Asia-Pacific Overview: April 2026

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Fighting resumes after a brief ceasefire

Fighting between Afghanistan and Pakistan resumed on 26 March, as a temporary ceasefire announced over Eid lapsed. The renewed fighting was restricted to the border regions as the conflict entered its second month. In early April, the two countries held preliminary talks in China, where they agreed to continue discussions toward a comprehensive agreement.¹

Throughout March, clashes between Pakistani and Afghan Taliban forces spanned the length of the disputed Durand Line, engulfing all but two border provinces. Pakistani warplanes struck targets in 11 Afghan provinces. On 16 March, a Pakistani airstrike on Kabul city hit the Omid drug rehabilitation center, killing at least 269 people. Pakistan claims the attack targeted an Afghan Taliban ammunition depot.²

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s response in March expanded beyond ground attacks on Pakistani border posts to include the use of drones. These appear to be commercially available drones, modified to carry a small load of explosives.³ Between 27 February and 3 April, ACLED records 12 instances of Afghanistan using drones, resulting in at least six civilian injuries. Most incidents occurred in Pakistan’s border provinces, though one strike reached Rawalpindi, about 10 kilometers south of the capital city of Islamabad. Their limited impact suggests that these drone attacks remain as yet largely experimental. However, their use will only grow given the cost-effectiveness, and as their capabilities become more sophisticated over time. Their ability to reach as far as Islamabad is already significant. 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Myanmar: Coup leader set to assume presidency amid increasingly deadly airstrikes

On 3 April, Myanmar’s military-controlled legislature installed coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing as the president, tightening his hold on power.⁴ Min Aung Hlaing’s appointment was made possible after he retired from serving as commander-in-chief of defense services. He gave that job to his closest confidante, General Ye Win Oo, who was previously the commander-in-chief of the army and a chief of military intelligence.⁵ Ye Win Oo’s intelligence experience could lead to institutional recalibration, with a greater emphasis on surveillance, targeted operations, and network disruption, alongside deploying conventional force.

However, the recent military-run elections and reshuffles do not signal any major change in the military’s hard-line approach to fighting armed groups. The military will likely sustain or increase its pressure — particularly through coordinated ground offensives and airpower — aimed at coercing resistance groups into signing ceasefires on the military’s terms. Min Aung Hlaing will also retain leadership influence through the new Union Consultative Council and his protégé Ye Win Oo.⁶ Indeed, while airstrikes remained at similar levels to recent months, with 241 events recorded in March, the number of people killed by these strikes soared to more than 400 — 65% more than any other month since the 2021 coup. Both civilian areas and resistance positions were subject to intense airstrikes, as the military attempted to stabilize territory and enable the convening of state-level parliaments.

See our latest report, The recent territorial clashes within Myanmar’s Brotherhood Alliance signal a shift toward Beijing, and more of ACLED’s coverage on Myanmar.

Pakistan: Separatist activity escalates in Balochistan

In March, separatist violence in Pakistan’s Balochistan province reached its highest level in recent years. This escalation was driven by an increase in smaller-scale attacks, including hit-and-run attacks on security posts and ambushes on army convoys, rather than any single high-profile incident. Militants also maintained a blockade on a section of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor route between 9 and 12 March. While roadblocks by separatists are common in the province, the prolonged duration of this blockade is notable, and comes amid a growing appetite among militants for capturing public spaces. The increase in violence also follows the killing of nearly 150 militants by Pakistani forces during operations in late January-early February, underscoring the challenges of countering militancy in this vast and rugged region.

The upswing in militant activity comes amid concerns of the potential for the Iran war to exacerbate insecurity, and may be a sign of militants seeking to exploit increased international attention on this region to draw focus on their long-running insurgency. Separatist militants operate on both sides of the border, and instability in Iran could facilitate militant movement and arms smuggling into Pakistan. In mid-March, the national and provincial governments agreed to deploy additional paramilitary forces in the province.⁷ 

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Pakistan.

Philippines: ​​Rido violence erupts in BARMM and Soccsksargen

Several days of heavy fighting marked the beginning of March in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) and the neighboring Soccsksargen region, as tensions related to rido, or clan blood feuds, boiled over. The fighting made March 2026 the most violent month for rido-related violence since ACLED began recording it in 2018.

In Soccsksargen, five people in Midsayap town were killed in the fighting between rival clan militias on 3, 4, and 6 March. Three of the people killed were civilians caught in the crossfire. The fighting was triggered by a feud between rival clans that escalated when each side supported opposing candidates in the May 2025 elections.⁸ The clashes displaced nearly 5,000 families from their homes.⁹

Separately in BARMM, rival clans affiliated with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) also engaged in a multi-day firefight in Shariff Saydona Mustapha town from 1 to 4 March. Four MILF members — two each from the feuding factions — were wounded in the fighting on the first day, while thousands of affected civilians evacuated to safer areas.¹⁰

Long-standing patterns link rido violence to both electoral competition and MILF factional disputes. These incidents underscore growing risks to the BARMM peace process, compounded by repeated postponement of the first-ever BARMM parliamentary election.¹¹ Growing frustration within the MILF, along with persisting clan enmities, are compounded by the easy recourse to arms for members of the erstwhile rebel group. The complete decommissioning of the MILF’s weapons is premised on the fulfillment of the polls, in accordance with the MILF’s 2014 peace agreement with the government.¹² In late March, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. finally signed a law resetting the BARMM polls for September 2026.¹³

See more of ACLED’s coverage on the Philippines.

Thailand: The insurgent activity in the Deep South escalates during Ramadan

Thailand’s Deep South grappled with a renewed escalation in the scale and intensity of violence during the 2026 Ramadan period, between 19 February and 20 March. While Ramadan has historically coincided with spikes in insurgent activity by Malay Muslim separatists (MMS), this year the spike was far larger than the routine seasonal increase: Violence soared by approximately 150% in 2026, compared to 60% last year.

During this year’s Ramadan, MMS ramped up direct engagements with state forces and targeted attacks on state infrastructure and officials. MMS insurgents and state forces clashed at least five times in March, including one firefight between a Joint Special Operations Unit — comprising military personnel, rangers, and Border Patrol Police — and MMS insurgents on 16 March in Pattani province, resulting in two reported fatalities. Insurgents also targeted local officials in the region, assassinating an assistant subdistrict headman in Yala. MMS continued sabotaging the state's CCTV infrastructure in March, particularly across Narathiwat and Yala, while increasingly using choley bomb IEDs, devices often concealed in or attached to motorcycle sidecars, to evade detection.¹⁴ 

The persistence and expansion of MMS activity comes despite heightened security measures such as increased checkpoints and patrols to coincide with Ramadan,¹⁵ suggesting both tactical adaptation and deliberate timing. While the surge aligns with the symbolic significance of Ramadan, it also likely exploits gaps in coordination during a period of government transition following the February national elections. Overall, the scale, coordination, and lethality of attacks point to evolving insurgent capabilities aimed at sustaining pressure on state forces beyond the Ramadan period.

See more of ACLED’s coverage on Thailand.