Asia-Pacific Overview: December 2025

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Continuing militancy threatens the fragile ceasefire

The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), a faction of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is taking on a more assertive role in carrying out attacks. Last month, it executed two high-profile suicide bombings: the 11 November attack outside a courthouse in Islamabad, and the 24 November attack targeting a paramilitary headquarters in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s provincial capital of Peshawar. The Islamabad blast, which resulted in the deaths of at least 12 civilians, was the first suicide bombing against civilians in Pakistan’s capital city in a decade. Notably, the TTP central leadership distanced itself from the attack, consistent with its messaging against attacks that are likely to cause significant civilian casualties.¹ An assertive JuA may weaken internal discipline within the TTP, which has been a key factor in its resurgence. 

Meanwhile, on 10 November, Jaish-ul-Hind (JuH) militants captured a cadet training college in Wana town for two days, holding more than 600 cadets and teachers hostage.² Security forces killed all eight militants involved during their clearing operation. Given the complexity of the assault, it is highly unlikely that the newly formed JuH acted without support from the more established TTP or Hafiz Gul Bahadur group. This suggests that these groups are making a strategic choice to keep a lower profile in light of the conflict with Afghanistan in October. However, looking at overall levels of Islamist militancy in November, that skirmish failed to significantly impact militant activity.

Pakistan claimed that Afghan nationals were involved in all three attacks. This provided the pretext for airstrikes in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces on 25 November, violating the Qatar and Turkey-mediated ceasefire reached in October.³ While Pakistan officially denied the strikes,⁴ United Nations sources seemingly confirmed them and claimed that at least 10 civilians, mostly children, were killed.⁵ Despite these strikes, Afghanistan and Pakistan reportedly resumed Saudi-mediated talks in early December.⁶

Bangladesh: Political violence rises ahead of the 2026 general elections

In November, political violence increased by more than 50% in Bangladesh compared to the month prior on the back of heightened political tensions. On 17 November, a special tribunal sentenced former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to death, after a trial held in absentia, for crimes against humanity related to her government’s crackdown on last year’s anti-government demonstrations. Hasina dismissed the verdict as “politically motivated charade.”⁷ In the run-up to, and after, the judgment, supporters of her party, the Awami League (AL), announced a nationwide shutdown and staged demonstrations.⁸ Rioters set fire to vehicles and exploded crude bombs outside police stations and properties associated with interim leader Muhammed Yunus. ACLED records over 100 such incidents of rioting, demonstrations and peaceful protests by AL supporters in seven of the country’s eight divisions — indicating the party’s continued ability to mobilize despite the ban on its political activities.⁹

Meanwhile, violence targeting political party members killed at least 10 people, mainly Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) supporters, as election campaigning got underway. Most of the incidents were linked to internecine violence, with different BNP factions competing for dominance. As the other major party in Bangladeshi politics, the BNP is the party best-positioned to benefit from the AL’s downfall. Factional violence within the BNP may emerge as the real contest for power if it does not face much opposition from other political parties. Both developments — the AL’s show of strength over the verdict and deadly infighting within the BNP — have set the stage for turbulent elections in February 2026.

India: ​​Suicide bombing in New Delhi triggers a security crackdown in Jammu and Kashmir 

On 10 November, a Kashmiri doctor carried out a suicide bombing near the historic Red Fort in New Delhi, killing at least 14 people. The assailant had links with both the Kashmiri separatist group Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) and the al-Qaeda-affiliated Ansar Ghazwat-ul-Hind,¹⁰ and the bombing may have been triggered in panic, after intelligence agencies raided a JeM cell in neighboring Haryana state.¹¹ In a worrying sign for the future trajectory of Kashmiri militancy, this was the first major attack by Kashmiri separatists in mainland India since the raid on the Pathankot airbase in 2016, and one of the first known attacks involving white-collar workers.¹²

In response, security forces launched a crackdown in the Kashmir Valley, detaining nearly 100 people for questioning.¹³ Police also demolished the family residence of the suicide bomber in Pulwama,¹⁴ one of at least 11 such extrajudicial demolitions of militants’ family residences recorded by ACLED in Jammu and Kashmir in 2025 alone. UN human rights experts have previously condemned this practice of extrajudicial demolitions, colloquially known as “bulldozer justice.”¹⁵ Additionally, explosives recovered from the raid in Haryana accidentally detonated inside a Srinagar police station, resulting in nine fatalities. 

Coming months after the Pahalgam attack, the latest bombing further undermines the Indian government’s claims of normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir after the end of its semi-autonomous status in 2019.¹⁶ A heavy-handed securitized approach may risk increasing alienation among the local population, a troubling dynamic given that the Delhi assailants were all local militants.

Myanmar: Political repression tightens as the military’s so-called elections approach

The Myanmar military ramps up arrests as it presses ahead with its plans to hold elections starting from 28 December. These elections, held over three phases, are widely seen as a sham designed to entrench military power amid ongoing conflict while excluding democratic parties and maintaining tight control over the electoral process, the media, and its use of repression. 

The military has intensified its use of the Election Protection Law — legislation that criminalizes activities deemed to oppose or disrupt the elections — to silence opposition. At least seven civilians, including three film directors, were arrested for posting anti-election content on social media or reacting to posts that criticized an election propaganda film between 24 October and 4 November. On 20 November, two protesters detained for hanging anti-election posters were sentenced to nearly 50 years in prison. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, at least 117 civilians have been arrested since the Election Protection Law was enacted in July.¹⁷

The military also coerced civilians into attending rallies for its proxy political party, often stoking local tensions and provoking violence. One of the most violent incidents occurred on 14 November, when a man stabbed and injured a party member from the military-proxy Union Solidarity and Development Party after she attempted to force villagers to join a party rally. This incident is part of a broader pattern of public resistance to the elections, which has included the destruction of voter lists and party posters, and the attacking of officials when they are being coerced. Election-related violence is likely to escalate as the military pushes ahead despite widespread opposition from both civilians and resistance groups. 

Papua New Guinea: ​​Violence between supporters of rival candidates mar local elections 

Election-related violence in Papua New Guinea became deadlier in November. At least 13 people were killed in clashes among supporters of rival candidates in Enga, Morobe, Jiwaka, and Western Highlands provinces during and in the aftermath of local-level government (LLG) elections held between 27 October and 8 November. Fighting broke out as a result of controversial election results and tensions arising from the selection process for councilor-appointed LLG presidents following the elections.

In Enga, members of the Kirapan tribe ambushed a convoy that the sitting Kompiam LLG president was riding in near Wabag on 9 November, fatally shooting his wife. Then, in Morobe on 12 November, Gena and Nayalo villagers clashed with Fareng villagers over the newly elected Fareng ward councilor seeking support from other councilors for the LLG presidency. The fighting left three people dead, nine injured, and several homes burned.

Further violence occurred on 18 November in Jiwaka Province, where supporters of a candidate from Kana Konjap clashed with others from the Takipkane and Kumpak communities over vote counting, resulting in one death. In the Western Highlands, post-election celebrations on 20 November escalated into clashes that killed five people and destroyed over 20 houses over two days.¹⁸ The communal nature of these incidents highlights the importance of clan and tribal networks rather than formal political party policies in PNG’s LLC elections,¹⁹ which often amplify existing intercommunal and intertribal tensions.

Philippines: Divided opposition stems momentum of anti-corruption protests

On 30 November, protests erupted across the Philippines amid continuing outrage over revelations of widespread corruption linked to flood control and other infrastructure projects. The nationwide mobilizations were a sequel to a similar effort on 21 September, representing the latest peak in a spate of protests in the Philippines. ACLED records a more than 170% increase in demonstrations from 1 September to 28 November compared to the three months prior. The demonstrations have targeted power across the ruling divide: During this period, 12% of protests went beyond anti-corruption calls and specifically condemned President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., Vice President Sara Duterte, or both.

The 30 November demonstrations brought out fewer people than the 21 September protest amid the growing divide in the opposition over whether to seek Marcos’ resignation. Nationwide, the two largest sites of protests were the same ones from September, both in the National Capital Region: a protest led by leftist groups in Luneta Park, Manila,²⁰ and a protest led by the center-left alliance along the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City.²¹ While both groups are critical of both Marcos and Duterte, the left has called for both to resign and sought the installation of a transitional council, while the center-left alliance has sought accountability without making resignation calls — wary of the potential installation of Duterte as Marcos’ constitutional successor. The debate rages amid fears of a military junta, which both the left and center opposition oppose.²²

Nevertheless, Marcos appears in full control, with much tougher security measures preventing the outbreak of violence similar to the kind seen on 21 September.²³ The president’s spokesperson also emphasized the government's efforts to secure accountability over the corruption scandal.²⁴ Meanwhile, pro-Duterte groups also held their own demonstrations on 30 November, calling for Marcos’ resignation days after Duterte affirmed she is ready to take power if Marcos steps down.²⁵