Report
United behind the ceasefire even as divisions loom: Gulf countries navigate US-Iran talks
Despite finding renewed unity in supporting the ceasefire, countries in the region are divided in their positions toward Iran
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The ceasefire between Washington and Tehran has led to a gradual cessation of Iran’s direct attacks on Gulf countries, while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has found renewed unity on urgent political demands. However, differences over what to demand from Iran and uncertainty surrounding regional security guarantees linger, shaping intra-Gulf positions in ongoing US-Iran talks and presenting the potential for Gulf actors more distant from Iran to act as spoilers in negotiations.
The ceasefire started on 8 April with a dramatic escalation when Iran targeted energy infrastructure across all Gulf countries — except Oman. Marking a shift in tactics, Tehran focused its strikes predominantly on Saudi Arabia, targeting Petroline, the east-west crude oil pipeline linking Saudi oil fields to the Yanbu terminal on the Red Sea. This was the largest coordinated attack on oil infrastructure since the beginning of the conflict (see graph below). It targeted several nodes of Riyadh’s energy infrastructure and slashed oil production by 600,000 barrels per day.1
Iran justified its attacks primarily in relation to Lebanon, in a final attempt to extend the ceasefire’s scope to the entire region. This posture was subsequently abandoned, and Tehran engaged in talks despite continued Israeli operations on that front.
Yet the attacks have also sent a strong message to the Gulf states. Throughout the conflict, GCC states have found themselves vulnerable to Iranian coercion: Exports were curtailed by disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, while Iran targeted critical infrastructure with direct strikes. The attack on Riyadh’s Petroline underscores that even alternative export routes remain within Iran’s reach — a weakness that is further compounded by the risk of Houthi attacks in the Red Sea. It also suggests that Tehran has so far exercised restraint, while retaining the capacity to escalate and inflict greater damage.
The attacks on 8 April marked a last spasm of violence, after which hostilities subsided. On 9 April, the GCC welcomed the US-Iran ceasefire agreement.2 Three key areas garnered broad consensus from all Gulf countries: preserving the ceasefire, restoring freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, and bringing the conflict to a lasting end. But despite this common ground, their stark differences on long-term strategic issues are likely to influence how these countries approach ongoing US-Iran talks.
Across the GCC, positions toward Iran span a spectrum. Oman and Qatar are closest to Tehran and prioritize dialogue. During the conflict, Oman — the country that has been the least targeted by Iran (see map below) — maintained open channels with Tehran. After the initial shock of the attacks on Ras Laffan, Qatar has moved to reopen diplomatic channels with Iran.3 Both countries are expected to proactively support the talks through mediation and back-channel diplomacy, while also promoting confidence-building measures.
At the other end of the spectrum, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and Bahrain remain the most distant from Iran. They suffered the highest number and the most successful amount of strikes. Abu Dhabi remains firm in demanding long-lasting guarantees for regional stability beyond a nuclear deal — including the dismantling of Iran’s long-range capabilities and proxy networks.4 If the US pursued a minimal deal, the UAE and Bahrain — which finds itself increasingly under Abu Dhabi’s sphere of influence — may potentially play a spoiler role by slowing negotiations and weakening the deal’s legitimacy without prompting a resumption of the conflict. That said, a recent call between UAE Vice President Shaykh Mansur bin Zayid al-Nahyan and Iran’s parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf may suggest pragmatic hedging behavior alongside potential spoiler dynamics.5 In the mid-term, these three countries could deepen security cooperation with Israel and increase financial pressure on Iran.
Positioned somewhere in between is Saudi Arabia. Closely aligned with Pakistan, the key mediator in the ceasefire talks, it has supported the negotiation track.6 Iran’s 8 April strikes have sent a clear message to Riyadh, renewing concerns about US security guarantees and reinforcing incentives for de-escalation. In the midst of the ongoing war, Saudi Arabia’s regional competition with the UAE is only temporarily on hold, making strengthened GCC security cooperation a distant prospect. Therefore, Saudi Arabia’s priority appears to be supporting the talks, with the minimum aim of reopening the Strait of Hormuz and securing guarantees against direct attacks.
Visuals produced by Ana Marco.
