Ukraine has carried out a successful attack on Russia’s military logistics in three phases of escalation by responding to Russia’s adaptations and making use of cheap drones.
Beginning in early 2026, Ukraine has pursued a medium-range strike campaign against Russia’s military logistics in the occupied south. Starting with a relatively low volume of strikes on radar and air defense systems, the campaign evolved to focus on vehicles along the R-280 road corridor before expanding to include bridges and fixed crossings that link the occupied mainland to Crimea, as well as rail, port, and energy infrastructure. This was a shift from interdicting movement to dismantling the network that carries it.
The campaign’s forward logic is adaptive, and as Russia shifts its operations from the struck routes, Ukrainian attacks follow. This is already happening with Russia’s latest adaptations: Pontoon crossings constructed at damaged bridges have themselves come under Ukrainian fire in June, while strikes on vessels in the Sea of Azov in July have undermined alternate sea routes. It is highly likely that, given the campaign’s current dynamics and concentration, it will continue over the coming months. Should Russia be unable to restore air defenses over the next three to six months, the campaign can be expected to continue, given the outsized disruption that the strikes achieve compared to the limited troop, technological, and financial outlay.
For this report, “road corridor” is defined as a 20 km buffer zone on the R-280, and an additional 10 km buffer on fixed road crossings that link the occupied mainland to Crimea. In total, Ukrainian forces carried out 361 attacks (Battles and explosions/Remote violence) within this zone during the period of 1 January to 30 June 2026. Target categories were coded from event notes.
The R-280 highway, renamed the “Novorossiya” by Russian occupation authorities, is a critical route for Russian military logistics in occupied southern Ukraine. It is a 700-kilometer coastal road running from Rostov-on-Don in Russia, through Mariupol, Berdiansk, and Melitopol into Crimea (see map below). It is specifically important since the 2022 Ukrainian attack on the Kerch bridge, which resulted in heavy and hazardous cargo such as fuel being barred from being transported across the bridge. Russians currently use the corridor to supply both the southern front and the Crimean garrison.
The R-280 highway has been a key target in Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian military logistics in the occupied south, which it has been carrying out since the beginning of the year. A recurring pattern in this campaign is that it is not simply the sustained interdiction of a single road; it is a progression through Russia’s supply network in three phases:
The figure below shows the monthly distribution of Ukrainian strikes by target category across the three phases.
The escalation was not steady. Strike activity dropped significantly during the middle weeks of May, before spiking at the end of the month. During this window, Russia closed the R-280 to military traffic, implemented convoy escorts, and restricted when and how military vehicles moved along the route.
A crucial factor in all of this is that Ukraine’s targeting campaign follows Russia’s adaptations. As Russia adapted, Ukrainian forces responded by shifting from targeting vehicles to breaking the entire network that carried them. In June, Ukraine began targeting bridges, rail infrastructure, and energy infrastructure, and expanded strikes against vehicles. When Russia closed the R-280 and A-291 to military traffic and moved to secondary routes, Ukrainian forces struck bypass roads and bridges in Novoazovsk and Volodymyrivka. Similarly, as Russian forces began moving supplies by rail, Ukrainian forces began targeting this route as well.
The trend continued in July, when Ukrainian forces increased the intensity of maritime attacks. Between 1 and 25 July, ACLED records Ukrainian attacks on at least 200 vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, targeting shadow fleet tankers, ferries, and support vessels, including those used to supply occupied Crimea, as well as those moving sanctioned oil to international markets. These strikes forced a temporary suspension of navigation on the Don-Azov Canal and a sharp reduction in traffic across the Kerch Strait.
ACLED records Ukrainian strikes on Russian logistics across the occupied south, mainly in Crimea (122), the Zaporizhzhia region (118), the Donetsk region (97), and the Kherson region (25). In June, the campaign focused on fixed crossings, with Henichesk at its center – out of 14 recorded attacks on the city between January and June, eight happened in June (see graph below). Satellite imagery corroborates the damage to these crossings, including Henichesk and Chonhar, as well as damage to pontoons Russia had been constructing, including a new route via the Arabat Spit that had, as of early July, not been struck.
This campaign has been carried out as a drone war of attrition against a road network. Nine in 10 recorded strikes are drone strikes, and in the second quarter of this year, Ukraine carried out these strikes nearly every day. Reportedly, around 10 Ukrainian drone units of roughly 5,000-8,000 personnel are targeting the supply network of an estimated 250,000-300,000 Russian soldiers.
The economics explain the campaign’s sustainability. Ukrainian forces are reportedly using mainly cheap, domestically produced loitering munitions and anti-bridge drones that cost less than 50,000 US dollars, compared to an estimated $2 million for a Storm Shadow cruise missile. The high cost per strike that made the 2023 Chonhar cruise missile strikes unsustainable has been substantially reduced, as the volume of strikes in Henichesk and Vladyslavivka in June demonstrates.
Over the coming one to three months, Ukrainian forces are likely to continue attacks on Russia’s supply network by following how Russia adapts to replacing crossings, railways, and sea routes. The practical implication is that Russia’s resupply to Crimea and the southern front is likely to become slower, more expensive, and less predictable. Three factors will shape the extent to which this will happen.
Targeting of replacement crossings: Ukrainian forces are closely following Russia’s adjustments. Pontoon crossings at Chonhar and Dzhankoi came under fire within days of construction, and the remaining test is the new Arabat Spit route, which Ukrainian forces are likely to try to attack. Should this attack be successful, Russia’s remaining options for moving supplies into Crimea will be limited to the Armiansk and Perekop detour, which is longer and more expensive but also predictable and therefore easy to attack.
Continuation of Ukrainian attacks on rail and sea pathways: The increase in Ukraine’s targeting of railways in June and strikes on Sea of Azov tankers in early July are both examples of how Ukrainian forces follow Russia’s adaptations. This trend is likely to continue as well, for two reasons. First, as fixed crossings are damaged, Russia is forced to route more supplies by rail and water, which in turn makes them valuable targets. Second, unlike a bridge, shipping can’t be disabled by a single successful strike, and hence, to suppress this kind of movement, Ukrainian forces would need to strike it repeatedly. Strikes on Russian vessels in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea led to a temporary suspension of navigation on the Don-Azov Canal and a significant cut in traffic across the Kerch Strait.
Rebuilding of Russia’s air defenses: The continuation of this campaign is possible because Ukrainian forces have continuously degraded Russia’s air defenses in the south. If Russia manages to rebuild this cover, Ukrainian drones are more likely to be intercepted, and the campaign’s tempo could be reduced. It is unlikely that Russia will be able to fully rebuild its air defense in this area in the next one to three months, but it could implement localized improvements around key crossings.
Visuals produced by Christian Jaffe.
ACLED’s Ukraine Conflict Monitor provides near real-time information on the ongoing war, including an interactive map, a curated data file, and weekly situation updates. It is designed to help researchers, policymakers, media, and the wider public track key conflict developments in Ukraine.
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