Meanwhile, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) posed a formidable challenge to internal security, as it engaged in around 700 attacks against, or clashes with, security forces in the first 11 months of 2025. The other key militant actor in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur group, joined forces with two smaller outfits to form the Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan, consolidating the militants’ position vis-à-vis security forces.² While most of their activity remained concentrated in the tribal belt, militancy increased in the province’s southern districts of Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki Marwat, and Bannu, which provide a gateway to Punjab. In an early sign that the militancy may expand beyond the frontier provinces, a suicide bomber affiliated with the TTP’s Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA) faction struck the capital city of Islamabad in November, marking the first such attack there in a decade. 

Pakistan’s response to the rising militancy was military-focused. It launched temporary and localized military operations either in response to specific attacks or based on intelligence about the presence of militants. In Balochistan,  the state simultaneously intensified its crackdown on ethnic Baloch people, risking further alienating the people in a region beset with separatist militancy. In June, the provincial assembly passed an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Act, allowing “preventive detention” for up to three months without charges. This amendment partially provides legal cover for the long-standing practice in Balochistan, where enforced disappearances during anti-militancy operations are routine.³ ACLED records a sharp rise in the reported deaths of people from the ethnic Baloch minority at the hands of security forces in 2025. The majority of the people killed had previously been forcibly disappeared. As demonstrations against state abuses of power continued, police forces arrested leading activist Dr. Mahrang Baloch in April on charges of sedition, increasing political disaffection.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, military forces significantly increased their use of quadcopter drone strikes to target militant hideouts, supporting military operations on the ground. At least six air- and drone strikes resulted in civilian casualties, prompting backlash. As the conflict drew closer to home, local communities also became more directly involved. Armed local militias increasingly intervened in support of security forces, and tribal councils directly negotiated with TTP militants.⁴ 

Pakistan blamed Afghanistan for providing a safe haven to both the TTP and Baloch separatists, sinking relations between the two countries, which have been strained since the Afghan Taliban’s takeover in August 2021, to a new low.⁵ Border clashes increased exponentially in 2025 compared to the previous year, along with a significant rise in Pakistani airstrikes inside Afghanistan (see graph below). A ceasefire, mediated by Qatar and Turkey after October’s conflict, holds for now, though the region remains volatile.

Internal security in 2026 hinges on regional cooperation and political will 

For militancy to abate in Pakistan, a combination of three factors is essential: sustained military pressure on militants, political engagement with Baloch and Pashtun groups, and cooperation from Afghanistan. While the first is in Pakistan’s hands, both the army and the government remain hesitant toward the second and have limited ability to influence the third, and most crucial, piece of the puzzle. This points toward, at best, a continuation of the status quo with sporadic bursts in regional violence in 2026 and, at worst, a further deterioration in the security situation as militancy enters the mainland.

As long as militants have a safe and permissive environment in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s actions are unlikely to secure lasting success. The porous border allows militants to retreat and then return once the immediate threat subsides. Pakistan realizes this security predicament. Its defense minister warned of “open war” with Afghanistan if the two countries failed to reach an agreement.⁶ The Afghan Taliban, however, appears unwilling to seriously crack down on the TTP, partly due to prior affinities between the two groups but also out of fear of TTP militants defecting to its main rival, the Islamic State Khorasan Province, whom it claims Pakistan is harboring.⁷ In the absence of a crackdown on the TTP, further escalation seems inevitable. Broader conflicts due to perceived state support for non-state actors have precedence in the region — it was Pakistan’s claimed support for Kashmiri separatists that triggered the India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025. 

External mediation by interested parties, such as China or Qatar, is also unlikely to be very fruitful. Besides Pakistan’s genuine concerns over the militants’ foothold across the border, blaming Afghanistan allows it to deflect attention from its own shortcomings. Pakistan has so far sought to avoid both political engagement with Pashtun and Baloch groups and a sustained military operation in the militant strongholds. Its long-standing fear of mobilization over ethnic grievances that could foment secessionism hinders such engagement. Political outreach seems even less probable: The 27th constitutional amendment, which was passed in November 2025, entrenches the military’s supremacy over civilian leadership.

Nevertheless, mounting security personnel losses coupled with the prospect of militancy reaching mainland cities may necessitate more decisive action. A full-fledged operation with a sustained presence on the ground would be more effective but is likely a last resort. Besides being costly, locals remain hostile to a sustained military presence. In the interim, the army may increasingly rely on air- and drone strikes. Increased use of such strikes, in a region scarred by the global war on terror, could further diminish popular support and, in turn, impact intelligence gathering — a critical component in defeating guerrilla tactics. The state may also increasingly support local militias, such as those already active in Balochistan, to do its bidding. The government formally supported such militias in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in the initial years after the TTP’s founding, when they acted as the first line of defense. The proliferation of arms resulting from increased activity by local militias may further destabilize the region. 

As for Islamist militants, the TTP’s growing strength may fuel expectations within its ranks to expand geographically and operationally. This would be a deviation from its current strategy, which is centered in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, focuses mainly on state forces, and largely avoids indiscriminate attacks against civilians. Its senior leadership may, however, be unwilling to change tack, given how well it has served the TTP’s resurgence. For example, the TTP distanced itself from the JuA’s recent suicide bombing outside a court in Islamabad.⁸ The TTP may also be forced to keep a lower profile, instead activating proxies to deflect pressure from itself, if Afghanistan exercises its leverage, or if Pakistan makes significant tactical gains. Both approaches may leave some within the TTP dissatisfied, deepening internal divisions and creating unexpected openings for security forces. 

At the same time, increased mining activities and poppy farming in Balochistan may create new opportunities for separatist militants. Pakistan has leveraged its mineral reserves as a bargaining chip in trade negotiations with the United States.⁹ Any resultant activities could act as a magnet for attacks by separatists, who view mineral extraction as exploitation of Balochistan’s natural wealth. Targeting American interests, albeit very risky, may help bring greater attention to their long-simmering insurgency. Balochistan has also emerged as a hub of poppy cultivation after the Afghan Taliban’s crackdown within its borders.¹⁰ The opium trade could provide a lucrative source of funds for the many militant groups active there, further destabilizing the region.

Conflict Watchlist 2026