Africa Overview: September 2025

Cameroon: Boko Haram escalates border attacks

With Boko Haram becoming increasingly reliant on kidnapping for ransom, civilian targeting more than doubled last month in the Extreme North region. In one such incident on 14 August, insurgents abducted around 50 passengers aboard a transport bus on the Kousseri road in the Diamaré department, releasing most of the travelers after they paid ransoms. This increase comes as Nigerian military offensives push the insurgents into Cameroon and away from key areas of influence in Nigeria. Civilian targeting last month expanded in the Mayo-Moskota district of Cameroon, but was highest in Kolofata district, an area near the Nigerian border that is consistently plagued with hit-and-run violence and livestock theft. 

Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province insurgents frequently use the porous borders between Cameroon and Nigeria to retreat from one side of the border to the other. While military forces in the Lake Chad region have historically collaborated to reduce spillover violence from one country to another through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), relations have been strained after Niger left the mechanism in March 2025 and Chad threatened to leave in late 2024. Recognizing the effect of these strained relations, MNTJF Major General Godwin Mutkut stressed the need for further collaboration between military forces during an assessment of insurgent use of waterways last month.¹ 

Democratic Republic of the Congo: M23 rebels continue their fatal campaign of targeting civilians

Despite the ongoing peace processes involving the Congolese and Rwandan governments and the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group, the M23 continued a deadly campaign targeting civilians in North and South Kivu provinces in August. Many attacks occurred near strongholds of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group with many members of the former Rwandan regime that led the 1994 genocide.² The M23 began attacking civilians near Virunga National Park and continued into areas of North and South Kivu in August, including the killing of at least 41 people in the Binza groupement between 30 July and 8 August. The civilians targeted included people working as farmers and ethnic Hutu, with many summarily executed using machetes and rifles.³ The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights claimed this campaign was conducted alongside Rwandan military forces (RDF), although the Rwandan government rejected this allegation.⁴ 

Since taking over vast areas of North and South Kivu provinces, the M23 has shifted toward increased civilian targeting as the rebels attempt to govern the area. The M23 has reportedly killed at least 470 civilians since the start of this campaign in July, with the reported number of civilians killed by the M23 in 2025 already exceeding all those recorded during the initial years of the rebellion between 2021 and 2024.

Mali: The years-long siege of Farabougou culminates in JNIM overrunning the army base

On 19 August, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) militants attacked the Malian army base in the village of Farabougou, Niono cercle, Segou region. As they overran the base, militants killed about 10 soldiers and captured five, looted weapons and ammunition, and set fire to the site. After capturing the base, JNIM fighters launched a punitive expedition in Farabougou, reportedly targeting Dozo self-defense militiamen.⁵ Militants then remained in the area for several days. The Malian armed forces (FAMa) did not intervene until 22 August, when they carried out air and ground operations in the area of Farabougou. The event marked the most serious security failure in the almost five-year siege of Farabougou. 

The attack on Farabougou was the centerpiece of a broader and coordinated JNIM offensive in central Mali. On the same day, militants overran a military position in Biriki-Were and shelled the Goma-Coura military camp.⁶ They also detonated an IED targeting a Malian army vehicle moving between Biriki-Were and Goma-Coura. The night before, JNIM had already attacked security force positions in Kassela, Koulikoro region, killing two people, including a toll gatekeeper and a forest guard.⁷ The siege of Farabougou began in October 2020, when JNIM accused Dozo self-defense militiamen of abusing Fulani villagers. Militants retaliated by abducting dozens of residents who were on their way to the Dogofry weekly market, leading to clashes between Dozos and jihadists. JNIM then besieged Farabougou, blocking food and goods and threatening neighboring communities. By capturing Farabougou and simultaneously attacking other targets, JNIM demonstrated both its capacity to coordinate operations and the difficulties Malian forces face in responding across multiple fronts. The Farabougou conflict, once a local dispute, has expanded into a broader struggle that undermines both community defense and state intervention in central Mali.

South Sudan: Elite competition erupts into violence in Central Equatoria state

In August, the growing political divide in the country gave way to escalating violence in Central Equatoria state between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO), headed by First Vice President Riek Machar, and the South Sudanese Armed Forces (SSPDF) under President Salva Kiir. While the military and SPLM-IO contested one another in Central Equatoria, ethnic Murle militias and the National Salvation Front (NAS) also increased their involvement in the violence within Central Equatoria by carrying out a string of civilian targeting and battles against military forces. The rising involvement by the NAS followed calls by their chairperson, Thomas Cirillo Swaka, for increased collaboration with the SPLM-IO in July.⁸

The violence last month in Central Equatoria reached the highest level since prior political divisions between Kiir and Machar resulted in a spike in battles in mid-2016, before South Sudan’s 2018 peace agreement. President Kiir — facing growing personal health challenges — has largely dismantled the 2018 peace agreement by ousting or diminishing the power of several senior government, military, and ruling party leaders.⁹ The SPLM-IO accuses government forces of systematically targeting and detaining figures affiliated with the opposition coalition.¹⁰ 

Sudan: Fatalities due to civilian targeting increase in North Darfur 

North Darfur, and specifically in and around the capital city, El Fasher — the last stronghold of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in Darfur — has become Sudan’s most violent hotspot as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attempt to consolidate control. Reported civilian fatalities from targeted violence rose by more than 50% in August, with civilians in North Darfur accounting for around 120 of the more than 230 reported deaths. Since May 2024, the RSF has besieged El Fasher and has been clashing with the SAF and its ally, the Darfur Joint Forces, for control of the city. Fighting has intensified since February, when the RSF set up a parallel government in its territories¹¹ and the SAF consolidated power in central Sudan.

Between 12 and 24 August, the RSF shelled the Abu Shouk IDP camp seven times, resulting in at least 44 reported fatalities. On 16 August, the RSF shelling killed between 19 and 34 civilians and wounded at least 13. The RSF also abducted 40 individuals when they entered the camp after the shelling. The violence targeting civilians extended beyond the camp. On 17 August, RSF drones and artillery targeted a food aid distribution site in El Fasher city. At the end of August, the RSF intercepted, abducted, and killed an unknown number of civilians fleeing the city. 

Civilians have also been heavily targeted in Kordofan as the RSF and SAF vie for control. In August, ACLED records at least 48 fatalities in West Kordofan, mostly caused by RSF attacks in al-Nahud city — including an attack on the al-Nahud Hospital on 9 August that killed 12 people. Additionally, on 6 August, the RSF killed 27 abductees who could not pay ransom. It is a common tactic for RSF members to abduct civilians for ransom. 

Tanzania: Tensions in the ruling CCM party lead to violence

Ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) finalized its roster of candidates for the October general elections on 23 August.¹² Selection was based initially on canvassing members' views on candidates at the constituency level, which took place in early August, before a final selection process that depended on approval at various levels of the party’s political leadership. Though the selection process is always competitive, this year saw notable outbreaks of violence at various locations. Violence during CCM’s candidate selection process is unusual, even if protest is not. 

Constituency-level processes in early August saw two candidates abducted by supporters of their opponents, five incidents of mob violence, and one violent demonstration involving CCM members clashing over the selection process. While some incidents are likely related to local rivalries, others reflect tensions that have emerged within CCM under the party’s chair, President Samia Suluhu Hassan. 

This year’s trouble reflects a party that is not at ease, with President Samia Suluhu Hassan under significant pressure internally. In Simiyu and Tanga regions, CCM members protested the deselection of sitting members of parliament, one of whom was a minister of long standing.¹³ In June, street demonstrations by the supporters of a rebellious CCM parliamentarian, Josephat Gwajima, were broken up by police, while a former senior party official, Humphrey Polepole, has been actively opposing Hassan online since July.¹⁴ Both have taken issue with state actions against opposition activists, including the jailing of Tundu Lissu, the most prominent opposition leader, on treason and sedition charges.¹⁵ Repression has resulted in the opposition having no effective candidates for the presidency this year. Ironically, this may also be feeding into power struggles within CCM, and may damage Hassan.