Pressure rises on Ecuador's government to rein in escalating gang violence

In 2025, Ecuador is set to record the highest homicide rate in the whole of Latin America for the third consecutive year, breaking its own record.¹ President Daniel Noboa’s approach — which is anchored on the declaration of an internal armed conflict — appears to have failed to curb violence carried out by gangs vying for the control of illicit economies such as extortion, drug trafficking, and illegal gold mining. 

The escalation of violence has affected a growing share of Ecuador’s population. More than 70% of the country’s 18 million inhabitants were exposed to organized crime violence in 2025, more than any other country in Latin America (see visual below). Once a safe haven for Venezuelans and Colombians fleeing conflict and human rights abuses, Ecuador has turned into an inhospitable country for its own citizens. Since 2021, around 132,000 people have been displaced internally due to violence, and over 400,000 — or more than 2% — have left the country.² 

A key driver of the ongoing violent escalation is the competition between the Los Lobos and Los Choneros gangs. Once the most powerful organized crime syndicate in Ecuador, Los Choneros were weakened by the arrest of their leader, José Adolfo Macías Villamar, who was extradited to the United States in July 2025.³ Los Lobos have taken advantage of the Los Choneros’ vulnerability to take over territories that serve as strategic routes for drug trafficking and gold exports, sparking a turf war with severe consequences (see map below). Violence has especially surged in Los Ríos and Manabí provinces, Los Choneros’ stronghold along the coast. But it did not stop there: The Los Lobos’ incursion in rival territory also precipitated conflict with the Los R gang, an ally of Los Choneros in Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas.

A second factor behind Ecuador’s security crisis is growing gang fragmentation, triggered by the capture, killing, or exile of gang leaders, which fuels internal frictions among factions battling for leadership. The Los Lobos gang has been torn by an internecine struggle with its Sao Box faction over the control of illegal gold mining activities in El Oro and surrounding provinces.⁴ Both inter- and intra-gang disputes often originate in prisons — which act as gangs’ operational centers — before spilling into the streets. Prison massacres and deadly gang clashes contributed to a 42% increase in reported fatalities in the first 11 months of 2025, compared to the same period in 2024.

Thirdly, Ecuador’s growing relevance in the regional drug trade and the transnational connections of organized crime groups further complicate the picture. As cocaine production continues to increase, Ecuador is becoming an ever more strategic transshipment ramp, with Ecuadorian gangs spreading their networks across the region and beyond.⁵ Conversely, Colombian armed groups are expanding their presence in Ecuador. This has prompted Noboa to label two dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and Comuneros del Sur, a National Liberation Army splinter group, as active enemies in the internal armed conflict.⁶ 

Meanwhile, Noboa has faced the constraints of his strategy. The deployment of soldiers on the streets and in prisons has stretched the army’s capacity beyond its limits.⁷ The Supreme Court has blocked the legislation he tried to pass, which proposed stiffened penalties for gang-related crimes and shielding security forces accused of committing abuses from prosecution. To circumvent the judiciary’s oversight, he proposed rewriting the constitution, but, on 16 November, Ecuadorians rejected his proposals to create a Constituent Assembly and reverse an existing ban on the installation of foreign military bases.

2026 will be a decisive year for Noboa

The president faces a wave of violent crime that shows no signs of subsiding, with reduced political capital and growing expectations. Failing to achieve concrete security results could damage his public image domestically and abroad, weakening his government ahead of the 2027 local elections.

Unless an organized crime group manages to establish hegemony or the government takes control of prisons and establishes a more permanent presence in gang-ridden communities, violence is likely to continue rising in 2026 and will possibly spread to other provinces. That said, there are no signs that gang turf wars will subside next year. Even though weakened, the Los Choneros gang still holds significant power in several parts of the country, and it will be challenging for Los Lobos to dismantle the social and institutional web it has sewn, particularly in the Manabí province. For its part, Los Lobos may also suffer from further internal struggles after the arrest of its leader in Spain in mid-November.⁸ 

These struggles will likely play out in the streets and in prisons, despite the government’s efforts to improve the penitentiary system with the construction of a new maximum security prison in Santa Elena province, where it has started to send the most dangerous criminals.⁹ In fact, gang members could resist transfers to the new prison. This could prompt gang mutinies, while criminal activities may further spread to the communities close to the new detention center. In addition, the country will soon start the process that will lead to the February 2027 local elections. This is likely to catalyze violence against political figures, as gangs attempt to impede the election of officials who are deemed hostile or believed to be in cahoots with rivals, as happened in 2023.

Meanwhile, political and security developments in neighboring countries will also shape the evolution of Ecuador’s security crisis. In Colombia, President Gustavo Petro is hoping to reach final agreements with some armed groups before the end of his term in August 2026, while stepping up military pressure against armed actors that have shown little commitment to advancing the peace talks launched as part of his Total Peace strategy. Petro is working on reaching deals with Comuneros del Sur and the National Coordinator of the Bolivarian Army FARC dissidents — both of which operate in the southern departments of Nariño and Putumayo. Even in the slight chance that this happens, however, the results of Petro’s Total Peace plan risk being too meager for this policy to be continued by his successor, increasing the likelihood that any upcoming administration will adopt a more hardline approach to the conflict. 

Developments in the presence and actions of armed groups in southern Colombia are likely to reverberate on the other side of the border, particularly in the Esmeraldas and Sucumbíos provinces, where the network of relations between groups could be altered. For its part, Peru — which is also experiencing a deterioration in security — will also elect a new president in April 2026. The policies implemented by the new government, particularly those aimed at curbing the smuggling of illegally mined gold and weapons to Ecuador, will play a role in stemming or fostering gangs’ access to firearms and financial resources.

Additionally, US policies will also influence what happens next in Ecuador. The US military buildup in the Caribbean and the multiple strikes against what it alleges are drug-smuggling vessels may temporarily reduce maritime trafficking activities in the Caribbean, as long as the deployment lasts. However, drug trafficking organizations may divert their activities to the Pacific, where US forces have targeted a few vessels off the Colombian and Mexican coasts but do not have a significant military presence, further increasing the flow of drugs through Ecuador. Meanwhile, the Trump administration’s crackdown on immigration has reduced the number of Ecuadorians reaching the US,¹⁰ but as long as the security situation continues to deteriorate in Ecuador, a growing number of citizens will feel the need to relocate, either internally or to other countries in the region. Even if it is still far from becoming a full-fledged humanitarian crisis, mass displacement or emigration would have serious humanitarian consequences for Ecuador and the receiving countries.

Visuals produced by Ciro Murillo.

Correction: In footnote 8, the title of the expert interviewed was changed to reflect his current affiliation.

Conflict Watchlist 2026