The recent territorial clashes within Myanmar’s Brotherhood Alliance signal a shift toward Beijing

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The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)’s offensive against the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), marked by the capture of the TNLA-held town of Kutkai, is not merely an isolated intra-Brotherhood Alliance clash over territory. Rather, it reflects a broader strategic realignment by the MNDAA toward Beijing and exposes weakness within the alliance under mounting pressure from Beijing.  

The fighting between MNDAA and TNLA, both members of the Brotherhood Alliance, over the weekend from 14 to 15 March, subsided after four days of negotiations on 20 March. Having suffered significant losses, the TNLA agreed to cede control of Kutkai town to the MNDAA. The scale and coordination of the MNDAA’s operations suggest a deliberate realignment of control over key economic corridors in northern Shan state — particularly the Lashio-Muse trade route, the main artery linking lowland Myanmar to China’s Yunnan (see map below). Despite the agreement, tensions remain high, and further clashes — either renewed MNDAA-TNLA fighting or spillover involving other resistance groups — are likely if the MNDAA pursues further territorial ambitions.

Ever since the Brotherhood Alliance seized large swathes of territory from the military in late 2023 and 2024 during Operation 1027, multiple armed groups — including the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), MNDAA, TNLA, and ethnic militias — have maintained a presence in Kutkai. The town is strategically located along the Lashio-Muse road, between the MNDAA-held town of Hseni and the Muse border zone, which is jointly controlled by members of the Brotherhood Alliance.

Kutkai township has a significant ethnic Kachin population. Since Operation 1027, when the TNLA began administering the town, there has been friction between the TNLA and local Kachin communities, as well as periodic confrontations between TNLA and KIA soldiers. While these tensions have never escalated into armed clashes, recent disputes between the TNLA and the MNDAA led to an armed confrontation. 

Several smaller-scale clashes and reciprocal arrests occurred between the MNDAA and TNLA prior to this latest armed confrontation. Tensions intensified on 13 March when TNLA forces blocked unilateral MNDAA attempts to install CCTV systems in Kutkai town. TNLA leaders cited unresolved disagreements over governance arrangements, while the MNDAA accused the TNLA of initiating hostilities. The MNDAA also restricted the flow of goods and fuel into TNLA-controlled areas. On 14 March, the MNDAA launched coordinated assaults on at least five TNLA positions in Kutkai township, deploying hundreds of troops and conducting drone strikes. The MNDAA also removed TNLA flags from shared-control zones, including the 105-mile Muse border area. By 16 March, the MNDAA had seized control of Kutkai town, and the TNLA had reported heavy casualties and about 100 missing personnel.

In the weeks preceding the clashes, the TNLA sought mediation from Beijing and the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC), a political coalition led by the United Wa State Army, but these efforts yielded no results. China’s response appeared restrained; reports indicate that Beijing discouraged FPNCC intervention while maintaining silence during the offensive, despite high-level engagement with Myanmar’s military authorities on border stability.¹ The FPNCC’s inability to act has exposed weak intra-alliance cohesion under pressure from Beijing. The rapid reopening of the Lashio-Muse route following the fighting supports an assessment that the operation aimed to evict the TNLA from the area. Beijing views the TNLA as being more closely aligned with anti-coup resistance groups and prefers working with the MNDAA, which is ideologically closer aligned with China and recently distanced itself from these groups, and the Myanmar military.²

The MNDAA’s control of Kutkai could exert further pressure on TNLA positions in strategically significant areas such as Namhkan town and villages near Lashio and Mogoke towns. A consolidation of the MNDAA’s influence along the trade corridor — alongside potential tacit accommodation of the Myanmar military’s priorities — would align with China’s ongoing preference for stable and compliant actors controlling it.³ In the near term, the loss of the TNLA’s position along the Lashio-Muse route is likely to constrain resistance groups’ logistics, mobility, and coordination, while improving the military’s access and operational flexibility in northern Shan state.