Africa Overview: July 2026

Cameroon: The US explores security cooperation in the Far North region

Following increased military involvement across the border in Nigeria since late 2025, the United States has begun exploring ways to expand its military cooperation with Cameroon’s security forces in the Far North region, where the Islamic State West Africa Province and Boko Haram (JAS) frequently retreat and regroup when fleeing from security forces’ offensives in Nigeria. In June, the US sent an envoy led by Deputy Chief of Mission in Cameroon John Robinson and Commander of the US Special Operations Command Africa Major General Claude Tudor. The US military mission follows a May meeting between President Paul Biya and Lieutenant General John William Brennan, Deputy Commander of the US Africa Command. Increasing joint operations between the two countries is likely to lead to greater intelligence sharing, airstrikes, deployment of US soldiers, materiel support, and increased training for the Cameroon military, as evidenced by the US military engagement in neighboring Nigeria.

The US government’s moves come as security developments in June point to the potential for the spread of insurgent operations within Cameroon following a rise in insurgent violence in the Mayo Tsanaga division, located in the south of the Far North region. Here, the insurgents targeted civilians, looted goods, and raised funds through kidnapping for ransom. ACLED data for June records the most violence in this department since July of last year, when suspected JAS militants conducted a widespread offensive against military forces in the area. Given Mayo Tsanaga’s location along the border with the North region, any sustained escalation in the division risks spilling into areas that have so far remained more stable.

Ethiopia: Election day triggers a record-high number of battles in Amhara region

In an effort to disrupt voting during Ethiopia’s election, which was held on 1 June, rebel groups in Amhara and Oromia announced road closures. Although the full extent of the disruption in these regions remains uncertain, the blockade did obstruct transport links between pivotal urban centers in Amhara for one day, on 29 May. The Amhara Fano National Movement (AFNM) launched “Operation Ayisha Seid” on election day, triggering more than 90 clashes with security forces across the Amhara region. More fighting took place on election day than on any other day since the conflict between the Fano militias and the government began in 2023. The fighting subsided the following day but continued throughout the month. 

Concurrently, in Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) — also known as the Oromo Liberation Front-Shane (OLF-Shane) — engaged in clashes with the state but did not initiate a wide range of operations on election day. On 1 June, ACLED records nine armed clashes between OLA/OLF-Shane and security forces, mostly in the East Wollega zone. The group also attacked mostly Orthodox Christian civilians and destroyed over 200 properties in Aseko woreda in the Arsi zone. The attack began a day prior, on 31 May, when members of OLA/OLF-Shane attacked residents and clashed with Oromia regional state riot police and kebele militias in Teleta Chefa kebele of Aseko woreda.

After election day, political violence returned to normal levels in both the Amhara and Oromia regions, and is expected to continue as before. It is normal for the AFNM to initiate a new round of operations and fight with security forces for a few days, then for the battles to subside.  

Niger: Parallel JNIM and ISSP offensives turn Tillaberi into key arena for jihadist rivalry

Over the past month, western Niger became the main battleground for competition between Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), as both groups intensified their attacks to expand and consolidate their areas of influence. The succession of large-scale attacks in June demonstrates not only the ability of each jihadist group to conduct coordinated operations but the strategic importance of western Niger as a crossroads connecting different conflict zones in the central Sahel and coastal West Africa.

ISSP carried out simultaneous large-scale attacks on military positions in In-Ates and Banibangou on 17 June. The group overran military camps; inflicted heavy losses among the Nigerien military; and seized large quantities of weapons, vehicles, and other military equipment. These attacks highlighted Tillaberi as the group's most important area of operations and further strengthened the group’s position in the Mali-Niger borderlands, where it has steadily expanded and consolidated its presence in recent years. 

Meanwhile, JNIM sought to capitalize on its successful attacks on military camps in Garbougna and Kirtachi during the offensive it launched in May. The group followed up with an attack on Niamey Airport on 18 June that was repelled by military and security forces. Subsequently, JNIM  launched coordinated assaults on Makalondi, Torodi, and Diagourou on 30 June alongside simultaneous attacks in Sebba, Solhan, and Gayeri in neighboring Burkina Faso. 

All of the previously mentioned JNIM attacks, except the one in Diagourou, were successfully repelled. Burkinabe authorities claimed that they had killed at least 400 militants and seized more than 250 motorcycles and 353 weapons. Despite the apparent failure of the offensive, these operations reflect the group’s ongoing effort to reduce the remaining pockets of state control while consolidating its position along the Niger-Burkina Faso border. As both groups continue to expand and consolidate their areas of influence, western Niger is likely to remain the main battleground for competition between JNIM and ISSP. However, the outcome of this rivalry will likely define the trajectory of jihadist violence well beyond Niger, impacting neighboring Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, and northwestern Nigeria.

Nigeria: June marks one year of elevated banditry-related violence in Sokoto state

June marked one year of elevated violence in Sokoto state, which has faced an escalation of armed banditry and spreading insurgent violence by ISSP since July 2025. Over the past year, ACLED records over 900 reported fatalities in the state, more than double the recorded total for the 12 months prior. 

In June, fatalities as a result of armed bandit operations escalated due to clashes with security forces and attacks on civilians, including a fatal attack on Tudu Village of Isa Local Government Area on 6 June, which reportedly killed 13 farmers. This case was particularly concerning as the group, which operates in the Sububu Forest, was reported to act under the leadership of Kachalla Chimmo, a bandit leader whom Nigerian military forces claimed to have killed in December of 2025. This is not the first such instance, however; Nigerian military forces have previously made unsupported claims regarding the killing of armed group leaders. The Sububu Forest is a strategic site for several armed groups and is a key corridor for the movement of goods and militants between Sokoto and Zamfara states. Collectively, banditry-related violence resulted in June being the deadliest month in Sokoto state since ACLED began recording violence in 1997.

Somalia: A dispute over a constitutional amendment turns violent in Mogadishu

On 3 June, heavy armed clashes erupted in Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, between Somali state security forces and armed militias, including defected members of the Somali National Army (SNA) who are aligned with the opposition Somali Salvation Forum (SSF). The violence was triggered by escalating political tensions between the government and the SSF, which is headed by former President Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, over a controversial constitutional amendment that granted sitting President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud a one-year term extension after his mandate expired on 15 May.

Clashes began in the Hawl Wadaag district near the residences of former President Ahmed and former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, a member of the SSF, before spreading to the Abdiaziz, Hodan, Wardhigley, and Daynile districts. Fighting persisted overnight into 4 June and ultimately ceased after successful negotiations between Khaire and the director of the National Intelligence and Security Agency to halt hostilities. As there is still no consensus on the proposed universal suffrage between the opposition group and the government, there is a high probability that similar violence will again erupt in the country. Currently, tensions are high between the federal government and the Puntland president, who is also a member of the SSF. Military deployments indicate that both sides are gearing up for a possible confrontation. 

Sudan: Drone strikes increase in North Kordofan

In June, North Kordofan remained the epicenter of contestation between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), as a volatile campaign of drone strikes counterbalanced the complete cessation of ground fighting. ACLED records more than 50 drone strikes across North Kordofan, which resulted in over 110 reported fatalities — around a 70% increase in reported fatalities from drone strikes compared to the previous month. 

The vast majority of these strikes were concentrated in the Sheikan locality and were driven by a strategic contest to control the state capital, El Obeid. Although the city remains under SAF control, the RSF has recently mobilized en masse in and around the Sheikan locality, likely to besiege El Obeid. This troop buildup appears to mirror the RSF's operational playbook during the rainy season in 2025, and it will likely limit its operations to drone strikes around El Obeid while prioritizing cutting the SAF supply route through the El Obeid-Kosti road, aiming to isolate and exhaust SAF forces in Kordofan by the end of the rainy season in October. In an effort to disrupt this mobilization, the SAF has aggressively targeted RSF troops and facilities, while the RSF has simultaneously deployed drone strikes against SAF bases and critical civic infrastructure, including fuel stations and power networks. Both sides will sustain a war of attrition rather than one intended to gain full control, leading the conflict into a prolonged siege with severe humanitarian consequences.