Violent escalation in Jonglei threatens South Sudan’s peace agreement

South Sudan has been experiencing a rapid security deterioration since late 2025, after clashes between government and opposition forces broke out in parts of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity State, as well as parts of the Equatoria region. Between 1 December and 23 January, this violence has reportedly killed at least 200 people, including no less than 40 civilians, in Jonglei state alone. Over 230,000 are reported to have left their homes in Jonglei in less than a month.¹

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) and its allied Nuer-majority militias — especially the White Army — have seized towns and government positions (see map below), forcing government troops into tactical withdrawals. Ahead of a planned offensive, which the government has dubbed Operation Enduring Peace, the South Sudanese army — formally known as South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF) — ordered all civilians, United Nations personnel, and humanitarian staff to evacuate the opposition-held Lou Nuer counties of Nyirol, Uror, and Akobo in Jonglei State. Heavy clashes occurred on 26 January on the outskirts of Yuai town as the SSPDF pushes ahead to regain lost territory. 

This recent escalation in fighting has come on the back of a series of unilateral decisions made by President Salva Kiir as the country anticipates holding its first-ever elections in December this year. Worth noting is the recent dismissal of Interior Minister Angelina Teny and the continued detention of her husband, First Vice President Riek Machar, who was arrested in March 2025 over charges including treason and murder over his alleged involvement in the fall of an SSPDF base to the White Army. Opposition members loyal to Machar view these actions as deliberate breaches of the 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) and its power-sharing arrangements, which are directly eroding the remaining institutional restraints and pushing armed opposition groups back to the battlefield. 

The elections scheduled for December are meant to end the extended transitional period set out in the R-ARCSS. The opposition, as well as several Western governments, claim that Kiir’s unilateral reshuffles and decisions, including deferring the permanent constitution and population census to after 2026,² are destabilising South Sudan to extend his hold on power.³ The SPLM/A-IO faction loyal to Machar continues to insist that these prerequisites are essential for credible polls and views the current process as rigged in the government’s favour.⁴

The deteriorating political and security situation has been matched by increasingly incendiary rhetoric by both opposition and government figures that points to further escalation and threatens to collapse the R-ARCSS. Opposition commanders have issued threats to march on the capital, Juba, which is protected by the SSPDF and thousands of Ugandan soldiers.⁵ Another peace agreement, signed between the government and rebels aligned with General Simon Gatwech’s SPLM/A-IO’s Kitgwang faction, is on the verge of collapsing after Gatwech announced the fall of Pajut town, in Jonglei State, into rebel hands on 16 January.⁶ For their part, the SSPDF have responded with threats to crush rebels and recapture the lost territory.⁷ 

A sustained deterioration in the political and security landscape would not only directly affect local populations in areas such as Jonglei State. Both the government and opposition forces have traded accusations of weaponizing cattle raids to spread terror in enemy territory. The emergence of other rebel groups, such as Operation Rescue South Sudan and the Red Belt Group, threatens further expansion and fragmentation of the conflict landscape.⁸ Uganda’s support to the SSPDF, which the opposition claims is enabling inter-ethnic conflict in South Sudan,⁹ further highlights the dangers of a regional spillover.

The 2018 peace agreement seems to have lost almost all credibility and appears to be no longer viable in its current form. Without swift, robust mediation and the release of Machar and other political detainees, the December elections, were they to proceed, would be more likely to exacerbate division and accelerate violence than to restore stable governance.

Visuals produced by Ciro Murillo.