Politicians in the crosshairs of Mexico’s criminal wars: The cases of Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán

This report is the first part of ACLED’s Mexico Special Election Series covering the national and local elections held on 2 June 2024.

On 26 February 2024, armed men shot and killed two pre-candidates for the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) and National Action (PAN) parties in two separate attacks after they had expressed their intention to run in the 2024 municipal elections of Maravatío de Ocampo, in Michoacán. Far from being isolated cases, these attacks are a testament to the threats faced by politicians in Mexico. Since 2018, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán have consistently ranked among the 10 most violent states for political figures, including during election years in 2018 and 2021, with violence increasing especially ahead of the vote. These three states have consistently been affected by some of the highest levels of gang violence since 2018 and share similar gang dynamics due to their geographical proximity and infrastructure connection, such as the presence of local criminal groups and larger cartels trying to assert dominance.

While several investigations have emphasized the multiplicity of drivers in the targeting of politicians and officials beyond organized crime dynamics, this report highlights that violence targeting political figures in the states of Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán generally occurs in hotspots of gang disputes. It also demonstrates that gang fragmentation has led to a higher number of events in certain municipalities. The report also stresses that municipal elections have acted as a catalyzer of violence, with violence fluctuating along electoral cycles in Guerrero and Michoacán, but that local criminal dynamics and gangs’ willingness to negotiate might lead to heightened violence levels regardless of the electoral calendar, such as in the case of Guanajuato. The type of violent incidents, as well as violence occurring on the day of the vote, is also likely indicative of local political conflicts beyond organized crime dynamics, including over greater political autonomy in Indigenous communities of Michoacán.

Political figures face higher risk in hotspots of criminal groups’ competition

Since 2018, ACLED data show that municipalities most affected by gang violence in Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán record some of the highest numbers of violent incidents targeting political figures. The frequency of the violence seems to be further influenced by gang fragmentation and the number of criminal groups fighting over specific territories. Between 2018 and February 2024, ACLED records gang violence events perpetrated by at least three separate criminal groups in most municipalities that have experienced high levels of political figures targeting. The finding notably contributes to understanding particularly high levels of this form of violence in Morelia in Michoácan, and Acapulco de Juárez and Chilpancingo de los Bravo in Guerrero, where ACLED records the participation of at least seven criminal groups in gang-related violence since 2018. In fact, criminal groups seek to protect their illicit markets through enhanced access to power and political proxies, driving them to seek alliances with political actors through either negotiations or the use of force. As municipal authorities play a key role in designing security strategies and allocating funds to profitable infrastructure projects, local elections have catalyzed heightened violence in municipalities where criminal groups are competing fiercely for power.¹

By contrast, in those municipalities where one group is hegemonic and criminal influence over local government less volatile, violence targeting political figures tends to be lower, even where overall violence targeting civilians is on the rise. For example, in Guerrero’s Tierra Caliente municipalities of Pungarabato, Cutzamala de Pinzón, Arcelia, Tlapehuala, Ajuchitlán del Progreso, and Tlalchapa, ACLED records few violent incidents targeting political figures since 2018. The Attorney General’s office is investigating these cities’ mayors for participating in roadblocks to demand the resignation of the state attorney general, who had seized 12 luxury vehicles owned by La Familia Michoacana leaders. Most of them won the 2021 elections without competition, suggesting that the criminal group likely supported their candidacy.²

Under this premise and understanding that criminal dynamics vary from one state to another and over time, where has violence targeting politicians and government officials concentrated?

In Michoacán, violence targeting political figures has occurred in municipalities where ACLED records persistently high gang violence levels (see map below). Overall violence levels in this state have been driven by the incursion of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG), which has fought for territorial control with local criminal organizations such as the United Cartels — an alliance of several criminal groups created to contain the CJNG’s expansion.³ Violence targeting political figures has concentrated in Morelia and Zamora where, in recent years, criminal groups have sought to diversify their activities, notably through expanding protection rackets. Likewise, violence prevails in Uruapan and Tangamandapio, which criminal groups covet as key to controlling lucrative agricultural businesses such as avocado production.⁴ Political figures also remain vulnerable to attacks in the municipalities of the Tierra Caliente region, such as Buenavista, Apatzingán, and Tepalcatepec, where rivalries between criminal and self-defense groups operating in the area have crystallized around the control of trafficking routes, including the shipping of chemical precursors used in the production of drugs that arrive in the Lázaro Cárdenas Port from Asia.⁵ Across the state, criminal groups are often accused of attacking municipal election candidates before and after the vote, likely in an attempt to influence the outcome of the elections. For instance, in Buenavista, the United Cartels alliance has known ties to political figures, allowing the group to act unpunished and rely on political support in the fight against a common enemy.⁵

Similarly, in Guerrero, violent incidents targeting politicians and officials have been especially concentrated in municipalities affected by criminal disputes (see map below). Political figures are particularly vulnerable to violence in the port city of Acapulco, where at least six armed groups fight for the control of extortion and trafficking activities. Amid turf wars between Los Tlacos, Los Ardillos, and the United Cartels over protection rackets and drug trafficking routes in the central zone of the state, ACLED records high levels of violence in Chilapa de Álvarez, Chilpancingo de los Bravo, and Eduardo Neri municipalities. High levels of violence in Chilpancingo, Guerrero’s state capital and an important center of political power, can be further attributed to criminal groups’ intention to influence local decision-making and law enforcement organs. Los Tlacos is further involved in territorial disputes with La Bandera and La Familia Michoacana in the northern Iguala de la Independencia and Taxco de Alarcón municipalities and with Los Ardillos in Chilpancingo, as well as in Acatepec and Tlapa de Comonfort municipalities in the La Montaña subregion, where the group is vying for control over poppy crops and trafficking routes.⁶

In Guanajuato, criminal groups’ turf wars are focused on strategic areas such as the so-called ‘Bermuda Triangle,’ a deeply interconnected and resource-rich area. It includes 15 municipalities connected by Pemex’s oil pipeline, particularly Salamanca, where the oil refinery is located, and its neighboring cities of Irapuato, Villagrán, and Celaya — crucial for oil theft — as well as the industrial zones of Guanajuato and León, where extortion is spreading (see map below). In these municipalities, political figures are constantly targeted by competing organized crime groups vying for the control of these lucrative businesses. According to the National Defense Ministry (Sedena), four main criminal organizations dispute the territory in Guanajuato: the Sinaloa Cartel (CDS), the CJNG, the Santa Rosa de Lima Cartel (CSRL), and two splinter factions of the Gulf Cartel (CDG).⁷ In the western city of León, local groups gathered under the umbrella of the León Union group and are resisting the advance of the CJNG, which seeks to gain control of drug peddling and extortion activities.⁸

The cases of Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán show that violence targeting political figures generally concentrates in municipalities where criminal interest and disputes converge, and where ACLED records high criminal fragmentation and overall levels of violence likely related to gang activities.

Municipal Elections: A Catalyzer of Criminal Competition and Violence in Guerrero and Michoacán

As criminal groups continue to fight over territorial control at the local level, the municipal election calendar seems to influence the frequency of violence targeting political figures. In Guerrero and Michoacán, ACLED records higher-than-average increases in violence targeting political figures in May 2018 and May 2021, shortly after the official beginning of campaigns for the municipal elections (see graph below). Although political figures can face threats or actual violence as soon as they express their intention to run for office, they and their campaign teams become more vulnerable to attacks after the formalization of candidacies. Criminal groups are more likely to target political figures, including through assassinations, to ensure the victory of their candidates, while rival political contestants might engage in violence to hamper campaigning activities. In 2024, in Guerrero, candidates’ exposure to violence has notably led a number of municipal candidates from the Citizens’ Movement Party to withdraw from the race.⁹

Nevertheless, violence targeting political figures has also occurred well outside the campaign period, with events recorded before the start of campaigns and after the elections. Notably, ACLED records several incidents during the pre-campaign period, when political parties select their future candidates. Between January and March 2024, armed groups already attacked at least six pre-candidates — individuals who seek political party nominations — in the states of Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán. Political figures further remain vulnerable to violence after the elections in the months preceding their inauguration as armed groups or political contestants seek to prevent them from accessing power. Political figures can also be targeted during conflicts outside electoral cycles, as observed in June and July 2019. In those months, Guerrero experienced a wave of demonstrations coordinated by farmers protesting against delays in the distribution of fertilizers, and demonstrators temporarily detained and, at times, assaulted local officials and civil servants.

In Guanajuato, violence targeting political figures seems to follow a different pattern. ACLED records almost only direct attacks involving armed groups, hinting that organized crime groups are likely the main perpetrators of this violence in this state. Despite a number of violent events targeting current and former candidates before and after the elections, violence has also remained constant since 2018, with no significant increase ahead of local elections (see graph below). The linearity of these figures throughout the years is partly attributable to ongoing criminal turf wars in the state, which remains a battleground as the CJNG and the SRLC attempt to establish territorial dominance. One consequence of criminal disputes is a high and constant rate of attacks against municipal and state security officials since 2018, and compared to Guerrero and Michoacán states. Security officials — in charge of planning and implementing local security strategies — are particularly exposed to violence, as organized crime groups seek to co-opt them or eliminate those who are not aligned to secure a strategic advantage against rivals. Differences also exist between criminal groups’ strategies when dealing with local authorities, with the CJNG reportedly being less inclined to negotiate and, therefore, more prone to using violence during and outside electoral cycles.¹⁰The SRLC and the CJNG have even attempted to instrumentalize security operators by anonymously committing violent incursions in municipalities under rival control, aiming to trigger security forces’ response in that area.

Electoral Conflicts Beyond Criminal Dynamics: The Case of Michoacán

While criminal violence has been the most significant driver of violence targeting political figures throughout the years in Michoacán, much of the violence that takes place around polling can be linked to local-level disputes, with several violent events and other acts of disruptions recorded on the day of the vote, especially during the 2018 electoral cycle. Unlike violence observed in the run-up to the elections, which principally consists of direct armed attacks, violence during the few days preceding and following the vote has also stemmed from mob activities and the destruction of properties, such as the temporary detention of political figures, disputes between party members, and the burning of polling booths and ballots. While direct attacks and political assassinations have been connected to organized crime groups, these forms of violence and disruption to electoral activities seem rather connected to local political disputes. In fact, many of these events fall in municipalities where ACLED records limited gang activity.

In Michoacán, incidents on the day of elections have mostly stemmed from conflicts between members of Indigenous communities, who seek greater autonomy on political matters in certain municipalities, including the holding of elections according to the Indigenous participatory electoral system, known as uso y costumbres (uses and customs). These conflicts notably affected the 2018 elections. For instance, in Nahuatzen and surrounding municipalities, members of the Purépecha Indigenous group burned ballots and even temporarily detained a municipal security director in Santa Fe de la Laguna to protest against the holding of elections set to not be conducted according to the uso y costumbres system.¹¹ Meanwhile, in Charo and Tarimbaro, armed men stole ballots as part of a conflict involving the local Indigenous Supreme Council, which has asked for greater autonomy in political matters and opposed the installation of voting polls in several Purépecha Indigenous communities of Michoacán.¹² Although these events appear isolated, they show that the dynamics of violence around elections can be multiple and shall not be solely understood from the prism of organized crime, even in states severely affected by gang violence, such as Michoacán.¹³

2024 Elections: Targeting of Political Figures on Track to Break Records

Between January and March 2024, ACLED records at least 32 violent incidents targeting political figures in these states. In Guerrero, violence already exceeds levels recorded over the same period ahead of the 2021 elections, echoing concerns that the 2024 electoral cycle could be one of the most violent for political figures (see graph below). Driven by a multitude of factors, it is difficult to predict the geography and magnitude of the violence against political figures in the run-up to the 2024 elections. However, observations of the dynamics of violence during previous elections, as well as recent data, offer avenues for interpreting these trends.

If organized crime groups’ competition is a risk factor, Guanajuato, Guerrero, and Michoacán are likely to turn into hotspots of violence during the 2024 electoral process.¹⁴ In 2023, gang-related violence increased by 32% and 4% in Guerrero and Michoacán, respectively, compared to 2022. In Guerrero, violent gang activity spearheaded the surge in the municipalities of Acapulco, Taxco de Alarcón, and Iguala de la Independencia, although turf wars have also intensified in Petatlán, Juan R. Escudero, San Miguel Totolapan, and General Heliodoro Castillo. In Michoacán, gang-related events spiked in the municipalities of Apatzingán, Uruapan, and Buenavista, but also increased in recent years in Charo, La Huacana, Mugica, Paracuaro, and Zinapecuaro. For its part, despite a slight decrease, Guanajuato continued to suffer from high levels of gang violence in 2023. The situation in León is particularly worrying, where gang-related violence has doubled in the last four years, with at least 353 events.

Amid already heightened levels of violence, particularly in Guerrero, the targeting of political figures is on track to increase further in April and May, following the official beginning of the campaign period for local positions in these states. At the same time, there are likely to be changes to the form that this violence takes in each phase of the election cycle. Violent incidents, especially riots and property destruction, are to be expected on the day of the vote as well as in the days preceding and following the vote. This is likely to occur in Michoacán, where disputes over the use of the uso y costumbres Indigenous governance system could arise, including in the Aquila municipalities where the community refused to participate in the election and rejected the installation of a vote center.¹⁵

Highly disputed elections and the likeliness of change in party governance at the municipal level might also drive more violent incidents targeting local politicians and officials. According to Integralia, during the 2021 elections, in municipalities where candidates were assassinated, the party of the targeted candidates lost the election in two-thirds of the cases.¹⁶ Electoral bodies might have further limited capacities to arbitrate electoral disputes in the advent of irregularities and fraud allegations. Outgoing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has notably proposed widely criticized constitutional reforms which, among other measures, reduce the staff of the National Electoral Institute (INE), further weakening the institution’s ability to carry out the elections in an orderly and safe manner.

Finally, while most attacks have targeted municipal political figures, the impact of state congress elections on overall violence levels should not be overlooked — especially in Guanajuato, which, unlike in Guerrero and Michoacán, is one of nine states set to vote in governor races this year. State governors are the main authorities on security matters within their jurisdiction. As such, they are generally more protected from gang violence but nevertheless remain targets of violence or negotiations from criminal groups seeking to limit the impact of state security operations on their illicit activities. For over 50 years, the state of Guanajuato has been governed by the PAN, and the current state attorney — who has been in office since 2009 — has been accused of collusion with gangs.¹⁷ In 2024, polls suggest that PAN could lose Guanajuato to the MORENA candidate Libia Dennise García as a result of the ever-persisting and critical security situation. A change in governorship in Guanajuato, which has one of the highest rates of corruption among civil servants, could lead to a new security approach and a shift in the current power dynamics between politics and crime, unleashing further violence on political figures carried out by criminal groups.

ACLED researchers María Alejandra Pérez and Natalie Tines supported the lead authors and contributed to this report with desk research.

Visuals in this report were produced by Ciro Murillo.