US hard power turns to Latin America and the Caribbean

On 2 September, the United States targeted a vessel carrying what it said were Tren de Aragua members, killing 11 people in the Caribbean Sea’s international waters, off the Venezuelan coast. The attack marked a significant shift in US policy in the region toward the use of hard power. It followed months of speculation about potential US military actions, and became the first of what now total 21 strikes that have killed over 80 people.

Since taking office on 20 January, President Donald Trump has expanded US military presence through Operation Southern Spear, deploying the USS Gerald R. Ford aircraft carrier in the Caribbean and jets in Puerto Rico (see timeline below).¹ The military buildup appears to target Venezuela, with the US authorizing CIA-led ground operations in the country.² The US has notably accused Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro of leading the Cartel de los Soles, an alleged criminal group that the US State Department has designated a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).³ A total of 14 criminal groups have been designated as FTO since February.

Although the US administration has framed these operations as efforts to curb the drug trade, the use of hard power may be more about pressuring governments to align with its foreign policy goals, which range from curbing migration flows to entering economically advantageous arrangements amid growing Chinese engagement in the region. Trump made this new approach evident months before his presidency, threatening to “take back” the Panama Canal in response to China’s influence over the strategic waterway, a threat he reiterated in February. 

The Trump administration has since extended its pressure to governments whose political or ideological positions diverge from Washington. It notably threatened to impose 30% tariffs on Mexican goods to force tougher migration enforcement and operations against criminal groups.⁴ In Brazil, Trump raised tariffs to 50% in response to the prosecution of far-right former President Jair Bolsonaro, and it conditioned its financial support to Argentina on the victory of ally President Javier Milei in legislative elections. Divergent positions on Operation Southern Spear also prompted swift retaliation: After President Gustavo Petro criticized the deadly strikes, the US imposed sanctions against Colombian officials and decertified anti-drug programs.

Rising US pressure reinforced the spread of militarized security policies and discourse across the region. This trend comes in response to worsening violence driven by the diversification of criminal economies, heightened competition among armed actors, and the internationalization of organized crime. Hardline approaches to gang violence are not new and have gained increasing popularity across the region, notably in Jamaica, El Salvador, and Honduras. However, the US shift in rhetoric from a law enforcement to a counter-terrorism framework spurred further emulation with countries like Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago following suit and declaring criminal groups terrorist organizations. 

The US depriorization of human rights — through the slashing of foreign aid funds and the use of strikes characterized by human rights bodies as extrajudicial executions,⁵ — combined with the spread of militarized security discourses, has already translated into deadlier use of force in 2025. Throughout 2025, at least nine countries saw rising lethality in clashes between non-state armed groups and state forces (see map below), including Brazil, where Operation Containment in Rio de Janeiro killed over 120 suspected gang members. 

US influence set to fuel more militarized security and violence in 2026

Washington's increased pressure in Latin America and the Caribbean aims to reassert the US as the dominant economic player in the Western Hemisphere and secure access to the region’s resources, staving off Chinese influence by promoting the emergence of US-aligned governments.

Much of the attention on US policy has converged on its efforts to trigger regime change through military intervention in Venezuela, an objective shared by segments of the US administration. Deployments of assets and reports of military briefings outlining possible scenarios for a land operation have raised concerns about the likelihood of such intervention, which would have severe effects on domestic violence levels and destabilize security in neighboring countries. 

Despite the rhetoric, it remains unclear how such an intervention may materialize. The US Congress appears fractured on the legality of US strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific, which could hamper the Trump administration in seeking funding and a longer-term military engagement. Trump also faces mounting public pressure to prioritize domestic crises. Still, Trump may be hoping that the mere threat of a land invasion will turn up the pressure on the Venezuelan government and lead Maduro to step down. 

Beyond Venezuela, the US will continue targeted operations and strikes in the region, while exerting significant influence through international channels such as the Haiti Gang Suppression Force (GSF). The GSF will be a test case for multilateral intervention and its potential application elsewhere. On the one hand, such initiatives could exacerbate tensions between the US and regional governments, as public concerns over the US’ growing influence rise — Ecuadorians notably rejected the return of a US military base in a referendum on 16 November. On the other hand, they allow Trump to further project himself as a champion of regional stability.

Militarized responses to organized crime are likely to spread further as governments adopt tough-on-crime measures and resort to emergency powers, particularly in countries that have recently gone to the polls, such as Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras, or, like Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, and Brazil, are heading into elections in 2026. In these countries, organized crime and militarized discourses around security will remain at the center of the electoral debate. While “mano dura” proposals remain largely driven by domestic political calculations and the popularity of El Salvador’s Bukele model, the prospect of favorable relations with Washington may enable regional leaders to further commit to strong-handed security responses. In addition, the US might seek to influence electoral outcomes, as seen in Argentina and Honduras, through diplomatic and economic pressure to sway the electorate toward a US ally.

Yet, growing US pressure on these governments to align with its interests carries considerable risks. Hardline security policies could deepen conflicts in the region, as the US continues to promote a militarized “war on crime” agenda, and are likely to lead to continued deadly violence. States of emergency and mano dura policies have at times coincided with reductions in violence, but in some cases, a crackdown on criminal groups has also contributed to the fragmentation of armed groups. In Mexico, for instance, the arrest of Sinaloa Cartel leader El Mayo in the US in July 2024 contributed to igniting one of the Sinaloa Cartel’s deadliest internal conflicts. 

Armed groups have also demonstrated considerable adaptability in the face of heightened pressure, at times shifting to low-visibility tactics, escalating into targeted operations against security forces, or adjusting their illicit activities, including switching from maritime to aerial transport or redirecting drug-trafficking routes. Armed groups have increased their use of explosive-laden drones in several countries, such as Colombia and Mexico. If states respond with indiscriminate, militarized tactics, civilians will face heightened risk of exposure. In Colombia and Haiti, the deployment of airstrikes and drones has raised mounting concerns about civilian casualties, including children.⁶ 

At the same time, the mano dura model carries the risk of shifting a landscape previously dominated by non-state armed groups into one where state actors return as the primary perpetrators of violence, as witnessed in El Salvador. The use of military force during law enforcement operations may normalize extrajudicial killings and abuses in the year to come. Ecuador stands as a case in point, with reports of forced disappearances at the hands of the military increasing significantly.⁷ As the US deprioritizes human rights, lowers the costs of rights violations, and rewards militarized responses, Latin American and Caribbean leaders may be more lenient in their use of force in 2026, contributing to the wider erosion of democratic checks without any guarantee of sustainably curbing the expansion of criminal activity across the region. 

Visual produced by Ciro Murillo.

Conflict Watchlist 2026